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The opponent, not wanting that, rejects it for fear of the doctrine of creation by a supreme being. Again, when asked, since parents beget a person, give a name, and nourish, therefore they are the agents of that. And those who are good friends or teachers, who teach those various branches of knowledge, skills, and arts, they are called causers, affirming this meaning. The previous action itself is intended as both the agent and the causer of that. 125. "Of that, of that itself?" With this, he asks: if for the agent of actions there is an agent, and for that also an agent, and for that also an agent, then, in that case, with each preceding one, a succeeding person must necessarily be made, and by this also, another person must be made in the future by the agent of those actions, and by that also another, then there is no end to suffering, no cutting off of the cycle, no unconditioned final liberation. Because of the absence of conditions, there is an absence of suffering dependent on conditions, which is said to be liberation, there is no such thing. Or, "Of that, of that itself?" If action is not merely action, but there is a person who is the agent of that, and an agent of that also, and an agent of that also, thus there is a succession of persons. In that case, that ending of suffering which is said to be by the non-occurrence of the cycle of action, that does not exist, is the meaning. The opponent does not want that. is rejected. Moreover, in general questions about agency, it is said "the doer, the causer" referring to the person, not the condition. For there are conditions for the great earth and so on. 135. The question, "Is there another doer of good and bad deeds?" is rejected for fear of views such as, "The self is endowed with mental formations." 136. "Is a result experienced?" etc., is stated to break down views, showing the person as the experiencer of the result. There, the inquiry, "experiencer of the result?" is for the opponent, the rejection is for our own side, since there is no other feeler apart from the arising of the result. The question again is for our own side, the affirmation for the other. 138. "Experiencer of that?" Since the result is to be experienced, but the person is not the result, therefore the rejection is for the opponent. Asked again, since, established in the result of merit, the experiencer of the result kisses and embraces a son or husband, mother or wife, therefore the opponent affirms, referring to such experiencing. "Of that very one?" If the result is merely a result, but the person is the experiencer of that, and another is the experiencer of that, then there is a succession of persons. If so, that ending of suffering declared by the non-occurrence of the round of results, does not exist. Hereafter, the meaning of the general questions about experiencing should be understood in the same way as stated below. 142. The question, "Is there another experiencer of the results of good and bad deeds?" is rejected for fear of views such as, "The self is endowed with feeling." 143. "Heavenly bliss" etc., is begun in terms of showing the division of the results of good and bad deeds. All that should be understood in the same way as stated below. Here, the rejection of the experiencer by our own side should be understood in terms of the person, not in terms of the feeler. 148. For having made the great earth and so on an object, The arising of feelings is not denied. 170. "The doer, the instigator, the experiencer of the result," etc., is begun by way of the mixed mode. There, what you say, "He does," and "He is the doer," and "He experiences," does he alone do, does he alone experience? This is an inquiry for the proponent of one's own view, a rejection for the proponent of another's view, fearing contradiction of the Suttas. 171. Asked again, the affirmation is of that same one, according to the Sutta beginning, "Here he rejoices, hereafter he rejoices," etc. (Dhp. 18). Then, refuting the opportunity for his statement, the proponent of one's own view says, "Self-made is happiness and suffering." 172. There, "Another does," is said by way of questioning the difference between the doer and the experiencer. Then, the proponent of another's view, rejecting it fearing contradiction of the Suttas, affirms, thinking, "Having done it as a human being, he experiences it as a divine being," when asked again. But for one speaking thus, happiness and suffering are caused by another, and when asked in that way, he rejects it again. 174. "He and another," is said by way of questioning the identity and difference between the doer and the experiencer. Then, the proponent of another's view, rejecting it fearing contradiction of the Suttas, affirms, when asked again, having combined the previous two modes into one. But for one speaking thus, happiness and suffering are both self-made and other-made, and when asked in that way, he rejects it again. 