Chinese
如前于第二品分别时所说，以三种方式归纳。第二，破斥其所缘，分为总破斥坏聚见之所缘和别破斥二十种坏聚见之所缘。第一，有十二种理智，第一种是观察我与蕴是一还是异而破斥。如圣者龙树于《中观根本慧论》中所说，如果五蕴是补特伽罗的我，那么就像蕴有生灭一样，我也应有生灭，成为无常之自性。如果补特伽罗的我与诸蕴是异体，那么它就不应具有蕴的任何特征。这也是不能接受的，因为当生起乐、苦、舍三种感受时，认为“我是乐的，我是痛苦的”，这样的想法也是不合理的，因为我所感受的不是乐和苦，因为我和感受二者是性质不同的异体。其他蕴也应以此类推。第二，观察前后而破斥。比如天授从天界死后转生为人，此时，作为天人的我和作为人的我，是一还是异？如果作为天人的我与作为人的我是同一个，那么我应是常，然而二者不可能是一。其理由是，如果作为人的我是作为天人的我，那么在人的身体上也应能自在地支配天人的处所、身体、受用、寿命等，但事实并非如此。如果作为人的我与作为天人的我是不同的，是异体，那么我应成无常，因为天界的我已灭，而人界的我已生。第三，观察能取者与所取者而破斥。能取者是补特伽罗的我，而其所取者是五蕴。例如，从天人的能取五蕴之集合中，然后转生为人的时候，就像执取所取人蕴五蕴一样。因此，能取者我与所取者蕴，是一还是异？如果说是同一，那么应
English
As previously explained in the second chapter on distinctions, it is summarized in three ways. Secondly, refuting its object, it is divided into generally refuting the object of the view of the perishable aggregate and specifically refuting the object of the twenty views of the perishable aggregate. First, there are twelve types of reasoning, the first of which is to examine whether the self and the aggregates are the same or different and then refute it. As the noble Nagarjuna said in the Root Wisdom of the Middle Way, if the five aggregates are the self of a person, then just as the aggregates have birth and death, so too should the self have birth and death, becoming the nature of impermanence. If the self of a person is a different substance from the aggregates, then it should not have any of the characteristics of the aggregates. This is also unacceptable, because when the three feelings of pleasure, pain, and equanimity arise, the thought "I am happy, I am suffering" is also unreasonable, because what I feel is not pleasure and pain, because the self and feeling are two different substances with different characteristics. The other aggregates should also be inferred in the same way. Second, refuting by examining before and after. For example, when Devadatta dies from the realm of the gods and is reborn as a human, at this time, are the self as a god and the self as a human the same or different? If the self as a god is the same as the self as a human, then the self should be permanent, but it is impossible for the two to be the same. The reason is that if the self as a human is the self as a god, then in the human body one should also be able to freely control the place, body, enjoyment, lifespan, etc. of the gods, but this is not the case. If the self as a human is different from the self as a god, is a different entity, then the self should become impermanent, because the self of the realm of the gods has ceased, and the self of the realm of humans has been born. Third, refuting by examining the taker and the taken. The taker is the self of the person, and what is to be taken is the five aggregates. For example, from the collection of the five aggregates of the taker of the gods, and then when reborn as a human, it is like grasping the five aggregates of the human aggregate to be taken. Therefore, are the taker self and the aggregate to be taken the same or different? If it is said to be the same, then it should
Chinese
取蕴者，非是人我，人我是常一自在之故，而所取之蕴，彼等初生，终灭，是无常之自性故。是故如我常一般，五取蕴亦应是常，或又如五取蕴无常、众多、他自在一般，取者我也应如是。又我从所取之蕴，非是异体，若彼二者无关联而各异，则见色之时，谓我见色亦不应理，色是眼识所见故，眼识与我二者，是无关联且各异故。第四，以集合而观察破斥者：如《宝积经》中之《圣父子相见经》所说，于身心之集合，施设名为士夫，而身心之集合，身之肉、皮、骨等是地界，血、胆汁、汗等是水界，身之暖是火界，气息等之动摇是风界，身之空隙等是空界，四名蕴等是识界，是于六界聚集之集合施设为士夫，若有实有之士夫，则地界等一一若是士夫，则成士夫六数等众多之过，六界中，如地界一般者是士夫，其余不是士夫，则于六者中，一者是士夫，其余不是也，则无有取舍之理由故。又士夫非是地界，亦非是水，非是火，非是风界，非是空界，亦非是识，若是六界皆非，则彼之外，亦无有可指定之实有士夫故。第五，以相而观察破斥者：如《中观四百论》中，圣天所说，若人我
English
