English
77 of our text- book, is " knowledge arising from the perception of a ' sign ;' " and as the ' sign' (linga) — the Greek ar^no-j or rather xexpypm — the " mark from which a conclusion may be drawn'' — may be of three kinds ; so the modes of ' inference,' as stated in the apho- rism of Gautama, are likewise three. 101. — The first kind of 'sign' Gautama calls e prior' fpurvva). The meaning of the term is explained by his commentator (in the Xijihja-sutra-vritti) as follows : — ^^ I u [By the expression in the aphorism] ' prior' [is meant] cause —[a cause being prior to, or the antecedent of, its effect — and, when perceived, serving as a 'sign' of the effect yet unperceived]. [By the expression in the aphorism] ' which has that' [i. e., which has the fc prior,' or cause— is meant] which has that as a ( sign*. 60 A LECTURE ON THE As (for example) the inference of rain from the circumstance of the gathering of clouds." In this example of inference, the c prior' (purvva) — the antece- dent or cause — is the ( sign ;' — the gathering of clouds, the ante- cedent or cause of rain, being that e sign' from which a fall of rain is inferred by anticipation. By European writers, this kind of inference is named, in terms strictly corresponding to those of the Nyaya, inference e a priori' [i. e. the inference of the consequent from the antecedent], 102. — The second kind of ' sign5 Gautama calls c posterior' (s'esha). The meaning of the term is explained by his commenta- tor as follows : — c' [By the expression in the aphorism] c posterior' [is meant] effect [ — an effect being posterior to, or the consequent of, its cause — and, when perceived, serving as a ' sign5 of the cause which was unperceived]. [By the expression in the aphorism] e which has the posterior' [is meant — inference] which has that ['posterior' or consequent] as a c sign.' As [for example] the in- ference of rain from the swelling of a river". In this example of inference, the 'posterior' {s'esha) — the con- sequent or effect — is the 'sign' ; — the swelling of a river — the con- sequent or effect of rain — being the 'sign' from which a fall of rain is inferred to have gone before. By European writers, this kind of inference is named, in terms strictly corresponding to those of the Nyaya, the inference ' a posteriori' [i. e., the in- ference of the antecedent from the consequent^, 103. — The third kind of ' sign' Gautama calles 'the perception of community' (sdmdnyato drishta). The import of the term is explained by his commentator as follows :— - SAN'KHYA PHILOSOPHY. Gl '* [By inference from] ' the perception of community' [is meant inference] where the ' sign' is other than effect or cause. As [for example] the inferring that something is a substance from its ha- ving the nature of earth1'. In this example the sdmdnya or 6 generic character' termed prithivitiva ' earthiness' is a ' sign' from which, when perceived, € substantiality' — neither the cause nor the effect, but, in this in- stance, the higher genus — is inferred. The definition applies also to 'inference from analogy', as the term samanyato drishta has been rendered. 104. — The commentator from whom we have quoted mentions another opinion in regard to the names of the three kinds of inference ; — that they refer to those three kinds of e signs' (specifi- ed in page 38 of the e Lectures on the Nyaya Philosophy' — ) viz., the c sign' which is in every case present ; that which is absent in every case but one ; and that which is present in some cases and absent in others. This notion — apparently origi- nating in nothing much deeper than the consideration that there are " three to three'' — may be dismissed as barely on a level with Captain Fluellen's parallel between Harry of Monmouth and Alexander of Macedon, (in e King Henry V — Act iv — sc. 7-), based on the consideration that " There is a river in Macedon ; and there is also moreover a river at Monmouth'\ 105. — Of the three examples given in our text-book (No. 77) the first— viz : the inferring of ' rain from the assembling of clouds,' falls under the first division (—see No. 101.). The second example— the inferring that ' there is water because there are cranes &c.', exemplifies the second division— (sec No. 102) —the 62 A LECTURE ON THE presence of the cranes and such-like waterfowl being consequent on the presence of the water which these birds frequent. The third example — the inferring of c fire from smoke' — (which the author of the Sdnkhya Pravachana Bhdshya refers to the first class) — falls under the same head as the second — smoke being met with only where there has been fire as an antecedent. The selection of examples here therefore is unsatisfactory — being at once redundant and defective. 106. — In the 5th and 6th of the < Memorial Verses', inference is spoken of as follows : — -f^f%^3*m*n*3iT?f Thus rendered by Mr. Colebrooke — " Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it." * * * * "it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcend- ing the senses is obtained :"— . [Professor Wilson prefers rendering the latter clause thus : — " It is by reasoning from analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained."] 107. — The remarks of the scholiast Gaudapada (in the Sdn- khya Bhdshya) on the foregoing text are as follows :— ■strong i wum *nj^nN ranrcf *RPirarrera ire SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. G3 cTT^fafr fT3TT ^faqmST^RT^rsr ^fWrTT^T Tfa W[- ?fT^KT ^^^ ^TTV^frr I 1OTWTrp^^ 11 f^ rffW f%" (i Inference, which is of three kinds, takes the name of * that which has the consequent' (see No. 99), ( that which has the antecedent,' and ' that which is [or consists in] the perception of Community.' ' That which has the antecedent,' is that [form of in- ference] where [it is argued] — 'That [which we are adducing as the sign] is the antecedent of this [which we wish to establish] :' — as, for example, when one proves [an approaching fall of] rain by the rising of clouds — because this [rising of clouds] is an antece- dent of rain. [As an example of inference] l which has the con- sequent'— [suppose that] having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred. c Ana- logous'— as, having observed their change of place, it is conclud- ed that the moon and stars are locomotive like Chaitra : that is, having seen a person named Chaitra transfer his position from one place to another, and thence having known thathewas locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars also are locomotive. So too, observing a mango tree in blossom, one establishes the fact that other mango trees also are in flower [not by adducing, in proof of the fact either, the cause of the fact or any consequence of the fact — but] by remarking the common nature [of the mango tree under inspection — in virtue of which common nature the other mango 64 A LECTURE ON THE trees blossom simultaneously with it.] Such is [inference by means of] i the perception of Community.' Again [the words] tailing 'gapurvvakam &c, [may be rendered otherwise : — thus] tad l that' — viz., ' inference' — UnggapurvvaJca ' where, from a characteristic, that which possesses the character- istic is inferred/ as, [one is inferred to be] a mendicant from his staff [when his staff is of the characteristic description carried by mendi- cants]. And [the act of inference may be said to be] linggipurvva- ka, c where, from what possesses a characteristic, the character- istic itself is inferred/ as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this [which he holds in his hand, and which, from distance or some other reason, is not clearly discernible in his grasp] is his triple staff — [for where the mendicant presents himself, there his cha- racteristic staff is sure to be found also]." Now, in his example of inferring the saltness of the ocean from the saltness of a drop taken from it, Gaudapada appears to have been misled by the ambiguity of the word s'esha, which the Nai- yayikas employ as the opposite of pur vv a — the opposition intend- ed being that of antecedent, and consequent not that of part and remainder.