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just as the Mahāsaṃghikas; referring to them, the question "one endowed with psychic power might last for an eon" is for the proponent of his own view. There, an eon is threefold: a great eon, a part of an eon, and a life-span eon. For here, in "These four, monks, are the incalculable periods of an eon" (A.N. 4.156), only the great eon is called an eon. In "The lifespan of the Brahmakāyika gods is an eon" (A.N. 4.123), it is a part of an eon. In "He suffers in hell for an eon, he rejoices in heaven for an eon" (Cūḷava. 354), it is a life-span eon. A life-span eon means the determination of life, either by way of the result of karma or by way of a calculation of years, the limit of life. Among these, he asks referring to the great eon, the other affirms. Then the proponent of his own view, "If you are endowed with psychic power, 'he who lives long lives a hundred years or a little more' (S.N. 2.143), thus a limited life-span eon might live upwards to a great eon or a part of a great eon, there must be a life made by psychic power," to challenge him, says "is that life made by psychic power" and so on. The other, "The life faculty is not made by psychic power." It rejects it, because it was said that "there is no cause, it is only the result of action." What is the difference here for one with psychic power? Surely, even one without psychic power could live for a lifetime? This is the difference: One with psychic power, by repelling with psychic power those things that cause interruption to the continuation of life, is able to prevent untimely death in the interim, but one without psychic power does not have this power. This is the difference between them. "Past and future," this is to challenge, since it was asserted that it would last for a kalpa without distinction. "Two kalpas," etc., is said for the purpose of challenging, "If one with psychic power is able to exceed the limit of life, not only for one, but for many kalpas could one last." "Arisen contact," etc., is said to show that not everything is obtained by psychic power, there are also things beyond the scope of psychic power. The rest here is of obvious meaning. Explanation of the Discourse on Psychic Power. 8. Explanation of the Discourse on Concentration 625-626. Now, there is the discourse on concentration. There, for those who, even if a single moment of thought arises, do not take singleness of mind as concentration in the sense of composure, but relying on the statement "he dwells experiencing bliss uninterrupted for seven days and nights," etc., hold the doctrine that "a stream of consciousness is concentration," just as the Sarvāstivādins and the northerners do; with reference to them, the question "is a stream of consciousness" is for one's own side, the assertion is for the other. Then, to challenge him, "if a stream of consciousness is concentration, a stream of consciousness is also past, and also future. Indeed, a single present thought is not called a stream of consciousness, so are all of them concentration?" he said "past," etc., the other, not wanting to agree, rejects it. "Surely, the past is ceased," etc., is said to show that "in a stream of consciousness, only the present thought is effective, the past and future are non-existent because they are ceased and unarisen, how can that be called concentration?" "A single moment of thought" is the question for the opposing side. Then, since in one's own tradition, in "develop concentration, monks," etc., the attainment of present wholesome thought, Concentration, unification, is called samādhi, referring to that, the Sakavādin makes his claim. "Concomitant with eye-consciousness" etc., is said with deceit, grasping only the word "single moment of consciousness," and is thus refuted by the Sakavādin himself. "Indeed, it was said by the Blessed One," the sutta proves the uninterruptedness of samādhi as it flows from beginning to end, not the state of samādhi as a continuous entity, therefore, it is not evidence. Explanation of the Discourse on Samādhi. 9. Explanation of the Discourse on the Stability of Dhamma 627. Now, there is the Discourse on the Stability of Dhamma. Therein, relying on the statement "that element remains stable," those whose doctrine is that "there exists a stability of Dhamma, known as dependent origination, and it is fully accomplished," like the blind men; referring to them, the Sakavādin asks, the other makes his claim. Then, to challenge him, "if there exists another fully accomplished stability of Dhamma for fully accomplished things like ignorance, etc., and by that stability of Dhamma, another stability is also fully accomplished," he says, beginning with "by that stability." The opponent rejects it, due to the absence of such a doctrine. Asked a second time, he claims it, referring to the condition of contiguity and the condition of reciprocity. The rest is clear in meaning, as it was explained below. Explanation of the Discourse on the Stability of Dhamma. 