English
”* The concept of ananyatvam, comes into clearer relief in the context of the Vedantic doctrine of Causation (to which it strictly applies as its peculiar category); nevertheless it is, as Deussen truly remarks, not only the law that determines the rela¬ tion between events and changes of phenomena, but is also the bond between substance and attributes. Although it may appear as an advance labelling, such a doctrine is the inevitable outcome of an immanental view of causation. * Brof. K. C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Vedmtism, p. 25. LECTURE YII Brahman and Maya : the Metaphysics op the Vedanta The devastating sweep of the dialectic of ‘ ex¬ perience ’ and ‘relation,’ which involved in one common ruin the whole world of manifold existence, may, indeed, stupefy and even scare away the meta¬ physical enquirer, but it cannot forever silence or stifle the metaphysical craving of the soul. Accord¬ ingly, we have in Samkara-Vedanta a frank recog¬ nition of duality or multiplicity, and an honest at¬ tempt to render its philosophical status and import¬ ance. The prevailing attitude of the philosopher of the Samkara-Vedanta School in this regard is that the world somehow exists, and its relation to Brah¬ man as its infinite and unconditioned ground is simply indefinable Maya, is the term which is exactly descriptive of this attitude. It is true that the description of the manifold world as Maya, has been regarded by critics as an evasion of explanation, and no explanation at all in the strict sense of the term. But admitting sub judice its claim to figure as a philosophical principle, one has yet to explain how far Brahman, as invested with Maya, may be regarded as the cause or ground of this multiform existence. The best way to proceed would be along the Vedantie dialectic of causation which has been worked out by Samkara in his classic re- • futation of the different theories of causation in the BRAHMAN AND MAYA 207 Tarkapadah (flfliraTC:) of the Brahmasiitrabhashya. He begins with his critique on the Buddhistic theory of Asatkaranavada (as outlined in his commentary on Brhadaranyaka Upanishad), according to which effects arise out of the primitive Non-being or Void ( ) by a process of negation of Negation (i.e., of the Void). But phenomena qu& phenomena cannot reasonably be conceived as being projected out of non-being. On the contrary, it is a matter of common experience that effects come into being only when causes are present. Even on the supposition of ‘ nothing ’ as the cause of some phenomenon, nothing becomes something, and no longer remains the Void or Non-being of the Buddhists. Against Ibis the Buddhists maintain that the pot-form can¬ not come into being unless the lump-form of the clay is destroyed. Hence, logically speaking, the iiunediate unconditional antecedent, i.e., the cause of the pot-form is not the clay but the destruction of the lump-form. To this it is replied that along with the destruction of the lump-form, the clay as material of the pot is not destroyed. All causes, while operating, destroy their quondam manifesta¬ tion just to usher into existence the alleged effect- fo.m (which is its present manifestation), inasmuch as the same cause cannot reasonably exist in two dif¬ ferent forms at one and the same time. In the pro¬ duction of the pot the clay forsakes the lump-form and is in a state of passing over to the pot-form. But what about its character or status during the ad interim period? Should it be left absolutely characterless or amorphous—neither fish nor flesh— a creature of the imagination? A similar absurdity 208 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA appertains to the theory- of transient causality which has to admit under pressure of arguments that a power emanating from A remains suspended, as it were, in vacuum—without any ostensible support or locus,—and then flows into B. Lotze has ably exposed the fallacy of such a procedure. Nor can it be argued with consistency, says $amkarn, that the clay of the moment is destroyed and the material of clay (in the production of the pot) is something different from, though similar to, the previously existing one in appearance. And it is this element of similarity which is the ground of our erroneously inferring the identity of the lump and the pot. But, urges Samkara, we have here a clear perception of identity, and apart from this perception we cannot build our theory upon similarity which is a matter of inference only. Besides the consciousness ‘ this is like that ’ is possible if the same knower or self is a witness to both the fleeting, momentary cognitions —which, however, is inconceivable from the Buddhistic standpoint. If it be asserted that the knowledge of identity may still be conceived, al¬ though