The taker of aggregates is not the self of a person, because the self of a person is permanent, singular, and independent. However, the aggregates to be taken are initially produced and ultimately destroyed, possessing the nature of impermanence. Therefore, just as the self is permanent, it follows that the five aggregates to be taken should also be permanent. Alternatively, just as the five aggregates to be taken are impermanent, numerous, and dependent on others, it follows that the self, the taker, should also be the same. Furthermore, the self is not reasonably a separate entity from the aggregates to be taken. If the two were unrelated and distinct, then when seeing a form, the thought "I see a form" would also be unreasonable, because the form is seen by the eye consciousness, and the eye consciousness and the self are unrelated and distinct. Fourth, refuting by examining the collection: As stated in the "Meeting of the Holy Father and Son Sutra" within the Ratnakuta Sutra, the collection of body and mind is designated as a person. The collection of body and mind includes the flesh, skin, bones, etc., of the body as the earth element; blood, bile, sweat, etc., as the water element; the body's warmth as the fire element; the movement of breath, etc., as the wind element; the body's cavities, etc., as the space element; and the four aggregates of name as the consciousness element. It is upon the collection of these six elements that the designation of a person is made. If there were a truly existent person, then if each of the earth element, etc., were a person, it would follow that there would be six or more persons. If, among the six elements, something like the earth element were a person, and the others were not, then among the six, one would be a person, and the others would not be. There would be no reason to accept or reject this. Furthermore, a person is not the earth element, nor the water element, nor the fire element, nor the wind element, nor the space element, nor consciousness. If it is none of the six elements, then apart from them, there is no truly existent person that can be identified. Fifth, refuting by examining characteristics: As stated by Aryadeva in the Four Hundred Verses, if the self of a person...
Chinese
既非女人，又非男人，又非雌雄人，彼时，执著于我，乃是仅仅无知之威力，你们仅是思念为我所有而已。详细解释那些意义，首先观察身体之相而破斥：男人不是人的我，因为与女人之形不相似之故。女人不是我，因为与男人之形不相似之故。雌雄人不是我，因为与女人之形不相似之故。若说于此不遍，则彼之遍成立是：自性相违、极其各异之三者，作为我之事物是同一，极不应理，因为男人是于女人有情爱，且具有勇气等之自性者，女人是与彼相反之自性者，雌雄人是与彼二者皆相异之自性之故。此外，若说我为彼唯一之实性，则相违是具有种种自性，因为实性是需要本体同一，或虽非如此，然亦需要极其相似、无有不同者之故。观察先后之相而破斥：二男人互相具有贪欲，成为互相亲友，又彼二男人远离贪欲，成为互相仇敌之时，具有贪欲亲友之状态是我的话，则远离贪欲仇敌之状态不是我，因为具有贪欲与远离贪欲二者自性极其各异之故。此外，若被烦恼束缚之状态是人之我的话，则从烦恼解脱之时不是我，因为束缚与解脱二者自性极其各异之故。若说即使自性相违，然事物是同一，则土石等亦将成为我的过失，因为即使自性相违，然事物成为同一，岂非将成太过之过失？承认极其各异之事物为人之我的事物是同一，乃是极其颠倒错乱。若想即使自性种种，然是我亦不相违，若你们说人之我为彼唯一之实性，则实性需要本体是同一，若非如此
English
Neither a woman, nor a man, nor a hermaphrodite, at that time, clinging to self is merely due to the power of ignorance. You are merely thinking that you are the owners. To explain those meanings in detail, first, examine the characteristics of the body and refute them: A man is not the self of a person, because he is not similar to the form of a woman. A woman is not the self, because she is not similar in form to a man. A hermaphrodite is not the self, because he is not similar in form to a woman. If it is said that this is not pervasive, then the proof of its pervasiveness is: It is very unreasonable for three things that are contradictory in nature and extremely different to be the same as the object of the self, because a man is one who has affection for women and has the characteristic of having courage, etc., and a woman is one who has the opposite characteristic, and a hermaphrodite is one whose characteristic is different from both of them. Furthermore, if you say that the self is the state of being that very thing, then it is contradictory to have various characteristics, because that very thing must be of the same essence, or if it is not so, it must be very similar and without difference. To refute by examining the characteristics of before and after: Two men have desire for each other, and become friends with each other, and when those two men are free from attachment and become enemies with each other, if the state of having desire and