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, so too are mundane qualities such as faith the faculty of faith, etc. The rest here should be understood as in the text itself. Explanation of the Discourse on the Faculties. The Nineteenth Section. 20. The Twentieth Section 1. Explanation of the Discourse on Unintentional Actions 857-862. Now, there is the Discourse on Unintentional Actions. Therein, those who hold the view that "deeds with immediate result are grave and weighty; therefore, even if one unintentionally destroys the objects of such deeds, there is immediate result," like some northerners; regarding them, the question "unintentionally" is from the proponent of one's own view, the assertion from the other based on their view. Then, to challenge him, saying, "Since a deed with immediate result must involve a complete path of action, if there were an unintentional breach of the path of action, then the remaining acts of killing, etc., would also be unintentional," he said, "having unintentionally killed a living being," etc. The other, due to the absence of such a view, rejects it. The rest should be understood as in the text itself. "It should not be said that one is a matricide" is a question from the opponent, the assertion from the proponent of one's own view refers to unintentional killing during medical treatment, etc. "But was the mother deprived of life?" is a question. The assertion regarding unintentional killing aligns with the proponent's view. However, the opponent establishes a doctrine without grasping this intention. That doctrine, being established unwisely, is unsustainable. The same principle applies to patricide and similar acts. In the case of schism in the Saṅgha, the question, "Is schism in the Saṅgha an immediately retributive offense?" is posed by the proponent concerning one who perceives it as Dhamma. The opponent's assertion, based on unwisely grasping the statement, "Having broken the Saṅgha in concord, he boils in hell for a kappa," is flawed. When asked "all?" again, the proponent denies it concerning one who perceives it as Dhamma on his side, but affirms it concerning one who perceives it as Dhamma on the opponent's side. The same principle applies to both questions regarding one who perceives it as Dhamma. Surely, the sutta, "spoken by the Blessed One," was spoken solely to show the immediately retributive nature for the proponent of Dhamma. In the verse "bound for misery, a hell-dweller," only the proponent of non-Dhamma is intended. However, the opponent establishes a doctrine without grasping this intention. That doctrine, being established unwisely, is indeed unsustainable. Explanation of the Discourse on Unintentionality. 2. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge 863-865. Now, there is the Discourse on Knowledge. Therein, knowledge is twofold: mundane and supramundane. Mundane knowledge includes both knowledge of attainment and knowledge of the efficacy of action, arising from giving and the like; supramundane knowledge includes both path knowledge and fruition knowledge, which discerns the truths. However, for those whose doctrine is that "only knowledge that discerns the truths is knowledge, not the other, therefore a worldling has no knowledge," without making this distinction, such as the proponents of causality, the question is posed by the proponent, the assertion by the opponent. "Wisdom" and so on are stated to show the synonyms of knowledge. By this, it is shown: if he has no knowledge, he has no wisdom and so on. But if he has wisdom and so on, he has knowledge. Why? Because wisdom and so on are not different from knowledge. "The first jhāna" and so on are stated to show the knowledge of attainment. "He might give a gift" and so on are stated to show the knowledge of the efficacy of action. "He understands suffering" indicates only supramundane path knowledge, and not that only supramundane knowledge is knowledge. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge. 3. Explanation of the Discourse on the Wardens of Hell 866. Now, there is the discourse called "Discourse on the Wardens of Hell." Therein, those who hold the view, like the blind, that "in hell, it is the hellish deeds themselves that torment beings in the form of hell wardens; there are no beings called hell wardens," regarding them, the question is by the proponent of one's own doctrine, the affirmation by the other. Then, to refute him, "if there were no hell wardens there, there would be no causal actions either. For when there are agents, there are actions," he said, beginning with "Are there not in hells?" 