English
It is the fruit, and the doing is to generate it in sequence, just like the order of time. It contradicts permanence, because permanence and the ability to function are contradictory. As it is said in other treatises: Because sequence and non-sequence are contradictory, permanence cannot perform a function. It is said so. Conversely, whatever functions is pervaded by impermanence, and it is also said in the same place: When things change into other things, the wise call it impermanence. Thus, the reverse pervasion is also established. Furthermore, permanence, the subject, is not established as truly existent, because it is separate from the true one and many. If we examine it with this reason, we cannot find a permanent entity even if we search for it among knowables, so the final পক্ষধর্ম (pakṣadharma) is also established. When these four aspects are established, it is pervaded by non-arising. The third meaning is the certainty of knowledge through reasoning: the object to be proven, non-arising, is the meaning, and because it is established by four reasons, it is a reason of self-nature that establishes the meaning. The statement that everything arises is not understood in this way, but is a delusion, just as the perception of blue arises from blue. Conceptual mind arises from causes and conditions. This eliminates the extreme of one side of non-existence. Saying that there is no arising in the very arising means that because it arises from various causes and conditions, all phenomena are empty of their own nature, which is the wisdom of emptiness. The second meaning is: Emaho, which is the wisdom of the Alaya-like mirror, and so on, as above. No cessation means that the appearance of the mind is not ceased. Its proof, also, is that Jetha Pa, the reasoning that proves the previous non-arising, can serve as the proof of non-cessation, because the negation of negation is affirmation, and in meaning, appearance and emptiness are inseparable. Some say that it is not permissible in that way, because depending on the gradual, the three truths arise sequentially in the continuum. I think it is unreasonable to say that, because at that point, the knowable would be established as truly existent, because outsiders or Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas think so. Those reasons are established from their treatises. They think that it is truly existent, but if it is not established as truly existent in the knowable, what contradiction is there? Here also, it is the same, the gradual must sequentially generate the three truths.
Chinese
然而，如果实相是显空无别，那又有什么相违呢？因为没有遍及。还有一些人说，有三种无碍的论证：因为专注于一个错觉的显现，因为显现不会被否定，以及如果显现不存在就会变成过失，所以显现是存在的。在这里，以自宗来说，有三种：确立心性无碍的论证，论证它的方式，以及确定它的种类。第一，心性是所立宗，显现是无碍的，因为如果显现不存在，就会成为认识空性的工具，如果自性中没有显现，那么现在的错觉就不会产生，如果显现不存在，显空无别就不会成立，以及任何事物都无法否定空性的显现，所以这也是用四个理由来论证的。第二，如果其他宗派说断灭，或者自宗中观的一些人说断灭，那么这些论证是不成立的，即使显现是真实的，也不存在显现，那么，首先论证的方式是，如果所知连显现都不存在，那么用什么来认识空性呢？如果用非显现来认识，那么，那是错觉还是非错觉？如果是前者，那么所知就不是真实的空性，因为认识者是错觉。如果承认这个论证，但没有遍及，那么，凡是认识者是错觉所认识的所知，都不是那样，就像眼识是错觉所认识的海螺的自性不是黄色一样。如果承认，那么认为空性在某一方面是真实的观点就会丧失。还有，如果是后者，那么我们所说的显现，就是认识所知空性的非错觉的认识者，就像把有褶皱的牦牛叫做牛一样。第二种方式是，现在的错觉是所立宗，不会产生，因为它的基础是显现不存在。如果不成立，那么显现就会存在。如果没有遍及，那么显现被否定，错觉也会被否定，就像海螺被否定，认为它是黄色也会被否定一样。如果想要反驳，那么错觉会被目标所消除。第三种方式是，实相是所立宗，不会是无别，因为部分显现不存在。如果承认这个论证，那么遍及就是部分被否定
English
