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— A fact which is not established by ' perception' or by ' inference,' is established (when it is established) by ' right affirmation'. Such matters (not proveable either by percep- tion or by inference) are (the existence of) Indra the king of the gods, the northern Kurus, the golden mountain Meru3 the nymphs in Paradise. These — Indra, &c, — not proveable either by perception or by inference, the sages, such as Vas'ishta de- clare— saying (i Indra &c. do exist/' There is also the Scripture ( — which is an authority sufficient to establish such points). " He who is assiduous in his own duties, devoid of passion and malice, intelligent, and virtuous — such a one is to be held 'wor- thy' (to be received as an authority in regard to matters not de- monstrable by perception or by inference)." Thus has ' threefold proof' been declared. 50 A LECTURE ON THE Cs No. 79. — Now it is asked — what is established by this * three- fold proof ? To this it is replied : — As^ in common life, things are estimated by means of a measure — grain and the like by means of such (measures of capacity) as nprastha, and sandal &c. by means of weights — so by means of this (apparatus of 'perception/ ' inference,' and c right affirmation'), the ' principles/ the e modifi- cations of intellect/ and the e elemental creation/ [ — see No. 67 — ] are accurately determined [ pramiyante — whence the^r name of pramdna l proof.'] No. 80. — u Oppressed by ' threefold pain/ the Brahman had recourse to the great sage Kapila" — [see No. 5] — so the ques- tion arises — what is 'threefold pain' ? To this it is replied — e natu- ral and inseparable' (ddhydtmika) ; ' natural and extrinsic* (ddhi- bhautika) ; and * non-natural or superhuman' (ddhidaivikaj. SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 51 No. 81. — Pain f natural and inseparable' [No. 80] is of two kinds, corporeal and mental. ' Corporeal* means residing in the body; 'mental' means residing in the mind. Pain, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm, and taking the form of fever, flux, cholera, swooning, Sfc, is called e corporeal'. Desire, anger, covetousness, folly, madness, envy, &c, — privation of what is liked and approximation of what is disliked — this is called ' mental' [pain or evil.] [The pain called ddhydtmika is that which arises from the things called adhydtma — see No. 56]. No. 82. — What arises from an object of sense (adhibuta — see No. 56) — is called ddhibhautika (f natural and extrinsic'). Pain is l natural and extrinsic' which arises from men, cattle, wild beasts, reptiles, or things that do not move. No. 83. — What arises from a supernatural agent {adhidaiva— see No. 56) — is called ddhidaivika (' non-natural' or i superhu- man'). Of this description is pain which arises from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like. No. 84. — [As stated at the outset — in the mind] of the Brah- man, oppressed by the three kinds of pain, there arose ca desire to 52 A LECTURE ON THE know' — such is the meaning of the word jijndsd (the desiderative noun from jnd 'to know'), just as pipdsd (from pa ' to drink') means the desire of a thirsty man to drink water. :*tajpr^r i xfH at n^n^iwfmw^w^ ^m i tot- T^ II No. 85. — This is saving knowledge (derived) from the com- pendium (of principles laid down by kapila.) Having known this, there will be no further transmigration. Such is the doctrine of the magnanimous great sage Kapila. It is to be observed that there are in this treatise (as much as, three hundred couplets of the Anushthubh metre. Thus concludes the comment on the aphorisms called * The Compendium of Principles/ 86. — Of the name Sdnkhya, which the philosophical system of Kapila bears, two explanations are given. According to the one explanation, the system is so named, from the word sankhyd c number,' — " because it observes precision of reckoning in the enu- meration of its principles." As the word sankhyd also signifies Ci de- liberation or judgment," the name was more probably intended to designate the result of the e< deliberate judgment" of Kapila on the great problem of the universe — with a special regard to eman- cipation from the evil that prevails in the world. 87. — The twenty-five ' principles' (tattwa) of the system, it will be observed, are comprised in the first three aphorisms (No. 6.) — viz., the c eight producers,' the ( sixteen productions,' and ( Soul.' These twenty-five principles, according to the Sankhya, constitute " all that is ;" and Kapila, we have seen, promises SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 53 the enquirer that his final liberation from all distress will be the result of understandine: "the real nature of all that is." A no- ticeable distinction between Kapila's way of speaking of things, and that of the Naiyayikas, presents itself in their respective choice of a fundamental verb. The language of the Nyaya is moulded on the verb " to be,'1 and that of the Sankhya on the verb " to make." The Nyaya asks " what is .?" — the Sankhya asks " what makes it so ?" The one presents us with a iC compte rendu" of the Universe as it stands : — the other presents as with a cosmogony. As the one subdivides its subject-matter into the two exhaustive categories of Existence and Non-existence, the other exhibits everything (except ' Soul' — the spectator of the phantasmagoria) under the two aspects of c producer' and ' pro- duction.' The f productions' are held to be not other than the 'produ- cers' modified; and the producers — all except the first of them — are but modifications of the first — the mula-prakriti. By what process of thought the notion of such a first principle is arrived at, the following extract from Morell's History of Philosophy (Vol. I. p. 208), may serve to illustrate. Mr. Morell is there speaking of one of the latest German systems, that of Herbart. 88. — ff The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes w to be felt is the following : — When we look round us upon the " world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a per- " ception of the various objects that present themselves on every " hand to our view. What we immediately perceive, however, is <c not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we " discover that many of those phenomena are unreal ; that they " do not portray to us the actual truth of things as they are ; " and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be " landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, 54 A LECTURE ON THE " what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact iC with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, " bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, i( upon reflection, we discover not to be so many real indepen- i( dent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, " which we term things. Again, when we examine further into " these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate " essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the " combination of which they are produced. What we term the " reality, therefore, is not the thing as a ivhole, but the elements cc of which it is composed. Thus the further we analyse, the " further does the idea of reality recede backwards ; but still it " must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a (i nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception 6i of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all (i phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the " essence that assumes the different properties which come be- *- fore us in sensation." 89.— This " essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation,". — this, which the European analyst arrives at as " the last result of the analysis" — is what the San- khya expositor, proceeding synthetically, lays down as his first position. This primordial essence — among the synonymes for which, given in our text-book (No. 7), are the e undiscrete/ the < indestructible,' that ' in which all generated effect is compre- hended,' Sfc, is the c Absolute' of German speculation. The developement of this principle, according to one of Schelling's views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147 vol. 2d) is " not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in nature, and only coming to self- consciousness in mind." So, according to kapila, "from Na- ture issues Mind, and thence Self-consciousness" [see No. 54] : SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY.