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, defilements, like one throwing away rubbish has no effort in throwing it away, but when the noble path arises with nibbāna as its object, defilements, not yet arisen, do not arise, therefore they are called abandoned, so he denies it with "No." Therefore, "Does he abandon defilements in the past?" etc., is said deceptively, since it should not be said, "There is no abandoning of defilements," therefore he says he abandons them in the past, etc., by deception. Explanation of the discussion on abandoning defilements. 2. Explanation of the Discussion on Emptiness 832. Now, there is the discussion on emptiness. There, emptiness is of two kinds: the characteristic of non-self of the aggregates and nibbāna. Of these, the characteristic of non-self might, in one way, be included in the aggregate of formations, but nibbāna is not included. But without grasping this distinction, those whose view is that "emptiness is included in the aggregate of formations," like the blind, referring to them, the question is for the proponent, the assertion for the opponent. "Signless" means nibbāna, devoid of all signs. "Undirected" is also a name for it. Why is this brought up? To impose a fault on the one who speaks without distinction. For one who, without distinguishing, has the view that "emptiness is included in the aggregate of formations in one aspect only," it follows that nibbāna is also included in the aggregate of formations. To impose this fault, "signless, undirected" is brought up. The opponent, not wanting its includedness, denies it. "Is the aggregate of formations not impermanent?" etc., is said to show the fault of the impermanence of emptiness, which is called nibbāna. 833. "Is the emptiness of the aggregate of formations?" means "If the emptiness of one aggregate is the emptiness of another aggregate?" "Being included in the aggregate of perception, it must also be included in the aggregate of formations," is stated as a challenge. "The emptiness of the aggregate of formations should not be stated," etc., is stated to show the reverse: "If the emptiness of the aggregate of formations is not included in the aggregate of perception, then the emptiness of the aggregate of perception is not included in the aggregate of formations." 834. The sutta, "Empty are these, monks, formations," is brought from another school. There, "formations" means the five aggregates, as in the passage "all formations are impermanent." And because they are empty of self and what belongs to self, "emptiness" is within the teaching, not contradictory, therefore it is allowed. But since this does not show that the aggregate of formations is included in emptiness, therefore it is not probative. Explanation of the Discourse on Emptiness. 3. Explanation of the Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship 835-836. Now, there is the Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship. There, in the path process and in the fruition attainment process, the result-consciousness of the noble path is called the fruit of recluseship, according to the established doctrine of our own school. But those who do not understand it thus, and hold the view that "the abandonment of defilements and the arising of fruition are the fruit of recluseship, therefore it is unconditioned," like the Pubbaseliyas; with reference to them, the question is from the proponent of our own view, the assertion from the other. The rest here follows the method stated below, so it proceeds just as in the Pāli. Explanation of the Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship. 4. Explanation of the Discourse on Acquisition 837-840. Now, there is the Discourse on Acquisition. There, "whatever is obtained, the obtaining of that is called acquisition. And that is unconditioned," such is the view of those, like the Pubbaseliyas themselves; with reference to them, the question is from the proponent of our own view, the assertion from the other. The rest here also follows the method stated below, so it proceeds just as in the Pāli. "It should not be stated," etc., is stated to reveal the view by which acquisition is thought to be unconditioned. There, the proponent of our own view, rejecting it by saying "it should not be stated thus," does not accept that acquisition is merely form, etc. For acquisition is not There is no such thing as a dhamma, but he does not acknowledge the unconditioned state. The other, by mere denial, establishes the doctrine of the unconditioned, but because it is established unwisely, it is indeed unstable. Explanation of the Category of "Having a View." 5. Explanation of the Category of "Suchness" 841-843. Now, there is the category of "Suchness." Here, those who have the doctrine that "Suchness, unspeakable, is the inherent nature of all dhammas, such as form, etc., and because it is not included in conditioned things such as form, etc., it is unconditioned," like some northerners, regarding them, the question is from the proponent of one's own view, the assertion from the other. The rest here is clear, as the method has been stated below. Explanation of the Category of "Suchness." 