Chinese
因为微尘有众多的部分，而且微尘本身也是包含八种内部分离微粒的性质，并且心也是各种不同的心识种类，如果每个部分都是补特伽罗的我，那么，它就不是自主的，而是成为他主的，并且不是常恒的，而是成为无常的，并且是具有迷惑性的，并且不是唯一的，而是成为众多的，因此，不具备我的特征。如果每个部分不是补特伽罗的我，那么，就没有与部分不同的身语意的集合。第九个要点是通过考察所遍、能遍来破斥：一般来说，所遍、能遍有本体相同的一个我和本体不同的所遍、能遍两种，那么是哪一种呢？第一种，如果能遍的我与所遍的蕴等是同一个事物，那么，就会出现之前所说的过失；第二种，如果它与所遍不同，那么，从善恶业的力量所产生的苦乐果报，我将无法体验，因为所遍与善恶业等没有关联。同样，之前被束缚于轮回的众生，通过修持道，获得了解脱，在那时，获得解脱者的我将不复存在，因为与之前被束缚状态时修持的道没有关联。第十个要点是通过考察概念来破斥：如果名为“供施”的士夫是我，那么名为“功德知识”的士夫，也会对名为“供施”的士夫产生我的概念，例如，无论什么样的人看到须弥山，都会对须弥山本身产生概念，没有差别。因此，供施自己，会执着自己为我，而功德知识会执着为他人，并且功德知识自己也会对自己产生我的概念，而天授会对他人产生概念等等，因为会产生各种不同的概念产生方式，所以我只是由心识假立的，而不是从对境本身成立的我，如果成立，那么一个有情产生我的概念的对境，所有有情都会
English
Because atoms have many parts, and the atom itself is also of the nature of containing eight kinds of internally separable particles, and also the mind is various kinds of different consciousnesses, if each part is the self of a person, then it is not autonomous, but becomes other-dependent, and is not permanent, but becomes impermanent, and is deluded, and is not one, but becomes many, therefore, it does not have the characteristics of self. If each part is not the self of a person, then there is no collection of body, speech, and mind that is different from the parts. The ninth point is to refute by examining the pervaded and the pervader: In general, the pervaded and the pervader have two kinds, one is the same entity related to the self, and the other is the pervaded and the pervader with different entities, so which one is it? The first kind, if the pervader self and the pervaded aggregates are the same thing, then the faults mentioned before will occur; the second kind, if it is different from the pervaded, then the self will not be able to experience the results of happiness and suffering from the power of good and evil deeds, because the pervaded is not related to good and evil deeds, etc. Similarly, a sentient being who was previously bound in samsara, through practicing the path, attains liberation, at that time, the self of the one who attained liberation will no longer exist, because it is not related to the path practiced in the state of being bound before. The tenth point is to refute by examining concepts: If the person called "offering sacrifice" is the self, then the person called "virtuous friend" will also have the concept of self towards the person called "offering sacrifice", for example, no matter what kind of person sees Mount Sumeru, they will have the concept of Mount Sumeru itself, without any difference. Therefore, the offering sacrifice itself will cling to itself as the self, while the virtuous friend will cling to it as another, and the virtuous friend himself will also have the concept of self towards himself, while Devadatta will have the concept towards another, etc., because various different ways of generating concepts will arise, so I am only imputed by the mind, and not a self established from the object itself, if it is established, then the object in which one sentient being generates the concept of self, all sentient beings will
Chinese
但也必须进入我的意识中。第十一条，以三藏中所说的教证来成立人无我，即：执著于我，称为魔的心。其理由是：因为执著于此，就会产生贪等烦恼之心，并且是从他化自在天的力量中产生的。因此称为魔的心。或者，魔的梵语是“摩罗耶”（藏文音译），这也适用于死亡，因此，由我执所驱使，积累业力，由此获得转生并死亡，或者再次受生后死亡等等，一次又一次地死亡和毁灭的原因。所以才这么说。因此，即使你观看或执著于这样的魔心，因为五蕴空无有人我，所以在这个蕴中，并没有真实存在的我和众生。既然如此，那么执著于我和众生是怎么回事呢？就像用轴、车身、轭、轮和将它们连接起来的东西，依靠各部分的集合而称为车一样，同样，依靠五蕴的集合，也只是假名安立为众生。第十二条，以法称论师的教理来破斥：众生各自执取的五蕴，为了追求超越此五蕴的其他事物，并且我生灭也被意识完全掌握。因此，人们通过这两种理由，从诸根等中，以经验得知人我是与蕴不同的。第二，分别破斥二十种坏聚见之境：一般来说，世尊在经部中说有二十种坏聚见，即：将五蕴中的每一个都执著为我，共有五种；认为我与五蕴中的每一个都具有朋友或眷属的关系，共有十种；认为所依的我以五蕴中的每一个作为所依而存在，共有十五种；
English
But it must also enter my consciousness. Eleventh, establishing the absence of a personal self through the teachings stated in the three pitakas: The grasping at a self is called the mind of Mara. The reason for this is that from grasping at this, afflictive emotions such as attachment arise, and it arises from the power of the Lord of Others' Emanations. Therefore, it is called the mind of Mara. Or, the Sanskrit word for Mara is "Madra Ya" (Tibetan transliteration), which also applies to death. Therefore, driven by self-grasping, one accumulates karma, thereby taking rebirth and dying, or again taking rebirth and dying, etc., again and again being the cause of dying and perishing. That is why it is said so. Therefore, even