English
(This topic has already been fully discussed and the discussions need not therefore be repeated here.) Moreover, the Samkhya theory of Parinamah is impaled on the horns of a dilemma : if it be maintained that the effect is a mere transformation of the cause, it is not a case of substantial mutation ; if, again, it be spoken of as a case of substantial mutation, it cannot in the same breath be regarded as mere transformation of the cause, because such transformation does not con¬ note the origination of anything new. Moreover, as the Bhamatl points out: ‘ If transformation means complete or radical change in the nature of the cause, knowledge would be impossible, for it would make every succeeding state of existence different from the foregoing. If, however, transformation means change of a part of its being, it is to be asked 28 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA further: is this part different from, or identical with, the entire being of the cause? If different, it be¬ comes a case of impossible synthesis; if identical, the complete being is changed and the effect becomes a completely different thing.’ These inherent'dialec¬ tical difficulties led the Vedantist to deny the inte¬ grity, of the cause-and-effect relation. The effect is identical with the cause, though in appearance, different. From the empirical ( ) point of view an effect may appear to be different ( *ptr,) from the cause, but in an absolute 1 or metaphysical ( mmtf g fo :) reference it is merely a vivartah (fipre?:), an appearance of the' cause. This is the local signi¬ ficance of ananyatvam as applied to the cause-effect relation. Ramanuja seems to have entirely missed this point when he taxed the Samkarite conception with flagrant self-contradiction thus : ‘ ‘ Those who assert the non-difference of the effect from the cause on the ground of the (alleged) unreality of the effect, cannot establish the non-difference of cause and r, effect, for there can consistently be no identity be¬ tween the true and the false. If it (this non-differ¬ ence) were true it would establish either the falsity of Brahman or the truth of the world.”* What the Vedantist is seeking to impress upon us is that the cause and the effect are identical in being, though different in appearance . i* ( r ’ . ,1 % g wnfln, r SW i wit [ffWTHl Witt ^p(—$reebha8hyam. BRAHMAN AND MAYA • . Thus the elaborate discussion on the nature of Causality lands Samkara in a purely formalistic con¬ ception of the causal relation. If, as Descartes maintained, the effect is contained ‘ formally or eminently ’ in the cause or if the effect be, as Samkara claims, of the very nature of the cause qjnaf), Spinoza may be said to have drawn the logical conclusion from this position, and made causation a purely ‘ formal ’ affair, a matter, of words merely ( ). As Samkara himself admits :—“ The original cause, however, which, up to the last effect, appears in the form of this or that effect like an actor in all possible roles* keeps its real nature, verily as does a dramatic actor, concealed from view,”—inasmuch as there is more reality in the cause than in the effect or even in the ensemble of effects taken collectively. That all the so-called effects are the modes of one primal substance is ; also established from the fact of reciprocal action among the phenomena of the empirical w.orld.“ Whatever stands,” says Samkara, “ in the relation of agent and patient or mutual interdependence is found to r be conditioned by a common cause and pervaded, by a community of nature... This entire universe as well as (its constituent elements .like) earth etc., illustrate this relation of' mutual inter-depend¬ ence. ”f . , ■* nw m nn$run an an nrwiinrftn ns<m Hfinraa— Com. on V. S. Ih i. xviii. ^ , , (. , t nn qrnrthtnfwfanrsf 'jntmnrnjnfnw ... ^snj^^BThaddrartyakabhd8hyam ’ A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDiNflA. The generalisation contained in the latter part of the extract seems to be a maturer view of the causal relation as exhibited in the phenomena of the world. The same immanent dialectic which spurs us on from the category of causality (or causal dependence) to that of reciprocity (or reciprocal dependence), which is nothing but causality more adequately con¬ ceived, seems to have led Samkara to this position. The argument embodied in the whole passage is substantially the same as that employed by Lotze in arguing from the fact of interaction according to law among the so-called independent facts of the world to the presence of one unitary principle (called M) as their immanent, underlying ground. To seek to know in detail the essential nature of this principle is an impossible demand set up by the finite mind. There must be left a residuum of mystery, a dark impenetrable