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55 — but here a striking difference between the European and the Oriental theory presents itself — for the Self-consciousness, which so many European philosophers assume as the only certain start- ing-point, and as the very characteristic of Soul, is declared by Kapila to be no property of Soul, and to be regarded as such only through a delusion. In the 64th of the 'memorial verses' of IV war a Krishna, as translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Kapila says : — 90. — " So, through study of principles, the conclusive, in con - (t trovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither i am, " nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.5' 91. — This statement M. Cousin not unnaturally regards as amounting to "le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme" — but Professor Wilson, in accordance with the commentaries, declares that " It is merely intended as a negation of the soul's " having any active participation, any individual interest or pro- " perty, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." The Soul, according to the Sankhya, might be described in the terms in which Fichte speaks of the Mind, "as it were, an intelligent eye, f: placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, sur- veying all that takes place there" — (Morell — Vol. 2. p. 95). In the words of Kapila (Verse 19th), " Soul is witness, solitary, " bystander, spectator, and passive." Soul being thus inert, all that is done arises from the energy of the c radical principle' — of which one might correctly speak in the terms employed by Schelling in speaking of the 'Absolute,' where he says — "The u primary form of the Absolute is ivill, or self-action. It is an u absolute power of becoming in reality what it is in the germ." (Morell— Vol. 2. p. 150). 92. — The 'Absolute,' the germ, in the hands of Kapila, hav- ing reached the form of c Self-consciousness' — ahaixkdra — the 56 A LECTURE ON THE t making of an If — the ( positing of an 'Ego' — the course of sub- sequent developement runs parallel, for some distance, with that followed by Fichte, who takes the l Ego1 as his starting point. According to a writer in Brande's Dictionary — " To use the " language of Fichte — the ego is absolute, and posits itself: it is " a pure activity. As its activity, however, has certain indefin- li able limits, when it experiences this limitation of its activity, " it also posits a non-ego, and so originates the objective world. " The ego, therefore, cannot posit itself without at the same " time projecting a non-ego ; which, consequently, is in so far (i the mere creation of the ego." In like manner the ahankdra of Kapila creates [No. 54] out of itself the five ' subtile ele- ments,' the bases of the gross elements, — so that the world of sense, formed out of these, is, in this as in Fichte's system, " the mere creation of the ego." A marked difference between the two systems, as observed before, consists in this — that Kapila makes the creative l Ego' to be something else than ' Soul,' which latter, he holds, by confounding itself with the active principle,, gets entangled in the distresses of life. 93. — The motive of the Brahman's enquiry at Kapila, it will be remembered, is this — that he wishes he may not be " again " obnoxious to the three sorts of pain :" — in other words that he may not be born again— that he may be no more liable to trans- migration or the Metempsychosis. Of the Metempsychosis Prof. Wilson (Sdnkhya Kdrikd p. x.) says : — " This belief is not " to be looked upon as a mere popular superstition; it is the main "principle of all Hindu metaphysics; it is the foundation of all " Hindu philosophy." The doctrine of the Metempsychosis may be regarded as the Hindu theory on the great question of the " origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil ex- ists— and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one SANKHVA PHILOSOPHY. 57 undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a newborn child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffering evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If it be asked how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer offered is this — it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior — and so on. Applying now the principle of c limits' — that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit — as there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time for its existence at which point this hypothesis does not serve equally well to account, it is argued that, on this hypo- thesis, and on no other, is the existence of evil fully accounted for. To the European this method of accounting for the origin of evil appears to be vitiated by the c regressus in infinitum' (ana- vasthd) — the same consideration which vitiates the theory of the earth's resting on the elephant, the elephant's resting on the tortoise, and so on without end. The origin of evil he regards as not having been revealed ; and the requirement that we shall maintain our reliance on the goodness of God in the absence of such revelation, he regards as a trial of our faith. 94. — Several of the terms in the treatise of which a translation has been given, do not occur in the Sankhya treatises generally studied. On these and some other points a few annotations here follow. 95. — Among the epithets applied to e Self-consciousness' (in No. 18) are sdnumdna and niranumdna. We can get no account anywhere of this application of these terms. Self-consciousness 'not associated with inference' might possibly refer to the simple consciousness of existence j whilst the consciousness 1 associated with inference' might refer to the notion of the Egoist II 58 A LECTURE ON THE who has reasoned himself into the belief that he himself consti- tutes all that is — (see No. 17) : — but then the difficulty would remain of tracing the connexion between this sense and the func- tions assigned to these aspects of self- consciousness under No. 61.— The technical or 6 slang' terms in Nos. 64 &c, differ in our text-book from those given in the comment on the Kdrikds — see p. 155 of the Sdnkhya Kdrikd, where Prof. Wilson says " No ex- planation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption." 96.— On the ' triad of qualities' (No. 49), Prof. Wilson, at p. 52 of the Sdnkhya Kdrikd, remarks : — " In speaking of qualities, ei however, the term guna is not to be regarded as an insubstantial tc or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul '" through the medium of the faculties. It is, in fact, nature, or " prakriti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, " unduly prominent ; nature entire, or unmodified, being nothing " more than the three qualities in equipoise, according to the 6C Sutra, ' Prakriti is the equal state of goodness, foulness, and 6( darkness.' " 97.— The term ahhihuddhi would seen to be obsolete in the sense assigned to it in No. 58. In the copy of the work em- ployed in making the translation, the same term (abhibuddhi) is repeated as representing the first of its own five subdivisions. This, with other obvious clerical errors, has been amended with the concurrence of learned pandits. The term karttavyatd, in the same passage, is akin to our term c susceptibility.' 98. — { Inference' is briefly noticed in paragraph No. 77 '. As the writers on the Sankhya do not appear to be all exactly of the same mind on the subject of inference, it may be worth while to examine the matter : — and, as the terms which they make use of are the same as those which are employed, with less diversity of SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 59 sentiment, by the Naiyayikas, it may be as well to begin by de- termining the sense in which the Naiyayikas understand the terms. 99. — After describing e perception/ in his fourth aphorism, Gautama, the founder of the Nyaya school, proceeds, in his fifth aphorism, to speak of f inference* as follows : — ^ m i "Now ( inference,1 preceded thereby [i. e., preceded by c per- ception'] is of three kinds — (1) that which has the ' prior' — (2) that which has the ' posterior' — and (3) that which is [or consists in] the perception of c community.' " 100. — c Inference/ as stated in paragraph No.