English
In the second method, the question of the proponent, referring to the time of the last gift, the time of birth before and after, and the time of passing away while living and after passing away, and the rejection of the opponent, seeing the fault of applying "that very one is a Khattiya, that very one is a Brahmin," and the fault of no difference between those living and those passed away. The rest is similar to what was said in the first method. 4. The Truth of the Parts 1. Description of Anuloma-Paccanīka 13. In the third method, the question of the proponent, referring to all things such as aggregates and sense bases, and the rejection of the opponent, fearing faults such as "the self is in form, the self is in the eye." The rest is the same. The Truth of Space and So On 2. Description of Paccanīka-Anuloma 14. Thus, these three, in the five of Anuloma-Paccanīka, having divided them in order by way of Anuloma alone, and again, in the five of Paccanīka-Anuloma, beginning with "a person is not found" to divide them by way of Paccanīka alone. There, in the Anuloma of the five of Anuloma, which is summarized in the text, the meaning should be understood in the manner stated, and in the Anuloma of the Paccanīka, which is summarized in the text, the meaning should be understood in the manner stated. Thus, it should be understood that this argumentative method called "eight-faced" is defined by way of two Paccanīkas, Anuloma-Paccanīka and Paccanīka-Anuloma, in each truth of the four truths of the pure one and these three. Which is written in the text as "eight defeats" by way of one defeat in each face. There it is said: "Thus, in the fourfold question, divided into two fives; This is the argumentative method called the eight-faced, declared. "There are eight defeats there, four of them are righteous; And four are unrighteous, everywhere for the proponent; Victory and defeat, everywhere for the opponent." The description of the Truths is finished. 5. Description of the Pure One's Connection 17-27. Id Here, with forms and so on, there is a comparison of the true meaning. There, "and form" means, as form is truly perceived, "Is a person also perceived in the same way?" is a question implying this, for the proponent of their own view. "A person exists" is merely taking the statement, an assertion for the opponent. "If a person exists truly like form, does difference arise for the person like for feelings from form?" is an inquiry for the proponent of their own view. Seeing the contradiction with the conventional teaching, a rejection for the opponent. The rest is clear in meaning. According to the Dhamma here, based on the proponent's own view, with the true meaning of the seventy-seven kinds of ultimate reality, seventy-seven direct inferences are shown in the direct-inferential mode. The four counter-actions and so on are summarized. Based on the opponent's view, in the reverse-inferential mode, seventy-seven reverse inferences are shown. The four counter-actions and so on are summarized. There, "It was said by the Blessed One" by merely stating this, showing the existence of a person and the perceptibility of form as true ultimate reality, "It was said by the Blessed One" is an inquiry for the opponent, to make them acknowledge the difference between the two. Because the question of oneness and difference of convention and ultimate reality must be set aside, a rejection for the proponent of their own view. The rest here is also clear in meaning. Description of the Comparison of Purification. 6. Description of the Comparison of Similes 28-36. Now, with forms and so on, there is a comparison of the true meaning by way of similes. There, "Is there a difference between form and feeling due to the commonality of perception?" and "Is there a commonality of perception between a person and form?" are both questions for the proponent of their own view. Both are assertions for the opponent. By the commonality of perception conceded by the opponent, "Like the difference between form and feeling, is there a difference between form and a person?" is an inquiry for the proponent of their own view, a rejection for the other. The rest here is also clear in meaning. According to the Dhamma here, based on the proponent's own view, with the basis of form and so on, and with the wheels, two thousand and ninety refutation pentads are shown. They are dependent. How? In the aggregates, in the cycle rooted in form, there are four, similarly in those rooted in feeling, etc., there are twenty. In the sense bases, in the cycle rooted in the eye sense base, there are eleven, similarly in the rest, there are three hundred and thirty-two. In the elements, in the cycle rooted in the eye element, there are seventeen, similarly in the rest, there are three hundred and six. In the faculties, in the cycle rooted in the eye faculty, there are twenty-one, similarly in the rest, there are four hundred and sixty-two. Thus, in total, there are nine hundred and twenty-five groups of five for refutation. 