English
Gaudapada, taking the word in its familiar sense of 6 the rest,' imagines that when we infer the rest of the ocean to be salt like a drop taken from it, the process falls under the second head in the division of the modes of inference, whereas it falls under the third head — the same which he exemplifies by the case of the man- go-trees. As we infer that other mango-trees blossom when one mango-tree blossoms, because all mango-trees have one common nature ; so likewise do we infer that the other drops of the ocean are salt, when we find that one drop is salt, because all the drops in the ocean have one common nature. Thus, whilst our anony- mous commentator on Kapila gives two examples of the second kind and no example of the third, Gaudapada gives two exam- ples of the third kind and none of the second. For the illustra- SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 65 ticn of Kapila, therefore, some of his commentators would ap- pear, by these discrepancies, to have borrowed the terminology of the Nyaya without considering themselves bound to adhere to the sense assigned to the terms by the inventors. Whether the writers on the Sankhya, as has been suggested, intended, by their peculiar application of the terms of the Nyaya, to inculcate their own tenet of the indifference of cause and effect) is a point the consideration of which we remit to another occasion. *:<■ LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 0 029 535 572 4