However, if the nature of reality is the inseparability of appearance and emptiness, what contradiction could there be? Because there is no pervasion. Some also say that there are three unobstructed proofs: because one focuses on a mere appearance of illusion, because appearance is not refuted, and because if appearance did not exist, it would become a fault, therefore appearance exists. Here, according to our own system, there are three: establishing the sign that mind-essence is unobstructed, proving its mode, and ascertaining its kind. First, mind-essence is the subject of debate. Appearance is unceasing, because if appearance did not exist, it would be the means of knowing emptiness itself, and if appearance were not established in its nature, this present illusory appearance itself would not arise, and if appearance did not exist, the inseparability of appearance and emptiness would not be established, and because no appearance that is empty of truth can be refuted by anything, this is also proven by four reasons. Second, if other schools say that it is annihilation, or some of our own Madhyamika schools say that it is annihilation, then those signs are not established, and even if appearance is true, it is not established as mere appearance, then, first, the way to prove it is, if the knowable does not even exist as mere appearance, then by what is emptiness known? If it is known by something that is not appearance, then is that delusion or not delusion? If it is the former, then the knowable will not be truly empty, because the knower is a delusion. If that sign is accepted and there is no pervasion, then whatever knowable is known by a deluded knower is not pervasive, just as the nature of the conch shell known by the deluded eye consciousness is not yellow. If you accept this, then the view that emptiness is true in one respect will be lost. Also, if it is the latter, then what we call appearance is the non-deluded knower who knows the emptiness of the knowable, just as a yak with a dewlap is called a cow. The second way is that this present illusion is the subject of debate. It will not arise, because its basis is the non-existence of appearance. If that is not established, then appearance will exist. If there is no pervasion, then the appearance is negated, and the illusion is pervaded by the negation, just as if the conch shell is negated, then the perception that it is yellow is negated. If you want to refute it, then the illusion will be eliminated by the object. The third way is that the nature of reality is the subject of debate. It will not be inseparable, because the part of appearance does not exist. If the sign is accepted, then the pervasion is that the part is negated
Chinese
就像两掌相合才能发出声音，如果只有一只手掌就无法发出声音一样。如果有人这样认为，那么这与“空性和缘起在中观的意义上是相同的”相矛盾。此外，“显现和不显现都不存在，存在和不存在也无差别”等等，这些关于无差别的深广教证已经阐明，因此可以排除这种观点。因此，心性具有显现和空性无二无别的性质，因为显现的自性在空性中成立，就像珍宝能满足愿望一样，这个理由能够证明无二无别。另一种观点是，一些中观派学者认为能够否定显现，因为他们被诸如一和多分离之类的理由所否定。如果有人这样认为，那么这是否定真理，而不是否定仅仅是显现。如果它是否定仅仅是显现，那么这个理由本身就不是真实的，因为它缺乏逆转的方式。如果理由不成立，那么在一和多的事物中就可能存在真理，并且缺乏逆转的遍及性也意味着它不是真实的，就像不确定的表象一样。如果有人这样认为，那么这个理由不能否定显现，因为它不是真实的。此外，如果在错觉中显现成立，那么在了解自性的角度来看，它也是成立的，因为这两者的区别仅仅在于是否证悟显现的法性。如果基础显现不存在，那么就没有可以证悟其法性的事物，就像如果蛇不存在于所知中，那么绳子上执着于蛇的认知也不存在于所知中一样。因此，持有这种宗派的人认为，通过空性智慧所成立的显现，也是通过智慧所成立的，因为实际上显现和空性是无二无别的。第三种是，由于从错觉中产生，并且知道它是空性的等等，仅仅从显现中产生，所以这是果的理由。或者，是无二无别的自性，所以这是自性的理由。还有，应该思考的是，如果先前在同一个心性上证明了无生，而在这里证明了无灭，这二者是否矛盾？这并不是说这两个是作为不同的自性来证明的，而是在了解原因的时候，由于没有逐渐地证悟无二无别，所以才证明和确定了不同的逆转。所谓的一切灭，是指在错觉中具有分别念的心。