if you look at or grasp at such a mind of Mara, because the five aggregates are empty of a personal self, there is no truly existent self or sentient being in this aggregate. If that is the case, then what is this grasping at a self and sentient being? Just as a chariot is named by relying on the collection of parts such as the axle, body, yoke, wheel, and what connects them, similarly, by relying on the collection of the five aggregates, it is merely nominally designated as a sentient being. Twelfth, refuting with the logic of Dharmakirti's teachings: Sentient beings, in order to seek something other than these five aggregates that are their own respective objects of grasping, and also because the arising and ceasing of the self is completely grasped by consciousness. Therefore, people know through experience, from the faculties and so on, that the personal self is different from the aggregates. Second, specifically refuting the objects of the twenty views of the perishable collection: In general, the Bhagavan said in the sutras that there are twenty views of the perishable collection, namely: grasping each of the five aggregates as a self, there are five; believing that the self possesses each of the five aggregates in the manner of a friend or retinue, there are ten; believing that the dependent self abides with each of the five aggregates as a support, there are fifteen;
Chinese
。执著于五蕴各自的依存方式而存在，共有二十种。如《亲友书》中所说：“色非我，已说我，不具有色，我非住色中，色非住我中，如是余四蕴，当知亦皆空。”如是所说。首先，破斥五蕴为我的观点。总的来说，如前所述，虽然存在我与蕴成为一体的妨害推理，但由于表达方式不同，理解方式也会有所不同。如果身体是色蕴，那么将其分解为多个部分后，如果每个部分都是我，那么就会陷入多个我的过失。如果其中一部分是我，而其他部分不是我，则没有理由，因为所有部分要么都是，要么都不是，是相同的。如果心是四名蕴，那么将主要的心识八识聚，以及随之而生的受、想、行等五十一心所进行区分后，如果这些也各自是我，那么就会陷入多个我的过失，并且一个是我，其他不是我，也没有理由，情况如前所述。如果存在身心之外的其他东西，那么在内外寻找时，由于无法找到，所以无法确定。如果说身心二者的集合只是假立的集合，是人我的我，那么集合只是不存在的，只是由分别念假立的。破斥执著我具有五蕴的观点：如果我具有身体，那么必须以自性的方式具有，或者以相互因果的方式具有，或者以所依和能依的方式具有，或者以主宰和被主宰的方式相关联。但是，这些都不合理，因为存在将在下文中阐述的过失。第一种情况是，如果我以自性的方式具有身体，那么之前破斥我与蕴成为一体的过失将会出现，因为就像身体是无常、众多、受他支配的一样，我也会变成那样。第二，我和身体互相生
English
. There are twenty ways of clinging to the five aggregates, each based on its own mode of dependence. As it is said in the Letter to a Friend: "Form is not self, it is said; the self does not possess form; the self does not dwell in form; form does not dwell in the self. Likewise, understand that the remaining four aggregates are also empty." As it is said. First, refuting the view that the five aggregates are the self. In general, as mentioned above, although there is the reasoning that hinders the self and the aggregates from becoming one, the way of understanding will be different because the way of expressing it is different. If the body is the aggregate of form, then if it is divided into many parts, if each of them is the self, then there will be the fault of having many selves. If one of them is the self and the others are not, there is no reason, because all of them are either the same or not the same. If the mind is the four name aggregates, then after distinguishing the main mind, the eight consciousnesses, and the fifty-one mental factors such as feeling, perception, and volition that arise with them, if each of these is also the self, then there will be the fault of having many selves, and one is the self and the others are not, there is no reason, as mentioned above. If there is something other than body and mind, then it cannot be determined because it cannot be found when searching inside and outside. If it is said that the collection of body and mind is just a collection, which is the self of a person, then the collection is just non-existent, just postulated by discrimination. Refuting the view that the self possesses the five aggregates: If I have a body, then it must be possessed in the manner of its own nature, or in the manner of mutual cause and effect, or in the manner of support and supported, or in the manner of master and dominated. However, none of these are reasonable, because there are faults that will be explained below. The first case is that if I have a body in the manner of its own nature, then the faults of previously refuting the unity of me and the aggregates will appear, because just as the body is impermanent, numerous, and subject to others, I will also become like that. Second, I and the body give birth to each other.