37-45. Even in the opponent's view, since form is perceived, by way of affirmation, he is made to acknowledge the difference of form, feeling, etc., then, relying on the sutta "there is a person," by six means, the commonality of perception of the person with form, etc., is imputed, and an inquiry into difference is made. The rest here is straightforward in meaning. Also, from the perspective of the Dhamma, in the proponent's view, nine hundred and twenty-five groups of five for counteraction are shown in the manner described above. A comparison of the ultimate truth with form, etc., by way of analogy. 7. Description of the comparison by the fourfold method 46-52. Now, since what is perceived by the ultimate truth must be one of the fifty-seven ultimate truths in form, etc., or dependent on form, etc., or other than form, etc., or dependent on form, etc., therefore, this comparison with the ultimate truth is begun by this fourfold method. Therein, the inquiry "Is form the person?" is for the proponent, the rejection "No, it is not" due to fear of the annihilationist view is for the opponent, the imputation of refutation is for the proponent. But is this proper? Should not even the statement "Form is feeling" be rejected? Yes, it should be rejected. However, that is because of the difference in inherent nature between form and feeling, not because of the absence of difference. And this one does not want the difference of the person even from a single element in form, etc., therefore it is proper. And this inquiry "Is form the person?"... up to "Is the unknowable faculty the person?" is begun with reference to the entire ultimate truth. But the entire thing, in terms of individual characteristics, is spoken of as one. It is not possible, this much only of the characteristic of application is established in the manner of the teaching. Therefore, the wise discern the meaning. But one who desires to argue, taking this characteristic, should speak in such a way that there is no opportunity for the opponent. Thus, even by the establishment of the characteristic of application in the manner of the teaching, it is fitting. In this way, the meaning should be understood in all applications. But this is the distinction: In "Is there a person in form?" etc., just as three great elements can be said to depend on one great element, and consciousness can be said to depend on material form, "Is there consciousness in form?" what is it to you if there is a person in form? And just as all phenomena, such as feeling, etc., are inseparable in nature, or the four immaterial aggregates, or even Nibbāna, can be said to be "other than form," what is it to you if there is a person? And just as, due to the dependence of material phenomena arising from mind, it can be said, "Is there form in feeling?...in consciousness?" what is it to you if there is a person? But in all applications, the opponent's rejection is due to fear of the annihilationist view and conflict with convention. The rest is clear enough in meaning here. In terms of the Dhamma, here, in each of the fifty-seven realities, by making four each, two hundred and twenty-eight have been shown by way of refutation. In the opponent's position as well, there are just as many by way of counteraction. Here, the assertion of the proponent when "Is there a person?" is said, is by way of convention as it comes in the Suttas. The rejection in "Is form the person?" etc., is because the question of the personality belief must be established. The opponent's counteraction is by way of deceit alone. Comparison by way of the tetrad. The discussion of comparison is concluded. 8. Explanation of the Appropriateness of Characteristics 53. Now, there is what is called the appropriateness of characteristics. Here, since, having established Nibbāna, the remaining ultimate realities are conditioned due to being dependent on conditions, being made by coming together with conditions, being impermanent due to arising and ceasing, being always non-existent, and since there is a cause, known as the cause of arising, Because of that sign, Nibbāna is without cause, unconditioned, eternal, and signless, due to the absence of the aforementioned characteristics; this is the characteristic of the Real. Therefore, if a person is also the ultimate reality of the Real, then they too should have this characteristic. With this in mind, the eight inquiries beginning with "Is a person conditioned?" are for the proponent of the self, and the refutation is for the opponent. "Understand the refutation" and so on is condensed here. Thus, these eight sets of five should be understood as being in accordance with the proponent's side, in terms of mere conformity. 54. On the opponent's side, there are also eight sets of five, in terms of mere opposition in accordance with opposition.