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There, since the opponent has established conventional truth by way of the Suttas, and there is no conditionedness etc. in convention, therefore the refutation is as it actually is for the proponent. But it should be said in terms of skill, "Understand the counter-action," and so on, all of which is condensed here as well. The explanation of the characteristics and reasoning is finished. 9. Explanation of the Purification of Words 55-59. Now, there is the purification of words. There, in order to purify the statement "a person is found," the question is "a person is found, is found a person?" This is the question for the proponent of the self. Its meaning is: these two words "a person is found," are they of one meaning or of different meanings? If indeed they are of different meanings, just as form is one thing, feeling is another, so a person is one thing, being found is another, it follows. But if they are of one meaning, just as what is mind is intellect, so the person himself is what is found, it follows. Therefore, I say that "if the person is what is found, then whatever is found is the person, do you accept this?" Then, because the proponent of the self wants the person to be found, but not the forms etc. that are being found to be the person, therefore he says, "a person is found, by some a person is found, by some a person is not found," and so on. Its meaning is: my person exists, the word of the Teacher is "there is a person." From this it is understood. But whoever is understood, is not entirely a person, but a person in some ways, not a person in others. Here, the *ke* in *ko-kāratthe* is *ke*, and *hi* is merely a particle. "A person in some ways, not a person in others" is the meaning here. This is what is said: Even among forms and so on, whatever is understood, there, a person is only a person. But among forms and so on, nothing is a person. Then that proponent of a personalist view said: "A person is understood in some ways, not in others." Its meaning: Since the meaning of the two words "a person is understood" is one, if the thing allowed as understood is different from the person, it follows that someone is a person, someone is not a person, and among them, someone is understood, someone is not understood. Do you accept this? Not wanting to deny the understanding of a person, he rejects it with "No." From here on, "Understand the refutation" and so on is all condensed. But it should be understood in detail. The same method applies to "A person is real" and so on. All these reasons are merely synonyms for "is understood." Moreover, since the personalist's assertion is "A person is understood as real in the ultimate sense," therefore, just as the view is "a person is understood," so too it follows that "a person is real." But the view that he has, "a person exists," is merely a synonym for "is present." Therefore, all these statements have been clarified. 60. There, what was said at the end, "A person exists, exists, not all is a person" and so on, this is the intention: Since what was said by the opponent, "A person exists, exists as a person in some ways, not as a person in others," amounts in meaning to "a person exists, exists, not all is a person," therefore, having made him accept it, the proponent now questions him thus: Because you have taken the view "a person exists" based merely on the statement "a person exists, practicing for self-benefit," Thus, as the Blessed One said, "Look upon the world as empty, Mogharāja, ever mindful," in this way, "it is not" is also said. Therefore, just as you have the view, "There is a person, but not the whole person exists," so too, it follows that there is no person, but not the whole person does not exist. Do you accept this? Then, not accepting it, he rejects it, saying, "No." The rest of the procedure here, such as refutation, should be understood in the manner already stated. The explanation of the scrutiny of speech is finished. 10. Explanation of the Application of Designation 61-66. Now, there is the application of designation. Indeed, in the realm of form, the personalist designates a person as having form, and similarly, in the formless realm, as formless. To break down that view of his, all the questions belong to the proponent, and the affirmation and denial belong to the opponent. For when it is said "having form," he affirms because of the existence of the body of form and the designation of such form. When it is said "desirous," he denies because of the non-existence of the absence of desire and the designation of such form. When it is said "formless," he affirms because of the existence of the formless aggregates and the designation of such form. In both cases, "being" is said as a synonym for person. 67. Now, since he desires, in the place where it comes, "contemplating the body in the body," that one body is different, and the person is different, therefore, to break down that view of his, the proponent's question is, "Is it the body, or is it the body?" There, "having made the body dear," means, "Having made the body something to be cherished, to be clung to, to be brought into oneness, to be made indivisible, I ask." "Is this it?" means, "Is this the very same?" "Is this, is this it?" is also a reading. "This is the very same," is the meaning. "One in meaning" means, "one in meaning." "The same, of the same kind" means, "the same, of the same nature, of the same kind." Only in the word is there a difference here. But in meaning, he asks, "Is this the body?" The opponent, not seeing the difference, affirms, "Yes." In the question, "Is it the person, or is it the life?" this is the same method. "Is the body different?" is the question. But the established one, having gained thus by contemplation of the body, acknowledges. But when asked about another, being unable to reject the spoken sutta, despises it. Thereafter, "Understand the refutation," etc., is simply straightforward in meaning. 68. In the opponent's position, when asked whether the body is one thing and the person another, the proponent rejects it because of the established convention, and the opponent makes a counter-move by means of deception. That too is straightforward in meaning. The explanation of conventional designation is finished. 11. Explanation of the Course of Existence 69-72. Now, by way of the cycle of existences, there is the inquiry into decease and rebirth. Therein, since the personalist, relying on suttas such as "a person, at most seven times more, transmigrates" (SN 2.133; Iti 24), takes up the view that a person transmigrates and speaks accordingly, therefore, in order to break that view of his, the question "does he transmigrate?" is for the proponent. Therein, "transmigrates" means wanders, makes comings and goings. Acknowledgment according to one's own view is for the opponent. The inquiry "is it the same person?" etc., is also for the proponent, the rejection for the other. Therein, "is it the same?" means is it exactly that one? Thus questioned, he rejects it out of fear of the eternalist view. When asked "is it another?" out of fear of the annihilationist view. When asked "is it the same and another?" out of fear of the partial eternalist view. When asked "is it neither the same nor another?" out of fear of the evasive view. Again, when all four questions are asked together, having rejected them out of fear of all four views, then, showing the suttas on which his view arose, he says, "Then indeed, does the person transmigrate?" etc. 76. Again, by the proponent, "according to your view, does he who transmigrates, is he the same in this world and in the next?" with the intention of restricting it to "is it exactly the same?", having rejected it out of fear of eternalism, and again, having made it firm, when asked in the same way, since it is indeed the person and not another being, and there is also the sutta "having passed away from there, he is reborn here" (Parā 12; DN 1.245), therefore he acknowledges. "Is it exactly the same human being?" He rejects the idea of rising to divinity, since one is only human. 77. When asked again, he affirms, "At that time, I was a teacher named Sunetta," according to the sutta (similar in meaning to A.N. 7.66). Then his own proponent, revealing that the statement is false due to the difference in the arising of gods and humans, says, "Having been a human..." 78. There, "Thus, death will not occur" means that in this state, death will not happen. From here on, the difference in questioning should be understood based on the difference in states of being: yaksha, peta, etc. 82. "Khattiya," etc., are stated in terms of lineage and in terms of bodily defects, etc. 87. Again, when asked by the opponent, "It cannot be said," the proponent's initial affirmation is due to the absence of going to another world for one established here. The second affirmation is also his, since the state of being a stream-enterer does not depart even in future existences for a stream-enterer. The statement "If so," etc., is the opponent's. 88. Again, the questioning is by the proponent, showing the absence of being human for one arisen in the deva world. 89. After that, "Not different, not departed": here, "not different" means entirely the same. "Not departed" means not departed in even one aspect. "It is not so" is said because of the absence of being human for one arisen in the deva world. 90. Again, having firmly questioned, he agrees with the doctrine that "the same person transmigrates." "Hand-cut," etc., are stated to break the doctrine that one who is not departed transmigrates, by showing the disappearance of form. There, "finger-cut" means one whose fingers are cut off. "Tendon-cut" means one whose major tendons are cut off. 91. In "Same form," etc., in the first question, he rejects it with reference to not going together with this form body.