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43.Title of the Treatise.g2.0f

Chinese

因此,所谓执著于有情我的方式,即称之为有情我,说成是在身体内部等某个确定的位置,以某种形态显现。这是由于长期串习执著有情我的分别念,因错乱而增长习气,从而产生这种错觉,但它并非任何有境正量所能证实的。因此,在声闻部派看来,有情我并不存在。因为如此执著的分别念是颠倒的识。它是颠倒的识,因为它是遍计烦恼。理由成立,世尊曾宣说六根本烦恼和二十近烦恼等,其中六根本烦恼中的恶见,即有萨迦耶见、邪见、边执见、戒禁取见、见取见这五种。而其中的第一种就是执著有情我。其周遍性也是确定的,即如果它是遍计烦恼,则一切都认为是颠倒的,对此,自宗的佛教徒没有任何异议。在外道看来,有情我并非实有,因为执著于它的分别念是遍计烦恼之因,必须这样安立。如果安立为“因为它是遍计烦恼”,那么对他们来说,法不成,因为他们不认为执著有情我是遍计烦恼。因此,对于“因为它是遍计烦恼之因,所以是颠倒的”这一说法,对他们来说,法和周遍性都成立。法是依靠于我执,贪嗔痴慢嫉妒等产生,这是显而易见的。《释量论》中说:“若有我则知有他,由我他分生执嗔,与此等相连系故,一切过失皆生起。”就像所说的那样。对他们来说,周遍性也是确定的,即除了顺世外道和怀疑论者之外的其他外道,都普遍认为贪等烦恼是颠倒的。

English

Therefore, the way of apprehending the self of a person, which is called the self of a person, is said to appear with a certain form in a fixed place such as inside the body. This is because the conceptual thought of grasping at the self of a person has been practiced for a long time, and the habit has increased due to confusion, so this wrong appearance arises, but it is not apprehended by any valid cognition of an object. Therefore, in the view of the Hearer schools, the self of a person does not exist. Because the conceptual thought that grasps in this way is a reversed consciousness. It is a reversed consciousness because it is a completely afflicted one. The reason is established, the Bhagavan has taught the six root afflictions and the twenty near afflictions, etc. Among the six root afflictions, the evil view includes the view of the perishable collection, the wrong view, the view of clinging to extremes, the view of holding moral discipline as supreme, and the view of holding asceticism as supreme. The first of these is the grasping at the self of a person. Its pervasiveness is also certain, that is, if it is a completely afflicted one, then it is considered to be completely reversed, and all Buddhists of our own school have no disagreement. In the view of the non-Buddhists, the self of a person does not exist as a substance, because the conceptual thought that grasps at it is the cause of complete affliction, and this must be established. If it is established as "because it is a completely afflicted one", then for them, the property of the subject is not established, because they do not consider the grasping at the self of a person to be a completely afflicted one. Therefore, for this statement "because it is the cause of complete affliction, therefore it is reversed", both the property of the subject and the pervasiveness are established for them. The property of the subject is that based on the grasping at the self, attachment, hatred, ignorance, pride, jealousy, etc. arise, which is manifestly established. As it is said in the <Commentary on Valid Cognition>: "If there is a self, then one knows there is another, from the division of self and other, grasping and hatred arise, and because these are completely connected, all faults will arise." The pervasiveness is also certain for them, that is, all the other non-Buddhists except for the Materialists and the Skeptics universally consider these afflictions such as attachment to be reversed.