background, to explore which is not within the reach of beings like ourselves. Now, the concept of causality, as so far cons¬ trued by the Vedantist, is brought to bear on the relation of the world-appearance to its causal subs¬ tance (). The net result of the dialectic of causation is that Reality is of the nature of cause and the appearance is the effect in a pheno¬ menal sense, while metaphysically viewed, it is non- different from the cause. But at the same time the Vedantist admits that the effect, empirically viewed, is a baffling mystery. It can neither be said to be existing nor non-existing. It is something indefin¬ able ( ). Equally mysterious is the nature of the cause as gauged by means of its reve¬ lation in a system of appearances; for the causal B&AHMAN AND MAYA 22l substance has an individuality of its own apart from its revelations, and this inner core of mystery is something at once inviting and resisting all scrutiny. Thus the dialectic of Causation leads up to the dialectic of Nescience or AjMnam The analysis of the causal relation has once for all established the point that a ‘lump of clay’ may be turned into a plate-form or jug-form, but the latter has no reality or being apart from that of the * clay.’ It is by borrowing reality from the abiding reality of the ‘ clay ’ that these diverse forms of ‘ jug,’ etc., masquerade before us as real entities, but they shine all the same with a reflected glory. Our experience, of all and sundry, will thus be found on analysis to be made up of two factors, the modes of AjMnam () and the real Being. Now, can this analysis be extended to the case of the relation be¬ tween the world-appearance and the world-ground? Kant, who had forbidden a transcendent use of the causal category, does himself employ it in a tran¬ scendental reference, for herein the boundary of our cosmic experience is only touched and not over¬ stepped. So we find some followers of Saipkara like Sarvajiiatmamuni, SureSwara, Praka&ananda, etc., calling Brahman the cause of the universe by impli¬ cation in so far as it is the support of Nescience or Maya, the principle of all becoming. Now what is the specific nature of this Nescience? It has been defined as that which is beginningless and positive yet terminable by know¬ ledge ( Althou g h it functions as a veiling agency of objects prior to 222 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA their manifestation in the determinate acts of know¬ ledge that have origin in time, it itself as associated with pure consciousness is beginningless. Further, as regards its positive character (iTT^tRel^) it should be noted, that it does not mean opposition to negation ( abhavah ) but connotes simply its difference there¬ from ( xmrafasrawri ) • It is not to be reckoned as a positive entity in the strict sense of the term ; it is positive simply because it is not negative. It is a category neither positive nor nega¬ tive as ordinarily understood, but a tertium quid different from both. Thus construed, an appellation is to be coined which will exactly convey the inde¬ finite or indeterminate nature of the category. It is the term ‘ anirvacaniyam ’ (jf fa d fo g fom ) which is just suited to the exigency of the case. But what is the voucher, the raison d'etre, it may be asked, of such a peculiar category of the Anirvacantya, the Indefinite and the Indefinable, which is distinct from both the categories of the real and the unreal ? The existence of such Nescience or AjMnarn is established, says the Vedantist, by means of Perception and Inference. Such perceptions as ‘ I had slept a blissful sleep and thus known nothing ’ (* *rnr directly testify to the presence of an object having no definite characteristics whereby it can be classed either as positive or negative, i.e., they refer to the Indefinite in question. The objection that has been so fre¬ quently pressed against . this hypothesis.- is. that- there can be no perception 1 whatsoever during. deep. BRAHMAN AND MAYA 223 sleep and that the remembrance of the peaceful repose of such sleep on waking is not a case of bona fide recollection of a past perceived state, but a case of inference. What we know (here by inference) is not a presentation or consciousness of something determinate or particular, but only the absence of knowledge and of the perpetual wear and tear of the waking, and, to some extent, of the dreaming state as well, in dreamless sleep (^5%.). Thus, on waking, we have the memory of the state before we retired to sleep and have perception of the state of freshness after the sleep—by comparing which we infer the absence of knowledge and other attendant distrac¬ tions of the Self during the ad interim period of deep sleep. Samkara takes exception' to this explanation as being illegitimate and illogical.