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23), since one possessing mundane morality cultivates the supramundane path, therefore, those whose view is that "he is endowed with two kinds of morality, namely, the former mundane and the supramundane at the moment of the path," such as the Mahāsaṅghikas themselves, regarding them, the question is by the proponent of one's own doctrine, the assertion by the other, concerning the components of the path. Then, to challenge him, "If he is endowed with two kinds of morality, mundane and supramundane, in one moment, then he must be endowed with two kinds of contact," etc., he says, "with two kinds of contact," etc. The other, not seeing such a line of reasoning, rejects it. In the question, "with mundane and supramundane," he acknowledges, referring to both what was previously undertaken and the right speech, etc., arising at the moment of the path. The question, "Is mundane morality ceased?" is by the proponent of another's doctrine, the assertion by the proponent of one's own doctrine, referring to the cessation of momentary dissolution. But the other, perceiving that as a transgression, says, "immoral," etc. But his establishing of the doctrine reveals only the non-difference of morality previously, not that it is endowed with two. Therefore, the doctrine is not established. Explanation of the statement involving two kinds of morality. 7. Explanation of the Statement that Morality is Non-Mental 590-594. Now, there is the statement that morality is non-mental. It is called "name." There, since even when morality arises and ceases, there is an accumulation of morality due to undertaking, by which one is called virtuous, therefore, "morality is non-mental," whose doctrine it is, like the Mahāsaṃghikas, regarding them, the question is by the proponent of one's own view, the assertion by the other. The rest here should be understood in the same way as said in the discussion of "giving is non-mental." And the establishment of doctrine is unestablished, because it is grasped unwisely. Explanation of the discussion on "morality is non-mental." 8. Explanation of the discussion on "morality does not follow the mind" 595-597. Now, there is a discussion called "morality does not follow the mind." There, "does not follow the mind" is merely a different expression, the rest is similar to the previous discussion. Explanation of the discussion on "morality does not follow the mind." 9. Explanation of the discussion on the cause of undertaking 598-600. Now, there is a discussion called "the cause of undertaking." There, having unwisely grasped the meaning of the verse "planting gardens," because of the statement "merit always increases," "morality due to undertaking increases," whose doctrine it is, like the Mahāsaṃghikas themselves, regarding them, the question is by the proponent of one's own view, regarding the accumulation of morality dissociated from the mind, the assertion by the opponent. The rest is similar to the previous discussion. Explanation of the discussion on the cause of undertaking. 10. Explanation of the discussion on "expression is morality" 601-602. Now, there is a discussion called "expression is morality." There, having grasped that bodily expression is bodily action, and verbal expression is verbal action, "expression is morality," whose doctrine it is, like the Mahāsaṃghikas themselves and the Sammitīya school; regarding them, the question "is expression" is by the proponent of one's own view, the assertion by the other. Then, since morality is abstention, not a material phenomenon, therefore, to challenge him in that sense, he said, "abstaining from killing" and so on. "Greeting is morality" and so on, he thinks that expression as it is, is "morality," to show that by extracting it, it is said. But since that is not abstention, therefore, again he said, "abstaining from killing" and so on. But the doctrine Because it is established by deception, it is indeed unestablished. Explanation of the debate on communicative morality. 11. Explanation of the Debate on Non-communicative Immorality 603-604. Now, there is the debate on non-communicative immorality. Here, those who hold the view that "non-communicative immorality" refers to the accumulation of demerit disconnected from consciousness, and the complete fulfillment of the elements in acts like killing, etc., by command, such as the Mahāsaṃghikas, regarding them, the question is by the proponent, the affirmation by the opponent. Then, to challenge him, "If that is immorality, it would be one of the acts like killing," etc., he begins with "killing," etc. Having undertaken a sinful deed means having made a sinful resolution, saying, "I will kill so-and-so, I will steal such-and-such property." Asked, "Do both increase?" he denies it, referring to the non-arising of demerit at the moment of giving. Asked a second time, he affirms it, referring to the accumulation of demerit disconnected from consciousness. The rest here should be understood in the same way as stated in the explanation of the consumption path. His establishment of the doctrine proves only the previously undertaken portion of the sinful act; not that non-communication is immoral. Explanation of the debate on non-communicative immorality. Tenth Section. The Second Fifty is completed. 