English
Just as clapping requires two hands, and there is no sound of clapping if there is only one hand. If one thinks so, it contradicts "emptiness and dependent arising are the same in the meaning of Madhyamaka." Furthermore, "neither appearance nor non-appearance exists, and existence and non-existence are also inseparable," and so on. These profound and vast teachings on inseparability have been explained, thus refuting this view. Therefore, the nature of mind has the nature of being inseparable from appearance and emptiness, because the nature of appearance is established in emptiness, just as a precious jewel fulfills wishes. This reason can prove inseparability. Another view is that some Madhyamikas think they can negate appearance because they are negated by reasons such as being separate from one and many. If one thinks so, that is a negation of truth, not a negation of mere appearance. If it is a negation of mere appearance, then that reason itself is not valid, because it lacks the mode of reversal. If the reason is not established, then truth could exist in things that are one and many, and the lack of pervasive reversal also implies that it is not valid, like an uncertain appearance. If one thinks so, then that reason cannot negate appearance, because it is not valid. Furthermore, if appearance is established in delusion, then it is also established from the perspective of knowing its nature, because the difference between the two lies only in whether or not one realizes the dharmata of appearance. If the basis of appearance does not exist, then there is nothing to realize its dharmata, just as if a snake does not exist in the knowable, then the perception of it on a rope does not exist in the knowable. Therefore, those who hold this tenet believe that the appearance established by the wisdom of emptiness is also established by wisdom, because in reality appearance and emptiness are inseparable. The third is that since it arises from delusion and knowing it is emptiness, etc., it arises only from appearance, so this is the reason of the result. Or, it is the nature of inseparability, so this is the reason of the nature. Also, it should be considered whether there is a contradiction between previously proving no-birth on the same nature of mind and proving no-cessation here. This is not to say that the two are proven as different natures, but rather that in the context of understanding the cause, different reversals are proven and determined because inseparability is not gradually realized. The statement that everything ceases refers to the mind with conceptual thought in delusion.
Chinese
从出生之时起，不会停留在第二个刹那而止灭，从觉知的角度来说，执着于此为真实，这与前面所说的无生证成之相违背，因此是止灭。止灭之时，没有止灭。这从所知的事物成立方式来说，无灭的显现与止灭空性无别，因此没有分别念，这就是如明镜般的智慧。第三个意义是唉玛吙，是指烦恼和意念的平等性。无有住处，是指前面所说的无生证成和无灭证成的相，这些法，在一个之上没有差别，因此不会停留在任何一个方面。一切住处，是指没有证悟到这一点，在迷惑的异宗看来，比空性还要空的事物，以及自宗的声闻缘觉所说的法我和，唯识宗所说的自证等等，这些都说是实有。还有异宗的断见者所说的无，以及自宗的中观宗所说的空性，这些有分别念的心都存在于差别之中。安住之时，没有安住。这是指对于事物的存在方式，没有差别和偏颇，是平等性的智慧。第四个意义是唉玛吙，是指意识各自的分别。无有对境，是指无有分别或无有边际的法性，对于外境没有执着。一切对境，是指在迷惑的显现中，执着的意识对于所取的对境进行分别。对境之时，没有对境。这是指在真实之中，当对外境和有境进行区分时，从色到一切种智之间，所有的法都如实地、毫不颠倒地证悟各自的自性，这就是各别自证智。第五个意义是唉玛吙，是指五根的成就。无有来去，是指心的自性在任何一边都没有动摇。来和去，是指证悟和没有证悟，显现为轮回和涅槃的自性。来去之时，没有来去。这是指这些在心性中不费力气自然成就，是成所作智。第二，行道之发心有二，即解脱道顿入之方式，与方便道下门之方式。初者有五，即摇动，进入，安住，发愿。