Chinese

若。第二点,对我和蕴作一与异的观察而破斥:作为我所执著的基础,蕴和我二者,无论是一还是异,都不能说,因为这会产生两种过失。那又是什么呢?要么是蕴是我之过,要么是我是实有之过。如果我和蕴是实体一,那么我是和蕴是一吗?蕴和我是同一的吗?如果是前者,那么就像蕴是无常的多体一样,我也会变成无常的多体自性。如果是后者,那么就像我是常恒的、唯一的、自主的一样,蕴也会变成常恒的、唯一的、自主的,这样就会产生过失。如果我和蕴二者是异体,那也是不行的,因为人我是实有的缘故。这样写道,仅仅这些也不能损害先前的观点,因为他们也承认我是实有,但如果是异体,就必须存在于清净的识的境中,必须这样提出理性的论证。所谓清净的识,是指没有被暂时的错觉原因所迷惑的根识上的清晰显现,以及没有被意识所迷惑的显现上明显生起。因为清净的识的境被安立,如果我是实有,就必须存在于这些境中。比如,由于暂时的错觉原因,眼花缭乱而看到毛发掉落,这是错觉原因存在于根识上。快速旋转,比如快速旋转火把,显现出圆形,这是错觉原因存在于境上。坐在船里的人,船向下行驶,看到左右的山等向上奔跑,这是错觉原因存在于处所上。黄疸病人看到海螺是黄色的,这是错觉原因存在于内部。梦中的显现出现各种各样的形象,这是错觉原因存在于意识上等等。没有被这些暂时的错觉原因所迷惑的,就叫做清净的识。第三点,遮破不可言说的补特伽罗我:如上所示,由于承认我和蕴是一体和异体,看到那些损害性的理性能造成损害,所以住子部的宗派们,总的来说,人我

English

If. Second point, examining self and aggregates as one and different, and refuting them: As the basis for clinging to self, neither the aggregates nor the self of a person can be said to be one or different, because this would lead to two faults. What are they? Either the fault that the aggregates are the self, or the fault that the self becomes substantially existent. If the self and aggregates are one substance, then is the self the same as the aggregates? Are the aggregates and the self the same? If the former is the case, then just as the aggregates are impermanent and multiple, the self would also become of the nature of impermanent and multiple. If the latter is the case, then just as the self is permanent, singular, and independent, the aggregates would also become permanent, singular, and independent, which would lead to faults. If the self and aggregates are different substances, that is not permissible, because the self of a person is substantially existent. It is written that just that much cannot harm the previous view, because they also accept the self as substantially existent, but if it is a different substance, it must exist in the realm of pure consciousness, and that is how the reasoning must be presented. The so-called pure consciousness refers to the clear appearance in the sense consciousness that is not obscured by temporary causes of illusion, and the manifest arising in the appearance that is not confused by the mind. Because the realm of pure consciousness is established, if the self is substantially existent, it must exist in those realms. For example, due to the temporary cause of illusion, seeing hairs falling due to blurred vision is when the cause of illusion exists in the sense consciousness. Rapid rotation, such as rapidly rotating a torch, appearing as a circle, is when the cause of illusion exists in the object. A person sitting in a boat, as the boat goes down, seeing the mountains on the left and right running upwards, is when the cause of illusion exists in the location. A person with jaundice seeing a conch shell as yellow is when the cause of illusion exists internally. The appearance of various images in dreams is when the cause of illusion exists in the mind, and so on. That which is not obscured by these temporary causes of illusion is called pure consciousness. Third point, refuting the inexpressible self of a person: As shown above, because of admitting that the self and aggregates are one and different, seeing that those harmful reasonings can cause harm, the schools of the Sthavira Nikaya, in general, the self of a person

Chinese

在处所上是存在的,但不能说与蕴一体,也不能说是他体,因此那本身是无法用其他方式表达的,世尊也在经中说:比丘们,有作者的补特伽罗,也有承担者的补特伽罗,我既不说常,也不说无常。因为经中显示了承担者的补特伽罗是实有的,并且说常与无常都无法表达。他们是这么说的。但那部经的密意并非如此,承担者的补特伽罗,是指依五蕴的状况而假立的假有,而不是实有,因为经中说常与无常都无法表达,如果实有,就必须是常或无常中的一种,但既然无法表达为其中任何一种,所以只是显示了并非实有,而是假立而已。那个教证是不成立的,而且也有理证的妨害,说补特伽罗是实有,又说它与蕴既非一体也非他体,这二者是相违的,如果实有,就必须是一体或他体中的一种,如果既非一体也非他体,就与实有相违。对此,前派说没有过失,因为可以用譬喻比量来成立。例如,木柴燃烧时,在木柴尚未化为灰烬之前,火与木柴无法区分的那种状态下,火与木柴既非一体,也非他体,同样,我和蕴二者也是如此,他们这样认为。一般来说,譬喻比量并非清净的量,因此那个譬喻无法成立,而且,火与木柴二者,是能被现量明确见到的他体。因为木柴是地界的自性,而火是火界的自性。从自性的角度来说也是他体,而且世间也明显见到火从木柴中蔓延到远处,并且经典中也从未说过火与木柴二者是不可说为同一或异体的,因此,可以成立二者是可以表达为他体的。第四个问题,驳斥认为我具有作用。