11. Eleventh Section 1-3. Explanation of the Debate on the Three Latencies 605-613. Now, there is the debate on the three latencies, that latencies are indeterminate, without cause, and disconnected from consciousness. Here, since a common person should be described as "with latency" when a wholesome or indeterminate thought is occurring, and the cause he has at that moment does not make the latencies caused, nor are they associated with that thought, therefore, those who hold the view that "they are indeterminate, without cause, and disconnected from consciousness," such as the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Sammatiyas, regarding them, in all three debates, the question is by the proponent, the affirmation by the opponent. The rest can be understood from the way stated below by the path of the text itself, therefore, it is not elaborated. Explanation of the Debate on the Three Latencies. 4. Explanation of the Debate on Knowledge 614-615. Now, the debate on knowledge. Indeed, there is such a thing. There, even with ignorance dispelled by the knowledge of the path, and the mind continuing to function devoid of knowledge in the form of eye-consciousness and so on, because that path-consciousness does not arise again, therefore, the doctrine of those who say, "One should not be called 'knowing'," such as the Mahāsaṃghikas; regarding them, the question is from the proponent, the affirmation from the opponent. Then, to refute him, saying, "If, with ignorance dispelled, there would be no designation of 'knowing,' then with passions dispelled, there would be no designation of 'passionless,' and you would be unskilled in the designation of persons," he said, beginning with "with passion dispelled." The opponent, not seeing a reason for the existence of passion, etc., when those are dispelled, rejects it. In the end, because with the attainment of knowledge, he deserves to be called "knowing," therefore, the proponent's rejection is not valid. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge. 5. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge as Disconnected from the Mind 616-617. Now, there is such a thing as the discourse on knowledge as disconnected from the mind. There, because an arahant endowed with eye-consciousness and so on, is called "knowing" with reference to the path-knowledge he has attained, but that knowledge is not associated with that mind of his, therefore, the doctrine of those who say, "Knowledge is disconnected from the mind," such as the Pubbaseliyas; regarding them, the question is from the proponent, the affirmation from the opponent. Then, to refute him, saying, "If, for you, knowledge is disconnected from the mind, it would be one of the disconnected forms, etc.," he said, beginning with "form." The opponent rejects it. The rest is in the same manner as stated below. But in the end, when asked about wisdom, he desires that occurrence based on attainment, therefore, he affirms it. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge as Disconnected from the Mind. 6. Explanation of the Discourse on Suffering 618-820. Now, there is such a thing as the discourse on suffering. There, the doctrine of those who say, "At the moment of the supramundane path, the yogi utters the words 'this is suffering,' and as he utters the words 'this is suffering,' the knowledge 'this is suffering' arises for him," such as the Andhakas; regarding them, the question is from the proponent, whether at the moment of the path, such utterance of words is knowledge. And affirming, referring to the practice, is for the other. Because he speaks a statement associated with the remaining truths like an ordinary person, and he does not desire that the arising of knowledge be thus, therefore he rejects in questions about origin and so on. "Form is impermanent" and so on is said in terms of seeing the aspect of suffering. But the other, not seeing such usage in his own doctrine, rejects it. "Thus" and "because" and so on, if knowledge arises for him in suffering, it is said to show that it arises successively with four knowledges in the i-sound, the daṃ-sound, the du-sound, and the kha-sound. But the other does not desire it thus, therefore he rejects it. This is the explanation of the discourse on suffering. 7. Explanation of the Discourse on Psychic Power 621-624. Now, there is the discourse called Psychic Power. There, taking the meaning of the benefit of developing the bases of psychic power unwisely, "one endowed with psychic power might last for an eon," whose doctrine it is,