the fact of identity may not exist, know¬ ledge as implying correspondence of ideas to facts becomes in that case a nullity. Hence, Saipkara winds up the controversy by saying that to maintain that effects arise out of the annihilation of the cause is denying roundly that they have a cause. Accord¬ ing to the Vedantist, however, the cause alone is real: whatever differs from it is unreal. Effectua¬ tion is only the self-alienation of the cause. The effect has, therefore, its ‘ truth ’ in the cause, and not vice versa. BRAHMAN AND MAYA 209 The Naiyayika doctrine of Causation known as Arambhavddah or Asatkdryyavadah holds that the non-existent effect originates from the existing cause. The effect is thus real after, and unreal before, effectuation. This does not, however, amount to the Buddhistic negation of cause. Now, Samkara points out in his criticism of the Naiyayika position that the effect being non-existent before its production, it is not real and as such cannot be related to the cause. Relation is possible of exist- ents only, not of the existent and the non-existent or two non-existents.”* The effect being thus un¬ related to the cause, any effect would be at random produced by any cause, and this means an end to the determinate relation between cause and effect ( ) in our experience of the world. Indeed, what we set store by in the cause-and-effect relation is the conception of Order underlying it, and along with the temporal and the spatial order, these three orders of Relation ( ) are generally considered as constitutive of the cosmic order. Hence the Naiyayika formulation of the doctrine of causality which seems apparently to have belittled this ultimate postulate of our experience of the world, tends to inaugurate chaos and confusion (tltafSui) in a sphere where law and order are im¬ mediately in evidence. The shaft seems to have gone home, and the Naiyayika seeks to avert this impend¬ ing disaster in the eventual overthrow of the cause- * WC I T vsvnv. wSfai—Com. on V. B. t II. i. xvni. 27 „ . . 210 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA and-effect relation by the hypothesis of an AtUaydh (*rf?rjpr. ) or surplus (energy) flowing from the causal substance into the effect-form. This is that famous admission of tSakt'ih ( ) in its varied application in the Nyaya system which, in its detail¬ ed working out, affords an instructive comparison with the Cartesian conception of the cause contain¬ ing the effect formaliter or eminenter. To this Samkara demurs on the following counts : if this atUayah or surplus be the antecedent condition (of being or non-being) of the effect in the cause, then the Naiyayika’s procedure is suicidal; if, however, it be anything else, it can either be ( i ) non-existent, in which case it would not produce anything, far less the specific effect in question, or ( ii ) different from the cause-phenomenon, in which case the effect- phenomenon cannot result from the cause-pheno¬ menon, or, lastly, (in) different from the effect, in which case there is no reason why it should produce this particular effect and no other. None of these alternatives being logically tenable, the hypothesis of tiaktih as a separate entity is negatived, and Saipkara puts forward his own conclusion that the alleged Saktih is identical with the causal substance on the one hand and the effect-phenomenon pertains on the other to the very essence of tfaktih (Sdfw: ^1%) and thus is established the non-difference ) of the effect from the cause ( qiumiq, mwO- Then £amkara proceeds to defend his thesis as to the eternity of effect (in the empirical sense) as against the Naiyfiyika view of the prior non- feRAHMAN And mays &Li existence of the effect in the cause. The effect-form is neither unreal (*paq) nor imaginary nor does it accidentally emerge into existence. The Asat, strictly speaking, cannot appear, for, whatever appears must be supposed to be existing prior to its manifestation, though lying concealed from us. As an object hidden in darkness or concealed by a non¬ transparent wall, manifests itself under more favour¬ able conditions—when the obstruction to its mani¬ festation is removed,—so does the pot-form hidden in the previous form of the clay, the lump-form, reveal itself under appropriate conditions. To this the Naiyayika objects that something existing and yet not appearing or manifesting itself is inadmissible. Admitting, for argument’s sake, the truth of the contention that “ all that is manifested was previous¬ ly existent,” the contrapositive of the proposition, viz., “ what was previously non-existent is not manifested ” would lay claim to validity, i.e., absence of manifestation would require verification —which is absurd. Hence it is reasonable that a thing is existent only when it is manifested.