English
Therefore, here the first question is for the opponent, the assertion for the proponent of his own doctrine, referring to the absence of a volition aiming at accomplishment. Then the opponent thinks that "he is fixed in wrongness" simply because the action is a matricide, etc., and is commanded. Therefore, he asks the question, "And is it fixedness in wrongness?" But the proponent of his own doctrine, referring only to the non-transgression of two fixednesses by one person, denies it with "No." "Is that action," that is, the action of matricide, etc. Therein, the assertion "Yes" is for the proponent of his own doctrine, referring to an unfixed command. For even when an unfixed command has been put into effect, Regret certainly arises, remorse certainly occurs. "If so," etc., is said by the opponent, taking only the arising of regret, to establish their doctrine. 661. Now, taking the same person for whom the opponent has refuted the abandonment of fixed destiny, even though they are subject to unfixed command and immediately liable to punishment, the question "Is a person immediately liable to punishment incapable?" is asked by the proponent of their own doctrine, and the affirmation is made by the other, according to their own view. Then, to rebuke them, the proponent of their own doctrine says, "An incapable person is one who commits matricide, etc. Did you commit those actions?" starting with "The mother was deprived of life." The other, not seeing such an action due to the absence of those facts, denies it with "No, indeed." "Having withdrawn that action" is said referring to the action under unfixed command. For that is said to be withdrawn by one preventing the command, "Lest they do what I commanded." Because it is withdrawn, regret is warded off here, and remorse is warded off. Even so, the opponent, thinking it is fixed due to the previous command, affirms with "Yes." Then, having made them acknowledge the withdrawn nature of that action, and having established their own doctrine, the proponent of their own doctrine says, "If so," etc. 662. Again, "Immediately liable to punishment" is a question by the opponent, as in the first question in the concluding question, and the affirmation is by the proponent of their own doctrine. "Did you not do that action?" is the inquiry by the opponent, and the affirmation is by the proponent of their own doctrine, referring to the time of execution before the time of withdrawal. Taking only the fact of prior execution, the establishment of doctrine with "If so" is by the opponent, in terms of unfixed command. But this doctrine, being established unwisely, remains unestablished. Explanation of the Discourse on One Immediately Liable to Punishment. 4. Explanation of the Discourse on the Fixed and the Inevitable 663-664. Now, there is the discourse on the fixed and the inevitable. There are two kinds of inevitability: the inevitability of wrongness, which is an immediately ripening action, and the inevitability of rightness, which is the Noble Path. Having established these two kinds of inevitability, And there is no other law. Indeed, all the remaining Three-world phenomena are called unfixed. One endowed with them is also unfixed. But a Bodhisattva, Declared by Buddhas with their power of knowledge, "This being will attain enlightenment in the future," Is called fixed due to the abundance of merit. Thus, taking this mere convention, "A Bodhisattva in his last existence Is capable of realizing the Dhamma in that birth," With this intention, "The fixed one transcends the law," Is the doctrine of some, Like the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas; Regarding them, the question is from the proponent, The assertion from the opponent. "Fixed in wrongness," etc., Is said to show the absence of another law For one fixed by another law. "Having developed the path previously," etc., Is said to show the variety of laws. "Mindfulness," etc., Is said to show the variety of Dhamma Within even one law. The statement "Capable Bodhisattva" Merely indicates the capability of the Bodhisattva, Not the transcendence of the law by the fixed one, Therefore, it is not probative. For he, previously unfixed by even one fixed Dhamma, Transcends the law by seeing the truth at the Bodhi tree. Explanation of the discourse on the fixed one's law. 5. Explanation of the Discourse on the Obscured One 665-667. Now, there is the discourse on the obscured one. Therein, since the pure one has no need for purification, "The one obscured, covered, and enveloped by hindrances Abandons the hindrances," Is the doctrine of some, Like the northerners; Regarding them, the question "Obscured?" is from the proponent, The assertion from the opponent. "The passionate one, passion," etc., Is said to show the fault in the abandonment of hindrances By the obscured one. "Completely pure, utterly cleansed," etc., Is said to show the complete purification Of one purified by temporary suppression. "Knowing and seeing thus," etc., Indicates the destruction of defilements Of one who knows and sees, Not the abandonment of hindrances by the obscured one, Therefore, it is not probative. Explanation of the discourse on the obscured one. 6. Explanation of the Discourse on the Confronted One 668-670. Now, there is the discourse on the confronted one. Therein, "confronted" means confronted by the fetters. He attained agreement with them. Here, this is just like a conversation that has ceased. Explanation of the Discussion on Experiencing. 