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, only proves the shape, not the sense-sphere. Therefore, even what is cited is like what is not cited. Explanation of the discussion of sense-spheres in the realm of form. 8. Explanation of the discussion of form in the formless realm 524-526. Now, there is a discussion of form in the formless realm. There, those who hold the view that, "conditioned by consciousness, there is name-and-form," and that even in the formless realm, there is subtle form distinct from gross form, like the blind men; concerning them, the question "is there form?" is for one's own side, the acknowledgment for the other. The rest here is straightforward in meaning. Explanation of the discussion of form in the formless realm. 9. Explanation of the discussion of form as action 527-537. Now, there is a discussion of form as action. There, those who hold the view that form, consisting of bodily and verbal intimation, is bodily action and verbal action, and that what arises from wholesome [mind] is wholesome, and what arises from unwholesome [mind] is unwholesome, like the Mahisasakas and the Sammitiyas; concerning them, the question "arisen from a wholesome mind?" is for one's own side, the acknowledgment for the other. Then, if that is wholesome, to challenge him, "that distinction of wholesome, beginning with having an object, etc., that is obtained, does he have that?" "Having an object," etc., is begun. There, "aspiration" is simply a synonym for intention. For wholesome intention, indeed, planning, is called aspiration. Because it stands in the mode of planning, it is also called resolution. But later, in "feeling, perception, intention, faith, arisen from a wholesome mind," etc., aspiration and resolution are obtained only for feeling, etc., not for intention. Why? Because of the absence of two intentions together, but this is to be understood as the way the text has gone, due to being established. "Form sense-sphere," etc., was said in the previous turn to show the divisions of what was summarized as "all that is wholesome." The rest is the method of comparison, the discussion of verbal action "un And all the methods beginning with "arising from a defiled mind" should be understood according to the Pāli. Here, "impurity" refers to semen. The explanation of the Sutta is straightforward. Description of the section on material form as a topic of discussion. 10. Description of the section on the life faculty as a topic of discussion. 540. Now, there is the discussion called the life faculty. Here, for those who hold that the life faculty is a non-material phenomenon dissociated from consciousness, and therefore there is no material life faculty, such as the Pūrvaseliyas and the Sammatīyas, the question is directed to the proponent of the opposing view, and the affirmation to the other. To the question, "Is there life for material phenomena?" he considers that even for conditioned material forms, such as grass and wood, only the continuity of existence, duration, maintenance, sustenance, movement, functioning, and preservation constitute life, and therefore he denies it. To the question, "Is there?" he affirms it for this reason. To the question, "Is there a non-material life faculty?" he considers that there is a continuum of the non-material life faculty dissociated from consciousness for non-material phenomena, and therefore he affirms it. 541. To the question, "Is the life of material phenomena a non-material life faculty?" he considers that whether beings are material or non-material in their continuum, it is only the non-material life faculty dissociated from consciousness for all, and therefore he affirms it. 542. In the questions regarding those absorbed in cessation, he denies and affirms, referring only to the non-material life dissociated from consciousness. But the proponent of the opposing view, not accepting that, says, beginning with "If indeed," to challenge that if non-material activity is absent, it must be due to material form. To the question about the aggregate of mental formations, he denies referring to the aggregate of mental formations such as contact, and affirms referring to the aggregate of mental formations such as bodily action. The view is that phenomena such as bodily intimation, verbal intimation, right speech, right action, and the life faculty are included in the aggregate of mental formations. But the proponent of the opposing view, not accepting that, says, beginning with "Is there a feeling aggregate?" to challenge that if the aggregate of mental formations exists even when non-material activity has ceased, then all four aggregates should exist. The other is within. He rejects it with reference to attainment; he acknowledges it with reference to the prior and subsequent stages of one who is attaining and one who is emerging. 