176. "Neither he does," is said by way of rejecting the identity and difference between the doer and the experiencer. Then, the proponent of another's view, rejecting it fearing contradiction of the Suttas, affirms, when asked again, thinking, "Since a person, having done a deed for arising in the divine world, does not experience it as the same human being, nor does another different from the one who did the deed experience it, therefore the doer and the experiencer are neither the same, nor different." Is this merely a matter of opinion? But for one speaking thus, happiness and suffering are neither self-caused, nor other-caused, but arisen by chance, and when asked in that way, he rejects it again. Moreover, in this mixed mode, the meaning should be understood in this way also, from the beginning. Since this proponent of a person He wants an agent and a feeler. Therefore, he must be either the agent, or the feeler, or another, or both, or neither; this is what he incurs. Thus incurring, while pursuing the inquiry, the proponent states all four alternatives, beginning with "he does." The rest is as previously described. At the end, however, all four questions are asked together. There, the rejection and the acceptance, and the incurring of the self-made fault, should be understood in the same way as before. Hereafter, instead of saying "wholesome and unwholesome," the alternatives are shown with "is there action?" etc., in the manner stated below. The meaning of these should also be understood in the manner stated below. Explanation of the Inquiry into Human Effort. The Group of the Wholesome is also a name for this. 14. Explanation of the Inquiry into Higher Knowledge 193. Hereafter, the attainment of arahantship is established by way of the Inquiry into Higher Knowledge, etc. There, when the proponent has agreed, the opponent, thinking that "there is no attainment of special powers such as psychic power in external, non-sensory objects, but there is internally, therefore there must be a person who produces psychic powers," says, "Is there anyone who manifests psychic power?" etc. All that is plain in meaning. Explanation of the Inquiry into Higher Knowledge. 15-18. Explanation of the Inquiry into Kin, etc. 197. Now, the Inquiry into Kin begins with "mother" etc. The Inquiry into Caste begins with "Khattiya" etc. The Inquiry into Practice is "householder or renunciate?" The Inquiry into Rebirth is "deva or human?" The Inquiry into Penetration begins with "stream-enterer" etc., and is also called the Inquiry into the Noble Ones. All these are plain in meaning. Here, "having been an arahant, not an arahant" is not stated because it is an empty assertion. 206. "Four pairs of persons" etc. is the Inquiry into the Sangha, and that too is plain in meaning. 209. "Conditioned" etc. is the Inquiry into the Nature of Reality. There, the third alternative is the question for the proponent. The rejection is for the opponent, because of the absence of such a reality. When asked again, the acceptance, referring to the person, is for the same. 211. In the question "another person?" also, with conditioned things... By the blind, otherness, not wanting, rejection is of that very thing. 212. "Khandhas are conditioned," etc., having shown the conditioned and unconditioned in their own form, is said for the purpose of questioning otherness. 213. "Form is conditioned," etc., having shown the aggregates in detail, is said for the purpose of questioning otherness. 214. "The arising of a person" is a question for the proponent of a personalist view; the affirmation, "subject to birth, subject to aging, or subject to death," etc., is for the opponent. But he does not want its conditioned nature, therefore he rejects it. 215. Asked in the manner of "again, no arising is evident," he affirms, "only suffering arises, only suffering ceases," etc. (SN 1.171), that the arising, etc., of a person are not fitting. 216. "Is there an end?" means, "end" refers to Nibbana. He asks, "is there existence in that?" If there is existence, it leads to eternalism; if there is non-existence, it leads to annihilationism. Not wanting either of these, he later rejects it. Description of investigation of relatives, etc. 19. Description of investigation of penetration, etc. 217. "Relying on becoming" in the question, "becoming" is rebirth-becoming. 218. In the question, "feeling is being felt," only the yogi who has grasped the feeling being felt understands feeling; the ignorant ordinary person does not understand. 224. The questions about mindfulness of the body, etc., are of obvious meaning. 226. In the verse of the Pārāyana, "look upon the world as empty," the meaning is: contemplate the world of aggregates as empty of self. 228. "Does a person contemplate?" is a question from a proponent of a personalist view.