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B020303puggalapaññatti aṭṭhakathā(designation of persons commentary)

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like the space between two boundaries?" Thus he begins to challenge. But the opponent, unwilling, rejects every question, merely out of adherence to his doctrine, not in accordance with the Dhamma. Therefore, the proponent refutes him, saying, "No, indeed!" 506. "The fifth womb," etc., are spoken to challenge him, that he does not agree with the established categories of wombs, etc., and that he must therefore exist in addition to them. "Action leading to intermediate existence": If that too is an existence, just as the Teacher has distinguished and shown that there are actions leading to existence in the realm of desire, etc., so too there must be action leading to that. This is spoken to challenge him. But since in the other's doctrine there is no specific action leading to intermediate existence; whatever existence one will be reborn into, one is reborn in the intermediate state by the action leading to that existence, according to their doctrine, therefore it is rejected with "No, indeed!" When asked, "Are there beings who undergo intermediate existence?" he rejects it out of adherence to his doctrine, saying that they are merely those who undergo existence in the realm of desire. When asked about "being born," etc., he rejects it, unwilling to accept birth, aging, and death there, as well as the continuous cycle of dying and rebirth. When asked about form, etc., he rejects it because, according to his doctrine, the form of a being in intermediate existence is indiscernible, and feelings, etc., are not as gross as those of others. For this very reason, the rejection should be understood even in the case of the five-aggregate existence. 507. Now, "existence in the realm of desire, existence, destiny," etc., is called the comparison of existences. Here is the intention: If there were such a thing as intermediate existence, just as a distinction of existence, destiny, etc., is found in the realm of desire, etc., so too it would be found there. Or, just as it is not found there, so too it would not be found in these. For in the same state of existence, this distinction exists in these, not in the other. And here is the reason for the difference. The other one, however, based on mere doctrine, both affirms and denies that very thing. 508. Asked whether all beings have an intermediate existence, because he does not accept an intermediate existence for those destined for hell, those with only perception, those destined for the animal realm, and those destined for the realm of form, therefore he denies it. For that very reason, he affirms the opposite. "Of those destined for immediate rebirth," etc., is said to show by distinguishing those for whom he does not accept an intermediate existence. All that should be understood according to the Pāli, along with the scriptural support. The Explanation of the Discourse on Intermediate Existence. 3. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Qualities of Sensual Pleasure 510. Now, there is the discourse on the qualities of sensual pleasure. Here, in one's own school, the realm of desire is said to be both the objects of desire and the defilements of desire, and the realm of sensual existence. Among these, the objects of desire are "desire" in the sense of being desirable, and "element" in the sense of being empty of inherent existence, thus the realm of desire. The defilements of desire are "desire" in the sense of being desirable and in the sense of desiring, and "element" in the sense of the meaning as stated above, thus the realm of desire. Sensual existence is "desire" in the sense of being desirable, in the sense of desiring, and in the sense of being the place where objects of desire occur, thus for three reasons it is "desire," and "element" in the sense of the meaning as stated above, thus the realm of desire. In another school, however, relying merely on the statement, "These five, monks, are the qualities of sensual pleasure," it is held that only the five qualities of sensual pleasure are the realm of desire. Therefore, with reference to those whose doctrine this is, just as now the Pubbaseliyas, the question "Are there only five?" is to clarify the non-difference of the realm of desire, for one's own proponent, the affirmation is according to doctrine, for the other. "Surely there is," etc., is said to show the defilements of desire. There, "connected with that" means connected with the qualities of sensual pleasure, meaning having the qualities of sensual pleasure as object. "And indeed, it should not be said that there are only five," because when these desires, etc., connected with that exist, it should not be said that there are only five qualities of sensual pleasure as the realm of desire. For these desires, etc., are also "desire" in the sense of being desirable, and also "element," thus the realm of desire. Or, "element" designated as desire in the sense of desiring, thus the realm of desire, is the meaning. "The eye of humans," etc., is said to show the objects of desire. There, "par" Having denied the state of being the desire realm due to the mere object nature of the six sense bases, when asked again, "Is it mind?" he affirms it is not the desire realm, referring to the exalted and supramundane. But since all mind in the three realms is indeed the desire realm, the proponent refutes him with a sutta. 