6. Explanation of the Category of "Skillful" 844-846. Now, there is the category of "Skillful." Here, the blameless is also skillful, and so is that which has a pleasant result. "Blameless" means disassociated from defilements. This method applies to all dhammas, excluding the unskillful. "Having a pleasant result" means merit that produces pleasant results in future existences and rebirths. This method applies only to the first word in the triad of the skillful. But for those who, not grasping this distinction, have the doctrine that nibbāna is skillful merely because of its blameless nature, like the Andhakas, to show the absence of skillfulness in nibbāna in terms of having a pleasant result, the question is from the proponent of one's own view, the assertion from the other, based on his own doctrine. The rest here is easily understood, as the method has been stated below. Explanation of the Category of "Skillful." 7. Explanation of the Category of "Absolute Determinacy" 847. Now, there is the category of "Absolute Determinacy." Here, regarding those who, relying on the sutta "Once submerged, one is submerged" (A.N. 7.15), have the doctrine that "there is absolute determinacy for the ordinary person," like some northerners, regarding them, the question is from the proponent of one's own view, the assertion from the other. The statement "a matricide," etc., is for the purpose of challenging that "since there is a fixed wrongness for one with fixed wrong view and for matricides, etc., matricides, etc., should also be absolutely determined, given the sameness of the fixed wrongness." It is said. The other one, "He is of fixed wrong view, a hook in existence; even in future lives he is fixed. But these ones, in this very existence," rejects with the view that they are not. 848. Would doubt arise? He asks, "Would it arise thus: 'Is this fixed or not?'" The other, not seeing a cause for non-arising, affirms. But when asked, "Would it not arise?" he affirms, referring to the non-arising in that which, adhering to a view, has entered into fixedness. Then, when asked, "Is it abandoned?" he denies it, because it is not abandoned by the path; he affirms it, referring to that view, because it is not manifested. Then, because there is no abandonment without the Noble Path, therefore, to challenge him on that basis, he says, "By the path of stream-entry," and so on. He denies it because it is not abandoned even by one path. Again, when asked, "By which?" he says, referring to the wrong path, "By the unwholesome," and so on. 849. Would the annihilation view arise? He asks about the arising of the second fixedness. The other, because it is said, "Those Okkalā who are wise in destruction, nihilists, non-doers, causeless ones" (M. iii. 143), even three fixed wrong views arise for one person, therefore he affirms. 850. Then, to challenge him, "And that is not an absolute fixedness," he says, "If so," and so on. For a completely fixed one, a second fixedness is pointless. In the question, "Would it not arise?" he affirms, referring to the non-arising, taking that which is grasped as eternal in the eternalist view as that which will be annihilated. When asked, "Is it abandoned?" he denies it because it is not abandoned by the path; he affirms it, in the manner stated, because it does not arise. The same method applies in "Would the eternalist view arise?" and so on. The rest is in the manner stated in the section on doubt. 851-852. "It should not be said" is the question of the opponent; the affirmation that the sutta exists is of the proponent. But he is not submerged even in future lives. For in this very life he is incapable of abandoning that view; this is the intention here, therefore this is not a valid argument. The statement "He always emerges and submerges" is... This was said to show that one should seek the meaning without clinging to views. Explanation of the Discourse on Absolute Necessity. 8. Explanation of the Discourse on the Faculties 853-856. Now, there is the Discourse on the Faculties. Therein, those who hold the view that mundane faith is merely called faith, not the faculty of faith; similarly, mundane effort...pe... mindfulness... concentration... wisdom is merely called wisdom, not the faculty of wisdom, like the Hethuvādins and the Mahīsāsakas; regarding them, the question is from the proponent of one's own view, the assertion from the other. "There is no mundane faith," etc., is stated to show that even mundane qualities such as faith are faculties in the sense of dominance, and there is no faculty of faith, etc., distinct from faith, etc., thus showing that even mundane faith, etc., are indeed the faculty of faith, etc. "There is a mundane mind," etc., is stated to illustrate that just as mundane qualities such as mind are the faculty of mind, etc.