English
Then, is the fruit to be produced an already established production, or an unestablished production? If according to the first case, the phenomenon like a sprout, will not need to be produced, because it is already established in the seed. If this reason is not established, then the statement that the fruit is established when the cause is established will collapse. If it is already established, then what hinders the production? If so, it would be too extreme, the cause itself would produce as the cause itself. If you admit the first inference, then self-generation will collapse. If it is the second case, an unestablished production, then the sprout, this phenomenon, will not be the nature of the seed, because it has the characteristic of contradicting unestablished and production. This has been established by valid cognition, and unestablished pervades not being a seed. If you admit, then self-generation, that is, the view that cause and effect are one entity, will collapse. Furthermore, the sprout, this phenomenon, will not have two parts, appearing and not appearing, in the object of one consciousness, because cause and effect are one entity. If it is the second case, it is produced from another, then the sprout, this phenomenon, will be produced from fire and coal, because the sprout depends on fire and coal, so it is other. Someone might say, this pervasion is not established, because it is the other that transforms into cause and effect that produces the other, because the seed producing the sprout is apparent, and it has the ability to produce from it, and it is the nature of things that it produces from it. The other that does not transform into cause and effect does not produce the other, because no one has seen a sprout produced from fire and coal, and it does not have the ability to produce it, and it is the nature of things that cause and effect are not confused. If so, then just as you have not seen a sprout produced from fire and coal, if you prevent the production of the fruit, then the virtuous and non-virtuous dharmas of this life will not ripen into happiness and suffering in the next life, because you have not seen it. If that pervasion is not established, then here, fire and sprout are also the same. Also, like earth and sprout, because it appears that it produces it from it, the production of the fruit is established. If so, the earth and sprout in a dream, this phenomenon, will be established to produce it from it, because in the dream it appears that it produces it from it. Someone might say, this pervasion is not established, because in the dream it appears that it produces it from it, but that is confused, so it is false. In the object of waking consciousness, the appearance of producing it from it is not confused, so it is true. If so, the difference between consciousness being confused and not
Chinese
像这样，如果考虑到所有法的自性都证悟为无生，那么这和虚假是一样的。仅仅显现为因果，即使在梦中也有，但醒来时的意识境中却没有，因为这个缘故。又，如果说梦中种子生出苗芽的征相不成立，那么醒时意识中的地芽也是一样的。如果说梦中的意识境，没有真实存在，因为它在醒时的意识境中不存在。这不相同，因为现在的因果，没有真实存在，因为如果去观察就找不到。第三种，从两者中产生，指的是因果是同一本体，以及从两个不同的本体中产生。这是因为特别遮止了从自和他两者中产生。总的来说，遮止了从两者中产生，例如，如果每一粒沙子都没有产生酥油的能力，那么沙子堆积起来的整体也没有这种能力。第四种，如果没有因就产生，那么苗芽，就不需要依赖处所、时间和自性的三种因，因为它是无因的。如果承认这个征相，但周遍不成立，那么无因生就会瓦解。如果想要这样，那么苗芽，遮止了依赖那三种因，因为它在雪山顶上没有，但在田地上有。自性上，它不会从煤炭中产生，而是从青稞等产生。时间上，冬天没有，但在夏天有。因此，当遮止了从自、他、两者和无因中产生这四种情况时，作为论式的第一部分，就成立了不是从其他因缘所生。第二个征相是，一些自在天派认为，一切法都是由自在天等造作者所造。第二种情况是，没有成立不是由其他造作者所造。那么，那个其他的造作者是由常还是无常所造？如果是第一种情况，那么自在天，将无法起作用，因为它是常法。如果承认这一点，但周遍不成立，那么常法就会瓦解。如果想要推出这个结果，那么它就不是造作者，因为它无法起作用。如果承认这个征相，但问即使无法起作用，作为造作者又有什么矛盾呢？凡是无法起作用的，就不是造作者，例如兔子的角。如果说是由无常所造
English
