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not the abandonment of fetters merely by seeing the benefit. Therefore, what is brought forward is similar to what is not brought forward. Explanation of the Discourse on Seeing the Benefit. 2. Explanation of the Discourse on Nibbāna as Object 549. Now, there is the Discourse on Nibbāna as Object. Here, regarding those who, taking the meaning of "he thinks of Nibbāna" and so on unwisely, hold the view that Nibbāna as object is a fetter, just like the Pubbaseliyas, the question is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, the assertion for the other. Then, to challenge him, "If Nibbāna as object is a fetter, it follows that Nibbāna has the nature of being fettered and so on," he said "Is Nibbāna a fetter?" and so on. The other rejects everything for fear of contradicting the suttas. The meaning should be understood in all cases in this way. But the sutta brought forward, "Nibbāna, Nibbāna," was spoken with reference to Nibbāna in this very life, therefore it is not probative. Explanation of the Discourse on Nibbāna as Object. 3. Explanation of the Discourse on Form as Having an Object 552-553. Now, there is the Discourse on Form as Having an Object. Here, form is said to have an object in the sense of having a condition, not in the sense of making something else an object, in terms of the object-condition. But regarding those who hold the view that form has an object without distinction, just like the Uttarāpathakas, the question is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, the assertion for the other, in order to show the distinction of the meaning of "object." The rest here should be understood in accordance with the Pāli. "It cannot be said" In the question, clinging to an object is the assertion of the proponent. In the second question also, clinging to a condition is the assertion of the same. Thus, object-clinging is established here only in the sense of being conditional. Explanation of the statement: "Form is object-clinging." 4. Explanation of the statement: "Latent tendencies are not object-clinging." 554-556. Now, the statement "Latent tendencies are not object-clinging" is explained. Here, those whose view is that latent tendencies are mental concomitants, causeless, and indeterminate, and therefore not object-clinging, like that of the blind and some northerners; concerning them, the question "Are latent tendencies...?" is from the proponent, the assertion from the other. Then, to challenge that it must be of such a kind as not object-clinging, he said "Form," etc. "Sensual desire," etc., is shown as not different from the latent tendency of sensual desire. In the question "Is the aggregate of formations not object-clinging?" he rejects it concerning the aggregate of formations associated with consciousness. He asserts concerning the latent tendency, the life faculty, and form such as bodily action, etc., which are included in the aggregate of formations. In this way, the meaning should be understood in all instances. In the question "Is it with latent tendency?" the state of being with latent tendency is admitted because the latent tendencies have not been abandoned. There is no possibility of the occurrence of latent tendencies. For what has not been abandoned is neither past, nor future, nor present. But a defilement to be destroyed by the path is said to exist only because it has not been abandoned. And it should not be said that such a thing has this object. Therefore, that is rejected. But this is not only for latent tendency, but also for greed, etc., it is the same, therefore it is not a proof that latent tendencies are not object-clinging. Explanation of the statement: "Latent tendencies are not object-clinging." 5. Explanation of the statement: "Knowledge is not object-clinging." 557-558. Now, the statement "Knowledge is not object-clinging" is explained. Here, since an arahant is said to be endowed with eye-consciousness and knowledge, and that knowledge has no object at that moment, therefore, those whose view is that knowledge is not object-clinging, like that of the blind; concerning them, the question "Is knowledge...?" is from the proponent, the assertion from the other. The rest here is as said in the discussion of latent tendencies. It should be understood like a son. Explanation of the statement that knowledge is without an object. 6. Explanation of the Discussion on Past and Future Objects 559-561. Now, there is a discussion on past and future objects. Since there is no such thing as a past or future object, the mind with such an object, due to the non-existence of the object, would be without an object. Those whose view is that the past is without an object, such as the northerners, are addressed in the question by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the assertion by the other. The rest here should be understood according to the Pāli text. Explanation of the Discussion on Past and Future Objects. 7. Explanation of the Discussion on What is Accompanied by Initial Application 562. Now, there is a discussion on what is accompanied by initial application. What is accompanied by initial application is of two kinds: by way of object and by way of association. Since there is no rule that a certain mind is not an object of initial application, all minds could be accompanied by initial application. However, since there exist minds dissociated from initial application, not all minds are accompanied by initial application. Those whose view is that all minds are accompanied by initial application without making this distinction, such as the northerners, are addressed in the question by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the assertion by the other. The rest here should be understood according to the Pāli text. Explanation of the Discussion on What is Accompanied by Initial Application. 8. Explanation of the Discussion on Sound as the Emission of Initial Application 563. Now, there is a discussion on sound as the emission of initial application. Since it is said that "initial application and sustained application are verbal formations," those whose view is that whenever one applies initial application and sustained application, even at the time of the arising of the mind-element, the emission of initial application is always sound, such as the Pubbaseliyas, are addressed in the question "Is everything sound?" by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the assertion by the other. Then, to challenge him, "If only the emission of initial application is sound, then the emission of contact, etc., would also be sound," he says, "Does everything contact?" The other, not seeing such a trace of the Sutta, rejects it. "Sound is the emission of initial application, perceptible by the ear," having made the emission of initial application alone sound, he asks. He rejects the sound arising from the dispersal of thought for those who are heedless and inattentive. Indeed, the statement that the sound of the dispersal of thought is not cognizable by the ear demonstrates his own view. For he asserts that only the dispersal of thought is sound, and that it is not cognizable by the ear. But the other one says it is cognizable by the ear, according to the statement, "Having heard the sound of the dispersal of thought, he commands" (D. III, 148). Explanation of the Discussion on the Sound of the Dispersal of Thought. 9. Explanation of the Discussion on Speech Not According to Thought 564. Now, there is the discussion on speech not according to thought. Here, since someone intends to say one thing but says another, therefore, according to those whose view is that speech not according to thought is not in accordance with thought, not following thought, but occurs even without thought, like the Pubbaseliyas; concerning them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, the assertion for the other. Then, to refute him, saying, "If there were no thought producing it, there would be no contact, etc., at that moment," he said, beginning with "without contact." In "not intending to speak," etc., since even one who intends to say one thing but says another is still called intending to speak, therefore he rejects it with "no." 565. Now, in "Is there anyone intending to say one thing," etc., one might intend to say "robe" but say "rube." Here, the thought of intending to say one thing, and the thought of saying another, thus, being dissimilar due to the preceding thought, it is called not according to thought, therefore, he has only non-offense, but there is no thought producing the word "rube," thus, even though "speech not according to thought" is established by this example, with the meaning that that speech is without thought, it is as if it were not established. Explanation of the Discussion on Speech Not According to Thought. 10. Explanation of the Discussion on Bodily Action Not According to Thought 566-567. Now, there is the discussion on bodily action not according to thought. Here, since someone intends to go one place but goes another, therefore, bodily action not according to thought is not in accordance with thought, not following thought. That the process occurs even without mind, is the view of some, like the Pubbaseliyas. Referring to them is the question of the proponent of one's own doctrine, the assertion of the other. The remainder here should be understood in the same way as explained below. Explanation of the discourse on bodily action without mind. 11. Explanation of the Discourse on Association with the Past and Future 568-570. Now, there is the discourse on association with the past and future. Here, two kinds of association should be understood: association in terms of attainment, and association in terms of acquisition. Among them, one endowed with present qualities is called associated. But those who have attained the eight attainments, although the attainments do not occur at one moment, some are past, some are future, some are present,