Chinese
如果具有能生和所生的因果关系，那么是身体作为因产生了作为果的“我”呢？还是“我”作为因产生了作为果的身体呢？如果按照第一种情况，从无常的因中，不可能产生常的果，这对于所知也是不可能的。如果是这样，那么“我”就成了无常的过失，同样，人我的因依赖于身体，因此也会变成不自在而依赖于他者。如果按照第二种情况，从常的因中不可能产生无常的果，而且常也不会变成因。第三种情况是，身体作为所依，与“我”作为能依的方式存在呢？还是“我”作为所依，与身体作为能依的方式存在呢？如果是第一种情况，身体是所依，那么依赖于它的有情之“我”，就会变成有生有灭，因为作为所依的身体是有生有灭的缘故。例如，如果山岩崩塌，那么依赖于它而存在的房屋也会随之倒塌。如果是第二种情况，有情之“我”是所依，那么依赖于它的身体就会变成常。因为“我”是常，所以身体一旦依赖于它，就必须恒常地依赖它而存在，因为它是依赖于常“我”的缘故。这里，虽然一般来说，所依不坏，能依也不坏的遍及不确定，但是因为“我”是常，所以任何事物一旦依赖于它，就必然会恒常地依赖它，这里是指这个意思。第四种情况是，“我”和身体二者以主和客的方式存在，那么对于认为二者相互存在的事物来说，会产生主的联系，但是对于没有有情之“我”的事物来说，身体和相互之间的主的联系是不可能的。如果“我”存在于色蕴中，那么在色蕴的内外各处寻找时，必须被量所观察到，但事实上并没有被观察到。如果认为色蕴存在于“我”中，那么与色蕴的联系就是相违的，因为“我”是常，所以存在于其中的色蕴也会变成常。此外，如果人我以主的方式支配色蕴等，那么色蕴等事物就应该像想要的那样，在舍弃和取受上具有自主性，但事实上并非如此，而是看到不由自主地进行舍弃和取受。
English
If there is a cause-and-effect relationship of producing and being produced, then is the body the cause that produces the "self" as the effect? Or is the "self" the cause that produces the body as the effect? According to the first case, it is impossible for a permanent effect to arise from an impermanent cause, and this is also impossible for what is to be known. If that is the case, then there is the fault that the "self" becomes impermanent, and similarly, the cause of the person's self depends on the body, so it will also become unfree and dependent on others. According to the second case, it is impossible for an impermanent effect to arise from a permanent cause, and the permanent will not become a cause. The third case is, does the body exist as the support, with the "self" existing as the supported? Or does the "self" exist as the support, with the body existing as the supported? If the first case is that the body is the support, then the person's self that depends on it will become subject to birth and death, because the supporting body is subject to birth and death. For example, if a rock mountain collapses, then the house that exists depending on it will also collapse. If the second case is that the person's self is the support, then the body that depends on it will become permanent. Because the "self" is permanent, once the body depends on it, it must always exist depending on it, because it depends on the permanent "self." Here, although in general, the pervasion that if the support does not perish, the supported does not perish is uncertain, but because the "self" is permanent, once anything depends on it, it will necessarily always depend on it, this is what is meant here. The fourth case is, if the "self" and the body exist as the master and the object, then for those who believe that the two exist mutually, a master relationship will arise, but for those who do not have a person's self, a master relationship between the body and each other is impossible. If the "self" exists in the form aggregate, then when searching everywhere inside and outside the form aggregate, it must be observed by valid cognition, but in fact it is not observed. If it is believed that the form aggregate exists in the "self," then the connection with the form aggregate is contradictory, because the "self" is permanent, so the form aggregate that exists in it will also become permanent. Furthermore, if the person's self dominates the form aggregate etc. as the master, then the form aggregate etc. should be able to abandon and take as desired, but in fact it is not so, but it is seen that abandoning and taking are done involuntarily.