English
In the second, he affirms it with reference to the intermediate-existence person. For according to his doctrine, he goes in the same form and enters the mother's womb. Then that form of his breaks up. "That living being, with which form-aggregate body does it go? Is that very living being that body?" he asks. The opponent, here, the sutta on the abandonment of the body... And refutes the contradiction. In "Savedano," etc., he refutes referring to the state of non-perception, and acknowledges referring to a different state of existence. "That lives" means it goes together with the body known as feeling, etc. He asks, "Is that very thing the life, that the body?" For by this view, all five aggregates are understood as the body. The opponent refutes the contradiction to the Sutta. 92. In "Arūpo," etc., in the first question, he refutes referring to the intermediate existence. In the second, he acknowledges referring to the formless being reborn into form. "Different, lives" means having abandoned the body known as form, the formless one transmigrates. He asks, "Is that body different for you, is the life different?" The other refutes the contradiction to the Sutta. In "Avedano," etc., he refutes referring to the state of perception, and acknowledges referring to a different state of existence. "Different, lives" means having abandoned the body known as feeling, etc., the one without feeling, without consciousness, transmigrates. He asks, "Is that other body different for you, is the life different?" The other refutes the contradiction to the Sutta. 93. In "Rūpaṃ sandhāvati," etc., the person is designated by taking up the aggregates of form, etc. He asks, "When that person transmigrates, does that form also transmigrate?" The opponent refutes, "Beings covered by ignorance, bound by craving, transmigrate, wander on," because the statement of transmigration is only for beings. Asked again, since there is no person without the elements of form, etc., he acknowledges with perception that when that one transmigrates, that form also transmigrates. The same method applies to feeling, etc. 94. In "Rūpaṃ na sandhāvati," etc., since that form is not the person for you, and you yourself say that he transmigrates, therefore I ask you, "Does that form not transmigrate?" The other, when the person transmigrates, it is not possible for the form that is the basis of clinging to transmigrate, so he refutes with perception. Asked again, "Only beings transmig He acknowledges by way of repeated questioning. Here, the sesame is simply turned upwards. Now, the meaning of the verses is this: according to the venerable one's view, the person exists dependent on the aggregates, just as shade depends on a tree, just as fire depends on fuel. If, when those aggregates break up, the person breaks up, then in that case, there is a doctrine of annihilation, the annihilationist view befalls you. Which is that unwholesome view rejected by the Buddha. But we do not say that which is expressed indirectly as "the ascetic Gotama is an annihilationist," he shows. Or else, if when those aggregates break up, that person does not break up, then in that case, the person is eternal. Then that becomes equal to Nibbana. "Equal" means exceedingly equal, or equal by way of similarity, equal by way of sameness. Just as Nibbana does not arise and does not break up, so too, for you, the person is equal to that. The application of transmigration, concluding with death and rebirth, is finished. Explanation of the application. 12. Explanation of the Application of Designation by Clinging 95. Now, there is the application of designation by clinging. There, the question is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, the rejection of the acknowledgment is for the proponent of another's doctrine. For he wants the designation, the declaring, the understanding of the person dependent on form, just as shade depends on a tree, just as fire depends on fuel. Therefore, asked "dependent on form," he acknowledges. Again, just as shade dependent on a tree is impermanent like the tree, and fire dependent on fuel is impermanent like the fuel, so too, asked about this meaning that the person dependent on form is impermanent like form, standing in his own doctrine, he rejects it. 97. In "dependent on blue form, blue," he rejects wanting oneness of the person with the blue form, and plurality by way of the many blue things in one body. 98. In "wholesome feeling," here too, he rejects wanting oneness with feeling, and plurality by way of the many wholesome feelings in one continuum. In the second way, the path... Because of the existence of the expression "skillful," he acknowledges, aiming at the meaning of "clever." He rejects "fruitful" and the like, because of the absence of such usage. 99. In the unskillful category, he acknowledges, aiming at the meaning of "not clever." 