7. Explanation of the Discussion on One Who Has Attained and Experiences 671-673. Now, there is a discussion called "One who has attained and experiences." There, relying on the statement "Having attained the first jhāna, he abides, and he savors it," etc. (A.N. 4.123), the view of those, like the blind, is that "One who has attained experiences, and for him, there is delight in jhāna, and jhāna is the object." Regarding them, the question "Does one who has attained experience?" is from the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is from the other. Seeing the question "Is that jhāna the object of that jhāna?" as not being the object of itself at that time, he rejects it out of fear of contradicting the Sutta, and he affirms it merely by the statement "He savors it." The Sutta "He savors it" means that one who has attained jhāna, having arisen from jhāna, savors the taste of jhāna, not that there is delight in jhāna and jhāna as the object only within attainment itself; therefore, it is not probative. Explanation of the Discussion on One Who Has Attained and Experiences. 8. Explanation of the Discussion on Unsatisfying Lust 674. Now, there is a discussion called "Unsatisfying Lust." There, in the Sutta "Whatever feeling one feels, whether pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, he delights in and welcomes that feeling" (M.N. 1.409), it is stated in terms of delighting in what is seen. Relying on the statement "He delights," the view of those, like the northerners, is that "Even in painful feeling, there is delighting in terms of the taste of lust. Therefore, there is unsatisfying lust." Regarding them, the question "Is there unsatisfying lust?" is from the proponent of his own doctrine. There, unsatisfying lust means attachment to painful feeling, thinking, "Oh, may it be just this for me!" "Yes," the affirmation is from the other, in accordance with the view held. The rest here is just straightforward in meaning. 675. But in the Sutta "He delights in that feeling," by turning it around, there is no arising of lust focusing on painful feeling alone. However, by grasping the aggregate, one who regards the characteristic of feeling, or painful feeling itself, as self, there is conceit of view. If one approves of feeling when seeing, approves of the change into painful feeling, overwhelmed by painful feeling, even desiring sensual pleasure as its opposite, one still approves of painful feeling. Thus, there is approval of painful feeling, is the meaning. Therefore, this is not proof that there is no delight in what is unpleasant. Explanation of the Discussion on No Delight in What is Unpleasant. 9. Explanation of the Discussion on the Undetermined Nature of Dhamma-craving 676-680. Now, there is the discussion on the undetermined nature of Dhamma-craving. Among these six cravings, namely, craving for form... ...Dhamma-craving, since the very last craving is called Dhamma-craving, therefore, it is undetermined, according to those whose view it is, such as the Pubbaseliyas; with reference to them, the question is by the proponent of one's own doctrine, the assertion by the other. The meaning of the remaining questions is clear from the text. The six cravings are summarized and shown in three sections, beginning with craving for sensual pleasure. For, craving that arises in the six objects, namely, form, etc., due to the enjoyment of sensual pleasure, is craving for sensual pleasure. Craving accompanied by the eternalist view, "The self and the world will exist," is craving for existence. Craving accompanied by the annihilationist view, "It will not exist," is craving for non-existence. But does not the term Dhamma-craving indicate the arising of craving in relation to a Dhamma-object, not its undetermined nature? Therefore, it is not proof. Explanation of the Discussion on the Undetermined Nature of Dhamma-craving. 10. Explanation of the Discussion on Dhamma-craving Not Being the Origin of Suffering 681-685. Now, there is the discussion on Dhamma-craving not being the origin of suffering. Here too, since it is called Dhamma-craving, therefore, it is not the origin of suffering, according to those whose view it is, such as the Pubbaseliyas themselves; with reference to them, the question is by the proponent of one's own doctrine, the assertion by the other. The rest is just like the previous discussion.