being friends is the self, then the state of being free from attachment and being enemies is not the self, because the nature of having desire and being free from attachment are very different. Furthermore, if the state of being bound by afflictions is the self of a person, then the time of being liberated from afflictions will not be the self, because the nature of being bound and liberated are very different. If you say that even if the characteristics are contradictory, the object is the same, then it will be a fallacy that earth, stones, etc. are also the self, because even if the characteristics are contradictory, the object becomes the same, wouldn't it become too extreme a fallacy? To accept that extremely different things are the same object of the self of a person is extremely confused. If you think that even if there are various characteristics, it is not contradictory to be the self, if you say that the self of a person is the state of being that very thing, then the state of being needs to be of the same essence, and if it is not so
Chinese
而且必须是非常相似的，因为不同和各种各样本身就是矛盾的。因此，如果人我的自性是唯一的实相，那么各种各样的不同等就是矛盾的。第六个要点，通过对作者的考察进行驳斥：因为感受苦乐舍三种感受，所以没有感受的自性。例如，眼睛的根、境色和眼睛的识三者聚合，完全享用境色的触，以及触之后的乐受，在那个时候，没有感受快乐的自性，因为体验者是由感受所作。同样，取者和行者也不是人我的自性。如果自性是那些，那么即使没有取者的手和行者的脚，也应该能够进行取和行等行为，因为没有那些，仅仅依靠自性就无法进行取和行等任何行为，而且进行那些行为必须依赖手脚。因此，成立了取者是手，行者是脚。第七个要点，通过对作者和异熟果的体验者的考察进行驳斥：善恶之业，通过伴随意念的身和，伴随意念的语和，仅仅通过意念也能见到。我没有造业，既然没有那样做，为什么我会体验果报呢？不应该体验，因为我在因位时没有造业。因此，作者由身语意所作，所以异熟的果报也应该由身语意的集合来体验。第八个要点，通过对部分进行考察进行驳斥：对方说，作者是身语意的集合，异熟果的体验者也是身语意的集合，这非常合理。然而，身语意的集合就是我。如果这样说，身语意的集合永远不可能是我，因为身语意是具有多个部分的。而且，身体有手脚内脏等多个部分，而且
English
Moreover, it must be very similar, because difference and variety are inherently contradictory. Therefore, if the self of a person is the sole reality, then various differences and so on are contradictory. Sixth point, refutation through examination of the agent: Because of experiencing the three feelings of pleasure, pain, and equanimity, there is no self that experiences feeling. For example, when the three—the eye faculty, the object form, and the eye consciousness—are combined, and the touch that fully utilizes the object form, and the feeling of pleasure that follows the touch are experienced, there is no self that experiences pleasure, because the experiencer is made by feeling. Similarly, the taker and the goer are not the self of a person. If the self were those, then even without the hand of the taker and the foot of the goer, they should be able to perform the actions of taking and going, etc., because without those, the self alone cannot perform any actions of taking and going, and performing those actions necessarily depends on the hands and feet. Therefore, it is established that the taker is the hand and the goer is the foot. Seventh point, refutation through examination of the agent and the experiencer of the ripening result: Virtuous and non-virtuous actions are seen to be done by the body accompanied by intention, by speech accompanied by intention, and even by intention alone. I do not perform actions, and since I have not done so, why should I experience the result? I should not experience it, because I did not perform the action at the time of the cause. Therefore, since the agent is done by body, speech, and mind, it is reasonable that the result of ripening should also be experienced by the assembly of body, speech, and mind. Eighth point, refutation through examination of parts: The opponent says, "The agent is the assembly of body, speech, and mind, and the experiencer of the ripening result is also the assembly of body, speech, and mind, which is very reasonable. However, the assembly of body, speech, and mind is the self." If that is said, the assembly of body, speech, and mind can never be the self, because body, speech, and mind have many parts. Moreover, the body has many parts such as hands, feet, internal organs, etc., and