English

It exists in its place, but it cannot be said to be one with the aggregates, nor can it be said to be different. Therefore, it cannot be expressed in any other way. The Bhagavan also said in the sutra: "Monks, there is a person who acts, and there is also a person who bears the burden. I do not say that it is permanent, nor do I say that it is impermanent." Because the sutra shows that the person who bears the burden is real, and it is said that neither permanence nor impermanence can be expressed. That's what they say. But the meaning of that sutra is not like that. The person who bears the burden is only a designation based on the state of the five aggregates, not a real entity. Because it is said that neither permanence nor impermanence can be expressed, if it were real, it would have to be one of permanence or impermanence, but since it cannot be expressed as either, it is only shown as a designation, not a real entity. That statement is not valid, and there is also a logical contradiction. Saying that the person is real, and then saying that it is neither one with the aggregates nor different from them, these two are contradictory. If it is real, it must be one or the other, but if it is neither one nor the other, it contradicts being real. To this, the former party says that there is no fault, because it can be established by analogy. For example, when firewood is burning, in the state where the fire and the firewood are indistinguishable before the firewood has turned to ashes, the fire and the firewood are neither one nor different. Similarly, the self and the aggregates are also like that, they think. In general, analogy is not a pure measure, so that analogy cannot be established. Moreover, fire and firewood are clearly seen as different by direct perception. Because firewood is the nature of the earth element, and fire is the nature of the fire element. It is also different from the point of view of nature, and it is also clearly seen in the world that fire spreads far from firewood, and the scriptures have never said that fire and firewood are inexpressible as the same or different. Therefore, it can be established that the two can be expressed as different. Fourth issue, refuting the view that the self has agency.

English

pa. The refutation of the desire to generate consciousness, and the refutation of the desire to control, and the refutation by examining that itself, among the three. The first is: From the eye's form seer to the mind's dharma knower, the six, and the agent, and the maturation experiencer, and the acceptance and rejection knower, and the one liberated by meditating on the path. In short, the ten kinds of actions of a person are explained. For example, as you said, the eye is the seer of form, therefore, the self-sect Hearer School and other outsiders acknowledge that there is a person entity that can perform the action of seeing form. If the self of the person performs the action of generating the eye consciousness that sees form, then, is it performing the action of generating a newly generated eye consciousness, or is it acting on a consciousness that has already been generated by other causes and conditions? If it is like the first case, then, the eye consciousness is the immediately preceding cause and the co-occurring condition, because it is visible that consciousness arises from these two causes and conditions. The self of the person acts as the cause and condition for the arising of consciousness, because it is not necessary, so it is meaningless to think that it is the cause of arising. Another explanation of the so-called "two exist" is that consciousness arises from the two, object and sense, which is not very good, and the self-sect's view is as stated above. Therefore, the self of the person cannot be the cause of action from the seer of form to the liberator. If it is like the second case, then, it is unreasonable to perform the action of generating again on the eye consciousness etc. that has already been generated by causes and conditions, because it is not necessary to generate again what has already been generated by other causes and conditions. Second, refuting the desire to control: If the self of the person controls in the manner of a master is the only one, then, unpleasant things should not happen, and it should not prevent unpleasant things from happening. For example, if the eye consciousness sees a pleasant form object, and the self of the person controls in the manner of a master, then, the appearance of the pleasant form object should always be maintained, not