10. Explanation of the Discourse on Impermanence 628. Now, there is the Discourse on Impermanence. Therein, those whose doctrine is that "the impermanence of impermanent things like form, etc., is fully accomplished, like form, etc.," like the blind men; referring to them, the Sakavādin asks, the other makes his claim. Then, to challenge him, "if that impermanence is fully accomplished, like those forms, etc., there must be another fully accomplished impermanence for it," he says, beginning with "by that impermanence." The other, denying the existence of two impermanences together, claims it again, because that impermanence is not permanent, and therefore disappears together with the impermanent thing. Then, the Sakavādin, without giving him any chance for evasion, The second impermanence is affirmed, and by that also, beyond that, imputing the fault of non-cessation in a continuous series, he says "by that, by that itself," and so on. "Old age is fully accomplished," and so on, is said in the way of applying the divisions of impermanence, since there is no other impermanence than old age and death for that which has arisen. Even there, the opponent's affirmation and rejection should be understood in the same manner as before. 629. "Form is fully accomplished," and so on, is said for the purpose of associating with those for whom that impermanence exists. There, thinking "just as there is impermanence, old age, and death for forms, etc., that are fully accomplished, so there are not those for impermanence, etc., that are fully accomplished," he rejects it entirely. Explanation of the Discourse on Impermanence. Eleventh Chapter. 12. Twelfth Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discourse on Restraint and Action 630-632. Now, there is the discourse called "Restraint and Action." There, based on the sutta "Having seen a form with the eye, he is a taker of signs, he is not a taker of signs," for those whose doctrine is that "restraint and non-restraint are also action," such as the Mahasanghikas, the question is addressed to the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the affirmation to the other. Then, to challenge him that just as the volition called "action" in one's own system, as it occurs at the doors of body, speech, and mind, obtains the name of bodily action, etc., so "if your restraint is action, it too, as it occurs in the eye-faculty, etc., should obtain the name of eye-action, etc.," he says "is eye-faculty restraint eye-action?" and so on. The other, not seeing such a sutta passage, rejects it at the four doors, and at the fifth body door, he rejects it with reference to the sensitive body, and affirms it with reference to the communicative body. For he considers both the sensitive body and the communicative body to be the body-faculty. At the mind-door also, he rejects it with reference to the resultant door, and affirms it with reference to the action door. The same method applies to non-restraint. The sutta "Having seen a form with the eye" only indicates restraint and non-restraint at those doors, not its nature as action. therefore, it is not probative. The Explanation of the Topic of Restraint. 2. The Explanation of the Topic of Action 633-635. Now, there is the topic called the topic of action. There, relying on the sutta passage, "Monks, I do not say that intentional actions..." (A. X, 217), those whose doctrine is that "all action has results," like the Mahāsaṃghikas; to them, the Teacher said without distinction that intention is "action," "Monks, I say that intention is action" (A. VI, 63); and that is both wholesome and unwholesome, having results, while the indeterminate is without result. To show this distinction, the question "Is all action?" is for the proponent of one's own view, the affirmation for the other. Again, the denial in the question "Is all intention?" is to be understood as referring to the indeterminate, the affirmation as referring to the wholesome and unwholesome. "Result, indeterminate," etc., is said to show the intention that has results and the intention that does not have results in its own form. The rest here is easy to understand. The sutta "Monks, I do not say" is said with reference to the experience of results in the here-and-now, etc., when there is a condition; therefore, it is not probative. The Explanation of the Topic of Action. 3. The Explanation of the Topic of Sound as Result 636-637. Now, there is the topic called the topic of sound as result. There, taking improperly the passages, "Because of doing, accumulating, increasing, and magnifying that action, he has a Brahma-like voice," etc. (D. III, 236), those whose doctrine is that "sound is a result," like the Mahāsaṃghikas; to them, to show that "only immaterial phenomena arising from action obtain the name 'result.' But this usage does not exist in material phenomena," the question is for the proponent of one's own view, the affirmation for the other.