English
Sarpkara opposes this extravagant demand—that a thing is existent only when it is manifested—which amounts to saying that all existents are manifested and this is an obvious impossibility. As to the potential existence of the pot-form in the lump-form, if it be contended that the lump-form should in that case occupy a space-position different from that of the pot-form, just as the * wall ’ (in the illustration) occupies a space-position different from that of the object hidden by it, Samkara would guestion the validity of the objection on the ground that there is 212 A systematic sTubY op the vEdAnTa no law that the respective space-positions, of that which conceals and of that which is concealed, should be different; for, to take an example, in milk the milk-form conceals from view the water-form and yet has the same space-position as the latter. To this parity of reasoning the Naiyayika may yet object and say that the two cases are not exactly similar; for, to see the pot concealed in darkness, one has to exert oneself (in the direction of lighting a lamp, etc.) but no such exertion is implied in seeing the pot emerge from the lump of clay. But Samkara persists in maintaining that so far as seeing is con¬ cerned there is absolutely no difference between the two cases : seeing involves no exertion, which pro¬ duction alone does. Baffled in this direction the Naiyayika falls back upon the argument from prac¬ tical efficiency ( v gt fam qn fc q *! )—the infallible prag¬ matic patent—and argues with apparent cogency that a thing which is merely, but does nothing is a figment of imagination, an entia rationis, debarred from the world of real things. A cause justifies its claim thereto only by producing the effect. This, in Samkara’s opinion, amounts to saying that the origination of the pot is ipso facto the origination of the potter, both being reckoned co-effects of a common cause. Does not this fact of mutual depend¬ ence lead to the conception of both the so-called ' cause and effect ’ as modes of one and the same substance instead of strengthening the Naiyayika hypothesis? The Naiyayika, however, would regard it as no more than a mere quibble and point out that the effect originates and acquires a positive nature fcfiAHMAN AND MAYA 213 after it has been previously endowed with the being of the cause, origination of an effect being in all cases regarded as the connection of the effect with the existence of the cause. But, replies Samkara, connection can only be of things that are, not of things that are not, nor of things one of which is, and the other is not.* How can the (non-existent) effect, therefore, be connected with the (existent) cause? Further, we cannot intelligibly use the phrase ‘ before its origination ’ seeing that the con¬ cept of non-existence has no temporal limit. It is only what is, and not what is not, that can have a conceivable limit. The non-existent is absolutely non-existent—there being no degrees of non-exist¬ ence. Thus non plussed the Naiyayika assumes the offensive, and provokes his opponent into giving a final and effective reply to his contention. If the effect be, as Samkara contends, pre-existent in the cause is not, argues the Naiyayika, the activity of the causal agent (tMTSTMUtlTT:) rendered superfluous Or useless (*pu§gft) ? Samkara, while summing up his position, embodies in his reply to this question all the corollaries that follow from the central theme. In the first place, he urges, the effect exists in the cause (before as well as after the production). If the effect be not granted an existence in the cause, the cause can, by no conceivable means, give birth to the effect. The effect should be supposed to exist in the form of potency which, under more favourable conditions, would originate as a thing or event. * wfifv sreafid— Com. on V. S. II. i. xviii. 214 a. systematic study op the vedAnYa effectuation being the manifestation of a cause in another form. Secondly, it is to be noted that this change of form does not, as it is generally supposed, entail an essential change in the causal substance. That Devadatta with contracted hands and feet ( ) is the same Devadatta with out¬ stretched hands and feet () is proved by the fact of Recognition ( TtfqfroTOTq ) which would be prima fade absurd in a doctrine of momen¬ tary existence (), as that of the Buddhists. Then, again, if the effect be non-existent before production, the supposed activity of the causal agent would be without an object whereon to exercise itself, like sword-thrusts on the surrounding atmosphere. Fourthly, it might be urged, that the past or future being, though different from the present being, is still being. No (future) object can be willed, unless the (future) object be existent; for willing (as dis¬ tinguished from mere desiring or imagining) is sim¬ ply the