543. The same method applies in the case of the non-percipient beings. For according to his view, at the moment of rebirth of non-percipient beings, a thought arises and ceases, and together with it, non-material life faculty dissociated from thought arises and continues for the duration of their life. Therefore, when asked whether they have a life faculty, he denies it; when asked whether they have one, he acknowledges it. He denies the aggregates of feeling, etc., with reference to their continuity; he acknowledges them with reference to death and rebirth. But his own proponent, not wanting that, says "If there is even for a moment feeling, etc., there, it would attain the state of being with five aggregates," in order to challenge, he says "state of being with five aggregates." The other one denies it out of fear of contradiction with the suttas. 544-545. To the question "Does one part break up?" his view is that what is associated breaks up, what is dissociated remains, therefore he acknowledges it. The question "Are there two life faculties?" is from the opponent, the acknowledgement is from his own proponent. For there are two life faculties in terms of material and immaterial, by these the being lives, it is said that he dies by their breaking up. For at the moment of death, both lives break up together. Explanation of the Discourse on the Life Faculty. 11. Explanation of the Discourse on the Cause of Action 546. Now, there is the discourse on the cause of action. There, the arahant who was previously accused of being an arahant in a former existence, because of that action, falls away from arahantship, according to the view of those, such as the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitiyas; with reference to them, the question "Is action the cause?" is from his own proponent, the acknowledgement is from the other. The rest is the same as what was said in the discourse on decline. "Indeed, does one accuse arahants?" this is said to make one accept that action is the cause of decline. Then his own proponent, having made him acknowledge that position, says "If so, all those who have never been accused of being arahants would attain arahantship," in order to challenge, he says "whoever," etc. The other one, because of that action, Rejecting the rule for attaining arahantship. Explanation of the doctrine of karma as cause. Eighth Chapter. 9. Ninth Chapter 1. Explanation of the Discourse on Seeing Advantages 547. Now, there is the Discourse on Seeing Advantages. Here, it is certain that for one who sees danger in conditioned things and advantage in Nibbāna, attachments are abandoned. But those who, taking a one-sided view of these two, hold the doctrine that "only the one who sees advantages abandons attachments," like the blind; regarding them, the question is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, the affirmation for the other. Then, to show the distinction that "you have taken a one-sided view, danger must also be seen," the proponent of one's own doctrine says, beginning with "conditioned things." In the question, "Does he attend to conditioned things as impermanent, and does he see advantage in Nibbāna?" this is the intention - their doctrine is that for one who sees advantage, attachments are abandoned. Indeed, when asked, "Does he abandon attachments by attending to conditioned things as impermanent?" he affirms, "Yes." Therefore, it follows that "he attends to conditioned things as impermanent, and he sees advantage in Nibbāna," do you accept this? Then the opponent rejects it, referring to a single moment of consciousness; when asked a second time, he affirms it in terms of different consciousnesses. But the proponent of one's own doctrine, refuting his intention, asks, "Since the attention to impermanence and the seeing of advantage have been affirmed together, is there a combination of two contacts and two consciousnesses?" The other, not seeing the combination of two, rejects it. The same method applies to the questions beginning with "suffering." What is the conclusion here? Do attachments get abandoned by attending to impermanence, or for one who sees advantage in Nibbāna, or for one who does both together? If abandonment occurs by attending to impermanence, it would occur with the insight consciousness. Or if for one who sees advantage, for one who sees advantage in Nibbāna through hearsay, it would occur with the insight consciousness. Or else, when one combines the two, there would be a combination of two contacts and so on. But since, at the moment of the Noble Path, the function of attending to impermanence and so on reaches fulfillment, and the recurrence of perceiving permanence and so on is impossible, and since in Nibbāna the benefit is directly seen, therefore, it should be understood that, by attending to impermanence and so on in terms of fulfilling a function, and by seeing the benefit in Nibbāna in terms of its arising, the fetters are abandoned. 548. The sutta "perceiving happiness in Nibbāna" only establishes the state of perceiving happiness in Nibbāna and so on,