100. In the indeterminate category, he acknowledges, aiming at the indeterminate nature in terms of eternalism and so on. The rest here should be understood in the same way as stated below. 104. Regarding "depending on the eye," and so on, he acknowledges because of the existence of the expression "the one with the eye avoids evils like one with a crooked stick..." and so on. He rejects, not wanting the cessation of the person through the cessation of the eye-element and so on. 107. Regarding "depending on form," "depending on feeling," other duals, triads, and tetrads rooted in form should also be understood here. But because the designation of a person depends on the aggregates, he acknowledges the designation depending on two, three, four, or five. However, he rejects because of the absence of two or five in one continuum. The same method applies to sense bases and so on. 112. Now, to show that just as the impermanence of that on which the designation depends implies the impermanence of that designation, and from that, difference is established, so too it befalls that person, he says "just as a tree," and so on. There, "depending on" means relying on, based on, not without. But the opponent, not wanting that, rejects, standing in his doctrine. 115. "Fetter" means a chain bond. "One with a fetter" means one bound by that, whose form is such. Because one who has form is one with form, therefore, just as not a fetter... is form, so the meaning is "other than one with form." 116. Regarding "in mind, mind," and so on, he acknowledges, aiming at the state of being passionate and so on, in terms of contemplating the mind. Asked in the way of "arises," and so on, he rejects, not wanting the momentary nature of the person. Asked "is it the same?" or "is it different?" he rejects, fearing eternalism and annihilationism. Again, asked "should one say 'a boy'?" or "a girl'?" he acknowledges that one should say it, fearing the destruction of conventional language. The rest here is obvious. 118. Now the opponent, wishing to establish his doctrine in another way, says, beginning with "A person is not found." There, "not to be said" means: Why this much investigation into designation by grasping? Just tell me this: What is not to be said? "A person is found in the sense of ultimate truth." When the proponent says "Yes," he then says, beginning with "Surely, he who sees." There, "he who" is the person. "That which" is form. "By which" is the eye. "He" is the person. "That" is form. "By that" is the eye. This is what is said: Surely, he who sees a form with the eye, is he, seeing that form with that eye, a person? Although the proponent acknowledges that the eye itself sees form, being the basis for eye-consciousness, and similarly, the ear itself hears sound…pe… and consciousness itself cognizes phenomena, in the conventional sense of "The Arahant has an eye, the Arahant sees form with the eye," he affirms "Yes." 120. Then, based on the fallacy, with the person's speakability having been proven by the opponent, turning that very argument around, he says, beginning with "A person is found." There, "he who does not see" is a blind person, an insensible being, one reborn in the formless realm, or one who has attained cessation; and even one who is not blind does not see except at the time of seeing. The same method applies in the remaining cases. The rest should be understood according to the meaning of the Pāli text itself. 122. In comparing with the suttas, he says "He sees form" because the divine eye has form as its object. In the second instance, from the statement "I see beings," he says that he sees a person. In the third instance, from the doctrine "Having seen form, he distinguishes the person," he says that he sees both. Since what is to be seen is included in the fourfold classification of seen, heard, sensed, and cognized, and only the form sense-base is included in the collection of form, therefore the proponent makes the inquiry "Is form the person, is the person form, are both form?" Its meaning is quite clear. Explanation of the Investigation into Designation by Grasping. 13. Explanation of the Investigation into Human Agency 123. Now, human agency… There is investigation. There, with action existing, by necessity there must also be an agent of it, this is the question of the opponent, the affirmation of the existence of such actions is of the proponent. Again, "Is there an agent and a causer?" is the question of the opponent. There, "agent" means the doer of those actions. "Causer" means one who causes to be done by means of commands, instructions, and other methods. Now, since the opponent asks about an agent referring to a person, not merely the instrument, therefore the proponent rejects it. 124. "Of that, is there an agent and a causer?" Here, if whatever is found, a person is found to be the agent of each of those, then is another person found to be the causer and the one who causes to be caused of that also?