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", he denies it with reference to what is dissociated from consciousness, and affirms it with reference to what is associated with consciousness. To the question "Is it wholesome?", he affirms it with reference to what is dissociated from consciousness. The same method applies to the subsequent questions about unwholesomeness. 740. But when asked "Having an object?", he desires only what is entirely without an object, therefore he denies it. "When consciousness is breaking up" means when consciousness is breaking up, then karma breaks up. Or, "when consciousness is breaking up" is in the locative sense. Or this is the reading. There, since what is associated breaks up, but what is dissociated does not break up, therefore he both affirms and denies. 741. "In karma, is there accumulation of karma?" means when there is karma, there is accumulation of karma, or when karma is established, there is accumulation of karma, and from the accumulation of karma, result arises. But when that karma ceases, the accumulation of karma remains until the arising of the result, like a seed until the sprouting of a shoot, such is Tissa's view, therefore he affirms it. "Is that the same karma, that the accumulation of karma, that the result of karma?" Because in karma there is accumulation of karma, and that remains until the arising of the result, such is Tissa's view, therefore he asks them about the oneness of the three. "Is the result having an object?" he asks to challenge that even the result, like the dhamma of the result, is dependent on an object. But the other, based on his view, affirms one and denies one. The same method applies in reverse. The rest here should be understood as in the text. Explanation of the Discussion on the Accumulation of Karma. The Fifteenth Chapter. The Third Fifty is completed. 16. The Sixteenth Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discussion on Restraint 743-744. Now there is the discussion on restraint. There, if those who have attained power and mastery in the world cannot restrain the mind of another, what is their attainment of power, what is their mastery? Indeed, they control the minds of others through the power of attainment and mastery, according to the doctrine of some, like the Mahasanghikas. Referring to them, the question "Does one control another?" is for the proponent, the affirmation for the opponent. Here, "controls" means prevents from falling into defilements. The rest here is to be understood just as in the Pāli. The same method applies to the discussion of support. Explanation of the Discussion on Control. 3. Explanation of the Discussion on the Non-Production of Happiness 747-748. Now, there is the discussion called "Non-Production of Happiness." Here, based on the sutta, "Indeed, the Blessed One is the destroyer of many happy states for us" (M. ii, 148), the question "Does one not produce happiness for another?" is according to the doctrine of some, like the Hetuvadins. Referring to them, the question is for the proponent, the affirmation for the opponent. But when asked "Does one not produce suffering?", not seeing such a sutta passage, he rejects it. In the question "One's own happiness, etc.," that which is one's own or another's, cannot be produced. That which is one's own, what is the meaning of "non-production" there?, he rejects. In the question "Neither one's own, etc.," that which is of such a nature, is not fit to be called "not produced," he affirms according to his doctrine. But this is not said because of the absence of happiness such as that experienced by the initiated. The statement "destroyer of happy states" indicates that the Blessed One is a condition for the arising of happiness in others, not the non-production of happiness like that of food and the like; therefore, it is not valid. Explanation of the Discussion on the Non-Production of Happiness. 4. Explanation of the Discussion on Comprehending Attention 749-753. Now, there is the discussion called "Comprehending Attention." Here, attention is twofold, in terms of method and in terms of object. Here, having seen the impermanence of even one phenomenon, "all phenomena are impermanent," attention in terms of method occurs in the remaining ones. But attending to a past phenomenon, one cannot attend to a future one. Attending to one of the past, etc., attention in terms of object occurs. Here, attending to a present phenomenon, with whatever mind he attends to it, he attends to that in the present moment. He is not able. There, those who, relying on the statement "all conditioned things are impermanent," etc., hold the view that "one who attends to (things) gathers, grasps, and collects all conditioned things together and attends to them," like the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas; regarding them, the question is from the proponent of his own doctrine, the assertion from the other. Now, since by attending to all things together, the mind with which he attends to them, that too must be attended to. Therefore, to challenge him with that mind, he says, "with that mind?" The other, intending that it is not possible to know by making it an object, denies it. However, knowing that such is the nature of the mind, he asserts that that mind too is known. Or, he denies that it is its object. He asserts based on the view arising from statements like "all conditioned things are impermanent, when one sees with wisdom." The same method applies to the remaining two questions. However, in "by that contact," etc., not seeing such a sutta, he simply denies it. In the questions about the past, etc., the denial and assertion should be understood in the manner stated below. The rest is conveyed as in the Pāli itself. The statement "all conditioned things," etc., is stated with reference to seeing according to principle, not with reference to being an object in one moment; therefore, it is not valid. Explanation of the discourse on attending by gathering. 5. Explanation of the Discourse on "Form is a Cause" 754-756. Now, there is the discourse called "Form is a Cause." There, "cause" is a name for the roots of good, etc., and also for the cause of a cause, and also for any condition whatsoever. But without making this distinction, those who, relying merely on the statement "the four great elements are the cause," hold the view that form is the cause without distinction, like the Uttarāpathakas; regarding them, the question is from the proponent of his own doctrine, the assertion from the other. "Is non-greed a cause?" he asks, "is form a cause designated as non-greed?" The other denies it. The same method applies to the rest. Here, in "the great elements are the cause of derived form as the condition," the state of being a cause is stated in the sense of a condition, not in the sense of a root; therefore, it is not valid. Explanation of the question "Is form with a cause?". 757-759. In the question "Is form with a cause?", the meaning should be understood in the same way as above. Explanation of the question "Is form with a cause?". 7. Explanation of the question "Is form wholesome or unwholesome?". 760-764. Now, there is the question "Is form wholesome or unwholesome?". Here, relying on the statement "bodily action and verbal action are both wholesome and unwholesome," those who hold the view that bodily intimation and verbal intimation, which are classified as bodily and verbal action, are both wholesome and unwholesome, such as the Mahisasakas and Sammitiyas; regarding them, the question "Is form wholesome?" is a thesis of one's own side, and an admission of the other. Then, to challenge them, saying, "If form is wholesome for you, it must be of such and such a nature," he begins with "with an object," and so on. The same method applies to the subsequent question about unwholesomeness. The rest here is straightforward in meaning. Explanation of the question "Is form wholesome or unwholesome?". 8. Explanation of the question "Is form a result?". 765-767. Now, there is the question "Is form a result?". Here, those who hold the view that just as mental states arising from the performance of an action are a result of that action, so too is form arising from the performance of an action a result, such as the Andhakas and Sammitiyas; regarding them, the question is from one's own side, and the admission is from the other. Then, to challenge them, saying, "If form is a result for you, it must be of such and such a nature," he begins with "associated with pleasant feeling," and so on. The rest is explained according to the text. Explanation of the question "Is form a result?". 9. Explanation of the question "Is form belonging to the form realm or the formless realm?". 768-770. Now, there is the question "Is form belonging to the form realm or the formless realm?". Here, those who hold the view that since form arises from the performance of an action in the sense-sphere, it is in the sense-sphere, therefore, form arising from the performance of actions in the form and formless realms must be in the form and formless realms, such as the Andhakas; regarding them, the question "Is there form belonging to the form realm or the formless realm?" is a thesis of one's own side, and the admission is from the other. The rest here is explained in the same way as above. Explanation of the question "Is form belonging to the form realm or the formless realm?". 10. Explanation of the Discussion on Being Included in the Form and Formless Realms 771-775. Now, the discussion is: "Is attachment to form included in the form realm? Is attachment to the formless included in the formless realm?" Here, since attachment to sensual pleasures is included in the desire realm, therefore, those who hold the view that attachment to form and the formless should also be included in the form and formless realms respectively, like the Andhakas, regarding them, the question is by the proponent of one's own view,