English
Ba. In such a temporary state, if someone is referred to by the name "Shariputra" and it is said that he teaches the Dharma, it is for the sake of ease of expression. Furthermore, if one asserts that the self of a person is substantially existent and truly established, there are two faults: it would entail that all sentient beings effortlessly attain liberation, or it would entail that it is impossible to attain liberation. The first is that if such a substantially existent self of a person were truly established as the nature of reality, then since all sentient beings are extremely accustomed to clinging to the self of a person, merely touching that nature would necessarily lead to effortless liberation. The second is that if sentient beings cling to the self of a person, and it is substantially existent and truly established, then since there is no possibility of abandoning that clinging, it would entail that it is impossible for sentient beings to attain liberation. In the third section of Maitreya's text, Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes, thirteen ways of viewing the self are taught: clinging to the self of a person as being singular; viewing it as the cause that generates other things; viewing it as the profound enjoyer of objects; viewing it as the agent; viewing it as the ruler who dominates objects; viewing it as the meaning of ownership; viewing it as permanent; viewing it as the basis, the support, for both complete affliction and complete purification; viewing it as a yogi; and viewing it as liberated and unliberated. These ten are views of the self of a person, and as antidotes to them, ten kinds of expertise are taught. That is, the antidote to the first is expertise in the aggregates, since they are by nature a collection of many diverse things, and therefore become an antidote to viewing it as singular. Expertise in the elements is the antidote to the second, since element means cause, and expertise in the eighteen elements becomes the antidote to viewing the self as the cause. Expertise in the sense-fields is the antidote to the third, since there is no self that enjoys objects, but rather it is through the interdependence of the twelve sense-fields that one closely enjoys objects. Expertise in dependent origination is the antidote to the fourth, since it is not done by a self, but is merely dependent origination of causes and conditions.
Chinese
是由于从显现产生的缘故。精通处与非处是第五种对治，因为这些事物不是由补特伽罗的“我”所控制，而是遵循相应的因果关系。精通根是第六种对治，因为补特伽罗不是主宰的因缘，而是二十一种根的主宰所依。精通时是第七种对治，因为“我”不是常恒的，而是由三时生灭的缘故。精通四谛是第八种对治，因为补特伽罗的“我”不是遍染污和清净的处所，而是前二谛是遍染污的处所，后二谛是清净的处所的缘故。精通乘是第九种对治，精通有为和无为是第十种对治。第二，再次广说彼（指“我”）。其中，识别坏聚见自性，以及破斥其执持之境。其中，第一，宣说执“我”之所缘行相，宣说执“我所”之所缘行相，考察其境，以及考察说坏聚见为无明，共有四部分。第一部分是：此执“我”之分别念，其所缘之境，乃是自相续的五蕴聚合。行相是缘彼境，以“我”的自性来执持的能取分。那么，是否仅仅缘自相续的五蕴而执“我”，除此之外，不会对其他境产生执“我”之想呢？答：此执“我”之分别念，是颠倒错乱的心识之故。分别念是不坚固、动摇的自性，因此，对于他相续所摄的众生，以及未能了知众生的相续，以及成为无情物的对境，也会产生执“我”之想。因为凡是错乱的，就是将非彼执为彼的分别念，所以不是绝对的，而是刹那刹那分别念的执持方式会转变。
English
It is because it arises from appearance. Being skilled in what is and is not the place is the fifth antidote, because these things are not controlled by the self of the person, but follow the corresponding cause and effect relationship. Being skilled in the senses is the sixth antidote, because the person is not the cause of the master, but the basis of the master of the twenty-one senses. Being skilled in time is the seventh antidote, because the self is not permanent, but arises and ceases by the three times. Being skilled in the four truths is the eighth antidote, because the self of the person is not the place of complete defilement and purification, but the first two truths are the place of complete defilement, and the latter two are the place of purification. Being skilled in the vehicle is the ninth antidote, and being skilled in the conditioned and unconditioned is the tenth antidote. Second, that itself is again explained in detail. Among them, identifying the nature of the view of the collection of destructibles, and refuting its object of grasping. Among them, the first is: explaining the aspect of grasping at the self, explaining the aspect of grasping at what belongs to the self, examining its object, and examining the explanation that the view of the collection of destructibles is ignorance, there are four parts. The first part is: the object to be focused on by this conceptualization of grasping at the self is the five aggregates of one's own continuum. The aspect is the grasping part of the attitude of looking at me as the self by focusing on that object. So, is it that only the five aggregates of one's own continuum are focused on and grasped as the self, and that the idea of grasping at the self does not arise for objects other than that? Answer: This conceptualization of grasping at the self is a mind that is completely confused. Because conceptualization is not firm and has a moving nature, it is possible to generate the idea of grasping at me as the self for sentient beings included in other continuums, and for objects that have not realized the continuum of sentient beings, and for inanimate objects. Because whatever is confused is the conceptualization of grasping what is not that as that, it is not absolute, but the way of grasping of conceptualization changes from moment to moment.
