English
Thus in all cases of difference, whatever it be, the relation of Substance and Attribute, is in no wise defensible tm). In case of a relation of identity (Which is the second alternative), consciousness is of the very essence of Self, and so the rela¬ tion of Substance and Attribute becomes all the more inconceivable according to the prin¬ ciple that a thing can never be an attribute of itself—‘ whiteness ’ surely is never an attribute of whiteness.’ Thus remains (as the last alternative) the case of identity-in-difference (lirsrrfjTOW.) • If is, however, a manifest contradiction to hold at the same time and, in the same relation, that a thing is both identical with, and different from another. If it be maintained in this regard that identity-in-difference is not self-contradictory as being sanctioned by per¬ ception (which is a valid source of knowledge) as, for example, in the apprehension ‘this is a cow,’ the ‘ cowness,’ which, is perceived as identical With this individual (cow, is recognised in the case of another individual (coW) as distinguish¬ ed from the first, and thus from the fact of identity and difference figuring in perception the conttovetsy can be set at rest, the Advaitist discredits the sug¬ gestion on the ground that perception in such a base is susceptible of a different psychological explana¬ tion * as > for example, things al¬ though different may yet appear as tton-difffebent or homogeneous in perception on account of such defects as extreme nearness, etc., just as the successive 25 194 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA flames of a lamp, though discrete, yet somehow ap¬ pear as one continuous mass or as in one Moon there is the appearance of two; hence it is concluded that perception, which is capable of being otherwise ex¬ plained, cannot invalidate the proved contradiction of ‘ identity-in-difference ’ (i.e., difference and non-dif¬ ference) JTOTOfaTO fayfaUT nfrotft gw*, i). Then the author of Hasta- mala-kabhashyam proceeds to the twofold distinction of Caitanyam into its transcendental and phenomenal aspects and pursues with relentless vigour the same dialectic of relation in its threefold aspect down to its minutest ramification. The polemic, however, is wound up with the secure establishment of one of the central tenets of Siimkara-Vedanta, viz., that, “therefore, the Atman is on no account to be termed a (transcendental) Substance with Consciousness as its attribute but the very essence of Consciousness itself ” (?ren*T?RT rnsam frafr utfo). Here, in the enunciation of the problem of Tran¬ scendental Substance versus Transcendental Subject we have the moot-point of controversy between Ramanuja and Samkara. It will be beside the point to refer here to the conception of Soul-substance as it has figured in the West from Plato down the course of the ages to Wundt, Avenarius and Mach, not to-mention others of a more recent date. Among the varied applications of this dialectic of Relation, the next in importance from the stand¬ point of Advaita-Vedanta is that pressed against the NaiySyika admission of J&ti (snfh) as an abstract, <THE DIALECTIC OF THE VEDANTA 19$ denotational, universal and incidentally against the Whole-and-part ’ ’ relation. According to the Naiyayikas, things of the nature of compounds abide m atoms as their constituent causes by means of samavaya or the relation of inherence. Now assuming the validity of the relation, it may still be asked, according to Samkara, whether a compound abides in all the atoms taken together or in each separately. If the former, as all the atoms cannot possibly be perceived, the world as an aggre¬ gate of things would remain unperceived. But it may be urged that a whole is apprehended even if some only of its constituent parts be apprehended. Samkara repudiates the suggestion with an emphatic disclaimer, and asserts that the one inherent in the many can be apprehended only if the many sub¬ stances in which the one inheres are apprehended. The opponent, however, re-affirms his position and says that the whole does abide directly in some parts and through the mediation of these in all the parts. Samkara would not concede even so much ; for, in his opinion, the whole, in order that it may abide in some parts, must presuppose other intervening parts and for these again other such parts, and so on to infinity. Samkara’s treatment, it is to be noted parentheti¬ cally, is somewhat similar to Bradley’s way of deal¬ ing with the spatial relation of the ‘ whole ’ and the ‘ part.’ Enlarging on the contradiction inherent in ‘space’ Bradley proceeds to set forth the antithesis thus: (1) “ Space is not a mere relation. For any space must consist of extended parts, and these parts 196 A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE VEDANTA dearly are spaces. . . . Again, from the other side, if any space is taken as a whole, it is evidently more than a relation. . . . The mere fact that we are driven always to speak of its parts should be evidence enough, what could, be the parts of a relation? (2) But space is nothing but a relation. For, in the first place, any space must consist of parts; and if the parts are not spaces, the whole is not space. Take then in a space any parts. These, it is as¬ sumed, must be solid, but they are obviously extend¬ ed. If extended, however, they will themselves consist of parts, and these again of further parts, and so on without end. ... We have seen that space vanishes internally into relations between units which never can exist. But on the other side, when taken by itself as an unit, it passes away into the search for an illusory whole. It is essentially the reference of itself to something else, a process of endless passing beyond actuality. As a whole it is briefly, the relation of itself to a non-existent other-.”* Now, to proceed with the second alterna¬ tive (offered by the Naiyayika), viz., that the whole abides in the parts separately which being true, the same whole, Samkara urges,' cannot be present independently in each of its several parts as the same Devadatta cannot simultaneously be present in two different places. What we should get, then, in the end, is not a single whole but a number of different wholes. The opponent would still argue that the whole might conceivably be present in each part, full and entire, even as ‘ cowness ’ (%f), in all COWS. * Appearance and Realtfy, pp. 86*87. THE DIALECTIC OE THE VEDANTA This, Samkara asserts, is never borne out by our experience. ‘ Generic characters ’ (such as ‘ struc¬ ture, ’ ‘ dewlap ’ as in the case of bulls) may indeed be visibly present in all the individual members of the class, but a (physical) whole cannot similarly be immanent in all its constituent members. If that were so, the ‘horn’ of a ‘cow’ would give us ‘milk.’ There is a world of difference, which the Naiyayika forgets conveniently, between the category of the ‘wbole-and-the-part’ viewed logically, and the same viewed physically. It is only the Absolute of the Hegelian type, and that too, according to the opinion of a limited section of Hegelians, which can thus appear in its constituent members, whole and entire without surrendering in the least its integrity. It is well worth noting here that the Samkara- Vedanta although it stands committed, by its rejec¬ tion of the relation of inherence, to the repudiation of Naiyayika Jati (unfa:) does yet retain the realistic Mti or universal, in a modified form. The Vedanta rejects the Naiyayika Jdti, which has been defined as an eternal reality inhering in the vy/ahtis (grfjff;) and being co-ordinate therewith (‘ *), so as to convert it in the end into the ab¬ stract denotational universal of those Eealists who subscribe to the motto : unwersalia ante item. To quote VeddntaparibhdsM ’ s phrasing oi this denun¬ ciation :* “ There is absolutely no. warrant for all these technical terms like Jati and Uptidhi, they being beyond the ken of all the accredited sources of * Chapter I. 1 i A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OP THE VEDANTA valid knowledge (snfaoatmfasqfTWreTOT'. **remnn- vHTl^nfuSttqT^). But the Vedanta construes the realistic Jdti in a modified Aristotelian sense, as ‘ the connotational real," not as co¬ ordinate with, and distinct from, the individual but identical therewith. Universalia in rebus or immanental realistic Jdti is what the Vedanta would sanction and recognise. The Vedantapari- bhashd presents this distinction with a pointed em¬ phasis in one sentence thus : “ Percepts, such as ‘ this is a jar,’ etc., attest the reality of ‘ jarness,’ etc., but not also (the reality of ‘ jarness,’ etc.) as abstract universals ’ ’ (gzts?m u<TO fir vreaife - 51 5 ?ra snfa^rsfq). That is why the Veddntaparibhashd, in perfect keeping with its ontological position, asserts that it is ilie Jati, and not the vyakti, that is the locus of iaktih (sjfai: or siWccf^), i.e., the capacity ol a word to refer to or mean an object directly. The object directly meant is, technically speaking, the Sakyarn (TORq) and to adopt the terminology of modern logic, ‘the Sakyarn of a word is its universal concept.’ Now, according to the Vedantaparibhashd the power inheres in the Jdti and not in the individuals (composing the class to which the word extends), because of the infinity of in¬ dividuals and the consequent extravagance (in the assumption of an infinity of such ‘ power *) (TO )• The Naiyayika, however, would go the whole hog and say that the iaktih in question may very well reside in the individuals characterised by ' generic qualities,’ THE DIALECTIC OP THE VEDANTA 199 the question : “ How is it, then, that we come to mean individual objects from such words as ‘ cow,’ etc. ?