511. "The nature of existence is the qualities of desire," etc., is stated to show that existence is the desire realm. But since there is no usage of "existence" for the mere qualities of desire, the opponent denies it, saying, "No." "Action that leads to the qualities of desire," etc., is all stated to show that the mere qualities of desire are not the desire realm. For there is only action that leads to the desire realm, which is designated as the desire realm, and beings exist only in the desire realm. There they are born, age, die, pass away, and are reborn, not in the qualities of desire. In this way, the meaning should be understood everywhere. Explanation of the Discussion on the Qualities of Desire. 4. Explanation of the Discussion on Desire 513-514. Now, there is the discussion on desire. Here, those who, relying merely on the statement, "These five, monks, are the qualities of desire," hold the view that only the five sense bases, beginning with the eye base, are desire, just like the Pubbaseliyas; to show that only defilement-desire is desire in the ultimate sense, the proponent asks, "Are they only five?" The other affirms. The rest here is of obvious meaning. Explanation of the Discussion on Desire. 5. Explanation of the Discussion on the Form Realm 515-516. Now, there is the discussion on the form realm. Here, those who hold the view that "phenomena with form are called the form realm," just like the Andhakas; referring to them, the proponent asks, "With form?" The other affirms. Then the proponent, since the form realm is the existence of form, not mere form itself, says, "Is the form realm?" etc., to challenge him with that meaning. All of that should be understood in the same way as stated in the discussion on the qualities of desire. When asked, "Is it the desire realm?" seeing the contradiction with the limitation of the plane, he denies it. When asked again, having strengthened his position, he affirms it according to his own view. However, in such a case, being endowed with two existences, He incurs, therefore the proponent says "with desire and existence" and so on. The opponent refutes, since one cannot be associated with two. Explanation of the Discourse on the Realm of Form. 6. Explanation of the Discourse on the Realm of the Formless 517-518. In the Discourse on the Realm of the Formless too, the meaning should be understood in this way. But among the formless phenomena, only the aggregate of feeling is taken, and the teaching here is given in the manner of "feeling exists" and so on. There, the meaning should be seen as: "What are those formless phenomena?" Are they any of the aggregates such as feeling? The rest should be understood in the same way as stated below. Explanation of the Discourse on the Realm of the Formless. 7. Explanation of the Discourse on the Sense-Base in the Realm of Form 519. Now, there is the Discourse on the Sense-Base in the Realm of Form. There, those who, relying on the sutta "formed of mind, complete in all limbs, with faculties not deficient" (D.N. 1.87), assume that even the signs of nose and so on are sense-bases for the Brahmakayikas, and therefore their existence is with six sense-bases, like the Andhakas and Sammitiyas; concerning them, the question "with six sense-bases?" is for the proponent, and the affirmation is for the opponent, according to their view. Then, to challenge him based on what is not a sense-base there, "is there a nose-sense-base there?" and so on is begun. Thereupon, the opponent affirms that only the form and sign of the three internal sense-bases, nose and so on, are sense-bases, according to their view. When asked about the external sense-bases, such as the smell-sense-base, he does not accept the nose-sensitivity and so on there, therefore he refutes, denying their range. In the reverse question and the combined question, the meaning should be understood in this way. 521. "Is there a nose-sense-base there? Is there a smell-sense-base there? Does one smell that smell with that nose?" This was said concerning certain teachers in that very later time. They indeed assume that the six internal sense-bases are complete there, and that a sense-base must be functional, and they assume that with those nose and so on, those smells and so on are smelled, tasted, and touched. That l The opponent, relying on a point, asks, and the other acknowledges. 522. But when asked about "root-smell in that place," etc., being unable to prove existence, he denies it. Surely, "there is a sign of smell in that place," etc.