Chinese
是。對於事物真實的狀態，在那裡執著的思維，也不是立刻就改變，而是根深蒂固地存在。因此，我執的思維，對於自己相續所攝的五蘊中的任何一個，都會恆常產生執著為我的概念。在其他不同的情況下，比如對於自己的親友，當別人對他們造成傷害時，會認為：「這個人傷害了我。」因而對親友產生我的概念。又比如對於自己的房屋田地等，當它們受到損害時，會認為：「這個人傷害了我。」像這樣對房屋田地產生我的概念。而針對自己相續產生我的概念，也不是絕對的。因為對於識蘊，我的概念會持續不斷地產生。有時僅僅對一個識產生我的概念，有時對識和色蘊這兩者執著為我，有時在它們的基礎上加上受蘊，對三者都執著，乃至對五蘊全部執著為我等等，以不確定的方式產生執著，這是顯而易見的。第二個是執為我所，也是觀察壞滅和聚合的五蘊。其中，主要是不太會對識蘊產生執為我所的概念。也就是說，對於阿賴耶識，從來沒有執為我所的情況。而對於其他的識，則會產生執為我所的概念，因為可以看到執著「我的眼識」等等。其他的四蘊，無論是屬於自己的相續還是屬於他人的相續，都會產生執著，例如「我的快樂」和「我的痛苦」，這是受；「我的好念頭」和「我的壞念頭」，這是想；「我的信心」和「我的慈悲」，這是行；「我的眼睛」和「我的耳朵」，這是色蘊，都會執為我所。對於屬於其他有情的相續，會執著「我的眷屬朋友」。對於「我的食物」和「我的衣服」等資具物品也會執著。但因為這些都不是根深蒂固的思維，所以也不是絕對的。第三個是，執著為我的和我所的執著方式
English
It is. Regarding the true state of things, the thoughts that cling to it do not change immediately, but remain deeply rooted. Therefore, the thought of self-grasping constantly gives rise to the notion of grasping as self any of the five aggregates included in one's own continuum. In other situations, such as with one's own relatives and friends, when others harm them, one thinks, "This person has harmed me." Thus, the concept of self arises towards relatives and friends. Also, for example, when one's own house and fields are damaged, one thinks, "This person has harmed me." Like this, the concept of self arises towards houses and fields. Even when focusing on one's own continuum to generate the concept of self, it is not always definite. Because the concept of self constantly arises towards the aggregate of consciousness, sometimes the concept of self arises towards only one consciousness, sometimes one grasps the consciousness and the aggregate of form as self, and sometimes one adds the aggregate of feeling to them and grasps all three, up to grasping all five aggregates as self, etc., in an uncertain manner, which is clearly seen. The second is grasping as mine, which also looks at the five aggregates of destruction and assembly. Among them, mainly there is not much of a concept of grasping as mine arising towards the aggregate of consciousness. That is, for the alaya-consciousness, there is never a case of grasping as mine. But for other consciousnesses, the concept of grasping as mine does arise, because one can see grasping "my eye consciousness" and so on. The other four aggregates, whether belonging to one's own continuum or to another's continuum, all have attachment, such as "my happiness" and "my suffering," which is feeling; "my good thoughts" and "my bad thoughts," which is conception; "my faith" and "my compassion," which is formation; "my eyes" and "my ears," which are the aggregates of form, all are grasped as mine. For those belonging to the continuum of other sentient beings, one grasps "my retinue and friends." One also grasps "my food" and "my clothes" and other material objects. But because these are not deeply rooted thoughts, they are not always definite. The third is the way of grasping of grasping as self and grasping as mine.