867-868. "There are among humans," to make known by direct perception. Just as among humans, when there are agents, there are actions, so also there, this is the meaning here. "Are there in hells?" is the question by the proponent of another's doctrine, the affirmation by the other. "Neither Vessabhu nor the King of the Departed," a sutta was brought by the proponent of another's doctrine from his own tradition. But that was acknowledged by the proponent of one's own doctrine as being within the Teaching. Therein, Vessabhu is a certain deva. The King of the Departed is mighty in the realm of the departed. Soma and others are well-known. This is said: "Those like Vessabhu do not strike a person driven from here by his own deeds, who has reached the next world. But by whatever deeds he was driven there, those very deeds of his own strike him there," thus showing the ownership of deeds, not the absence of hell wardens. But by the proponent of one's own doctrine, those sutta passages brought forth, beginning with "Monks," are of implied meaning. Explanation of the Discourse on the Wardens of Hell. 4. Explanation of the Discourse on Animals 869-871. Now, there is the discourse called "Discourse on Animals." Therein, in the heavens, deva-sons like Erāvaṇa manifest the appearance of elephants, the appearance of horses; there are no animals there. But those who, seeing deva-sons with the appearance of animals, hold the view that "there are animals among the devas," like the blind, regarding them, the question is by the proponent of one's own doctrine, the affirmation by the other. Then, to refute him, "if there were animals in the deva realm, there would also be devas in the animal realm," he said, beginning with "Are there animals?" "A worm," Those who desire its non-existence, it is said to show them. "Erāvaṇa" in the question, the affirmation of its existence is by the proponent, not by a beast. "Elephant-keepers" etc., "If there were elephants etc. there, there would also be elephant-keepers etc.," it is said for the purpose of challenge. There, "yāvasika" means givers of barley. "Kāraṇika" means elephant trainers etc., by whom they would do various things. "Bhattakāraka" means cooks of food for the elephants etc. "Na hevaṃ" means not desiring thus, he rejects. Explanation of Animal Talk. 5. Explanation of Path Talk 872-875. Now, there is the Path Talk. There, those who, relying on the fact that "Formerly, his bodily action, verbal action, livelihood are completely pure" (A. N. 3.431) this sutta, and the non-association of Right Speech, Action, and Livelihood with consciousness, have the view that "the path is five-factored without alternative," like the Mahīsāsakas, regarding them, the question "is it five-factored?" is by the proponent, the affirmation by the other. Right Speech is a factor of the path, and it is not the path, etc., is said according to the doctrine of another school. For in another school, Right Speech etc. are factors of the path. But because it is form, it is described as not being the path. "Right View is a factor of the path" etc., is said to show that there is no non-pathness of a path factor. In the sutta "Formerly, his...", the cultivation of purity is the path, not the other, to show the purity of the practice according to the tradition, "bodily action, verbal action, livelihood are completely pure" is said, not to show the five-factoredness without these. Therefore he said, "Thus, this noble eightfold path of his goes to the perfection of cultivation." The sutta brought by the proponent is of definitive meaning. Explanation of Path Talk. 6. Explanation of Knowledge Talk 876-877. Now, there is the Knowledge Talk. There, regarding the twelve-aspect knowledge in the turning of the wheel of the Dhamma, those who have the view that "twelve-based knowledge is supramundane," like the Pubbaseliyas, Ānanda, these questions are posed with reference to one's own doctrine, and the answers are affirmations of the other's. Then, to challenge him, "If it is twelve-based, it must be with twelve path knowledges," he begins with "twelve." The other, referring to the unity of the path, rejects it, but affirms the diversity of knowledges in each truth, based on the aspects of knowledge of truth, knowledge of function, and knowledge of completion. The same method applies in "twelve Stream-entry paths" and so on. But the sutta, "It was said by the Blessed One," along with its preliminary and concluding parts, reveals the diversity of knowledges, not the twelve knowledges of the Noble Path. Therefore, it is not a valid argument. Explanation of the Knowledge Discourse. The Twentieth Chapter. The Fourth Set of Fifty is Complete. 21. The Twenty-First Chapter 1. Explanation of the Doctrine Discourse 878. Now, there is the Doctrine Discourse. Here, referring to the three councils, and to those whose view is that "the doctrine was made new," and "is there anyone who makes the Tathāgata's doctrine new?" and "is it possible to make the Tathāgata's doctrine new?"—such as some northerners—the questions in all three discussions are posed with reference to one's own doctrine, and the answers are affirmations of the other's. "Mindfulness practices" and so on, the doctrine is the name for the mindfulness practices and so on, the noble teachings, and the teaching of wholesome things and so on.