objectification of the future. If the so-called future being be really non-existent, the perception of the Yogins (who acquire certain abnormal powers, such as clairvoyance etc.), known technically as yogipratyaksham (utfiraorapi), although uncom¬ mon becomes impossible; for the Yogin is supposed to be perceiving the past and the future as we perceive the present. Following up this line of thought a little, further, and abstracting from the limitations that characterise our perception, we come across the case of God’s foreknowledge, which should strictly be called knowledge of what is future to finite beings that are in time. Now, God’s know¬ ledge (or foreknowledge) would be unthinkable if BEAHMAN AND MAYA 215 the future (object) were not eternally existent. Thus it is that Saipkara escapes between the horns of that standing dilemma of theology—if Divine foreknow¬ ledge be a fact, man’s free-will is a delusion—by employing the strictly metaphysical notion of Exist¬ ence as participation in a Being that is essentially timeless. The solution here given by Saipkara of this problem of the reconciliation between Divine foreknowledge and human free-will has nothing to do with the ingenious device of a ‘ self-imposed ’ limitation requisitioned for this purpose. It rather reminds one of the Augustinian or the Anselmic way of solving the dilemma. Again, what does, asks Saipkara, non-existence of the (future) pot mean? It means simply the non-existence of the non-exist¬ ing (not of the existing) pot and as such it does not mean anything definite. Non-existence (of the pot) qud non-existence has no distinguishable mark by which it may be distinguished from the non¬ existence of cloth, for example. Non-existence is therefore a notion which is strictly indefinable. Finally, in order that we may make an intelligible use of the proposition : * * the effect comes into being, ’ ’ the ‘ effect ’ as subject must be already existent in order to own * comes into being ’ as predicate. The modern logician, however, would say that it need not necessarily be existent; concep¬ tual ‘ existence ’ or ‘ subsistence ’ may be sufficient for that purpose. As against the Buddhist Asatkaranavddin as well as against the NaiySyika Asatkaryyavddin Saipkara wields the double-edged weapon of the 216 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA eternity of the principle underlying the cause-and- effect relation, i.e., the eternity of cause as well as the eternity of effect (in an empirical sense of course). This seems to be the contention of the Saipkhya theory of Satkaryyavadah which, for that reason, makes the nearest approach to the Vedantic theory af causation. The Samkhya theory is also known as Parindmavadah ), for it believes in evolution with substantial mutation and holds effects to be the real transformations of the causes. The Satpkhya repudiates the Naiyayika theory as pre¬ posterous so far as the latter subscribes to the monstrous hypothesis that the previously non-exist¬ ent somehow acquires existence. What is non¬ existent is so absolutely and eternally; you cannot at random make a thing change its nature, e.g., a jar change into a cloth. Even an admission of Saktih ( u fawHffH: * will not achieve the miracle and thus escape from the impasse. The only plausible hypo¬ thesis is the supposition of the effect as potentially present in the cause, and a collocation of circum¬ stances is necessary to make the latent state patent in the form of the effect. There is no need, according to Saifikhya, of postulating a separate Saktih, (sifa;) bringing about the desired effect: it is the promise, ' not-yet ’ state ( qpTpraTaren ) °f the effect that has got the dynamic, the potency, of the causal relation. The effect, from the Samkhya point of view, may be viewed as the immanent finality, the nisus forma- tivus, realising itself through a series of real trans¬ formations till ii reaches the very acme of develop¬ ment. Effectuation is not thus a falling away from, an attenuation or self-alienation of, the reality of BBAHMAN AND MAYA 217 the cause but a fuller realisation of the latter; for the reality of the effect and the reality of the cause are not two different types of realities. Rather it is the reality of the cause that appears in the effect, the effect being nothing but the cause redistributed or transmuted. But this doctrine of causation as Parinamal f, on closer inspection, will be found to be a distinct anticipation of the Vedantic doctrine of causation as Vivartah (fw&). ‘ Evolution,’ ‘ change,’ ‘ trans¬ formation,’ ‘ development’ are categories which have only an immanent use, that is, have their exemplifi¬ cation within the strict limits of the finite or pheno¬ menal, and as such are irrelevant in a wider context. They have only, as Kant taught us, empirical validity but transcendental ideality.