Chinese
我所执着的<最初认为的我>的事物，因为甚至在名言中也不存在，所以在所知中是不可能的。无论是俱生智还是遍计智都一样，因为像常、一、自在的我，无论何时都不存在。然而，执着于此的分别念的执着方式的所取分，是无实义共相。在胜义理智面前，不要说人我存在，即使在世俗理智面前，人我也不存在。在<有无等理智>没有考察分析的情况下，顺应世间的名声，认为人与补特伽罗存在，但这无论如何也不是实物之义。因此，虽然在二谛中不存在，但作为<业果等的所依>，承认其仅仅在如实名言中被假立存在。同样，见者、有情、作者和受异熟果者等十二种作者补特伽罗，也与之相似，仅仅是假立存在，认为其是实物和真实存在也是错误的。第四个问题是，坏聚见本身就是无明吗？不是真正的无明，因为无明是执着方式不清晰。而<我见>在此，执着方式非常清晰，将不存在的误认为存在，颠倒地认识，所以是特殊的无明。例如，将非人称为非人一样。因为这个原因，坏聚见是从因无明中产生的，并且它也会产生果无明，因为它的自性与许多无明朋友相关联。因此，法称等一些聪明人也使用了无明的名称。一般来说，如果按照将烦恼归纳为三种的方式，那么五种见都归于无明。但是，在解释六种、十种和二十种等烦恼的差别时，需要分别引用坏聚见和无明。因此，像十二缘起支中的无明就不是这个，在归纳为三种烦恼时，所有烦恼的种类都是毒。
English
The object of my attachment, the thing that is <initially thought of as 'I'>, is impossible to be known because it does not even exist conventionally. Whether it is innate or imputed, it is the same, because such a self that is permanent, singular, and independent never exists. However, the apprehended aspect of the way of grasping of the conceptual thought that grasps at it is a non-existent universal. In the face of reasoning that investigates ultimate truth, let alone the existence of a self of a person, even in the face of reasoning that investigates conventional truth, there is no self of a person. Without examining or analyzing <existence or non-existence, etc., by reasoning>, in accordance with worldly fame, it is asserted that persons and individuals exist, but this is never in the sense of a substance. Therefore, although it does not exist in the two truths, it is acknowledged that it exists as something that is merely imputed in valid convention as <a basis for actions and results, etc.>. Similarly, the twelve types of agents, such as the seer, sentient being, actor, and experiencer of ripening results, are also merely imputed in accordance with that. It is a mistake to think that they exist as substances and in reality. The fourth question is, is the view of the aggregates as a collection ignorance itself? It is not actual ignorance, because ignorance is an unclear way of grasping. But here, the <view of self> has a very clear way of grasping, mistaking what does not exist for what does exist, and perceiving it in a reversed way. Therefore, it is a special kind of ignorance, like calling a non-human a non-human. For that reason, the view of the aggregates arises from the cause of ignorance, and it will also generate the result of ignorance, because its nature is related to many ignorant friends. Therefore, some intelligent people such as Dharmakirti also used the term ignorance. In general, if we consider the way of summarizing the afflictions into three, then all five views are included in ignorance. However, when explaining the distinctions of six, ten, and twenty afflictions, it is necessary to cite the view of the aggregates and ignorance separately. Therefore, the ignorance that is part of the twelve links of dependent origination is not this, and when summarizing into three afflictions, all types of afflictions are poison.