In this way, if we consider that the nature of all dharmas is realized as unborn, then it is the same as falsehood. Merely appearing as cause and effect, it exists even in dreams, but it does not exist in the consciousness of being awake, because of this reason. Also, if it is said that the sign of a sprout arising from a seed in a dream is not established, then the same is true for the earth sprout in waking consciousness. If it is said that the object of consciousness in a dream does not truly exist because it does not exist in the object of consciousness in the waking state, this is not the same, because the present cause and effect do not truly exist, because if you examine it, you cannot find it. The third, arising from both, refers to the cause and effect being the same entity, and it arising from two different entities. This is because, in particular, it precludes arising from both self and other. In general, arising from both is precluded, for example, if each grain of sand does not have the ability to produce butter, then the whole pile of sand does not have that ability either. Fourth, if it arises without a cause, then the sprout does not need to depend on the three causes of place, time, and nature, because it is without a cause. If this sign is accepted, but the pervasion is not established, then arising without a cause will collapse. If you want this, then the sprout precludes relying on those three causes, because it is not on the top of a snow mountain, but it is on the field. By nature, it does not arise from coal, but it arises from barley and so on. In terms of time, it is not in winter, but it is in summer. Therefore, when the four situations of arising from self, other, both, and without a cause are precluded, then as the first part of the thesis, it is established that it is not born from other causes and conditions. The second sign is that some Ishvaras believe that all dharmas are created by a creator such as Ishvara. The second situation is that it is not established that it is not created by another creator. Then, is that other creator created by something permanent or impermanent? If it is the first case, then Ishvara will not be able to function, because it is permanent. If this is accepted, but the pervasion is not established, then the permanent will collapse. If you want to deduce this result, then it is not a creator, because it cannot function. If this sign is accepted, but asked what is the contradiction in being a creator even if it cannot function? Whatever cannot function is not a creator, like a rabbit's horn. If it is said that it is created by something impermanent
Chinese
那么，因为它被三时所包含，过去和未来是无实有的，因此不适合作为作者。如果它能成为作者，那么兔子角也能产生果实，为什么能阻止呢？一切都是一样的。现在的（时间）如果前后考察，也是找不到的。正如其他经文中所说：如何像刹那无边一样，初始和中间也应考察。因为是三个刹那的自性，世界不住于刹那。就像这样。因此，作者被否定，所以第二个方面（同品遍在性）成立。第三个理由是，自宗唯识宗的人这样认为：一切事物都是先前没有而新产生的，因此第三个方面（有法）不成立。那么，种子是所立宗，不会产生果实，因为在作为因的种子的时候，果实是不存在的。如果那不存在不成立，那么一切果实都是先前没有而新产生的说法就被破坏了。如果种子的时候没有，新产生又有什么妨碍呢？那么，为什么能阻止石女产生儿子呢？如果说石女和儿子产生是相违的，那么这里也是一样的，种子没有芽，它产生也是相违的。另外，种子是所立宗，从现在开始兔子角也会产生，因为在作为因的种子的时候，芽和兔子角两者都没有，是相同的。如果说周遍性不存在，因为没有看到从种子产生兔子角，所以那两者不是因果，而看到芽产生，所以那两者是因果。那么，就像上面一样，今生的善恶不会成为来世的因果，梦中的土地和芽也会成为真实的因果，因为没有看到和看到的原因。因此，因为果实被看到是因先行的周遍性，所以第三个方面（异品空无性）成立。第四个理由是，其他宗派的常住论者说，事物作为实体存在，并且从第二个刹那开始不会改变，因为是常住唯一的，所以最后一个方面（周遍性）也不成立。那么，那个事物是所立宗，将不能起作用，因为是常住的。如果承认那个理由，并且说常住也能起作用有什么妨碍呢？凡是常住的就不能起作用，就像虚空中的莲花一样。因此，意义上
English
Then, because it is encompassed by the three times, the past and future are unreal, therefore it is not suitable as an agent. If it could become an agent, then why would it be prevented from a rabbit's horn also producing fruit? Everything is the same. The present (time) also, if examined before and after, cannot be found. As it is said in other texts: How, like an infinite instant, should the beginning and middle also be examined? Because it is the nature of three instants, the world does not abide in an instant. Like that. Therefore, because the agent is refuted, the second aspect (presence in similar instances) is established. The third reason is that our own school, the Mind-Only school, thinks like this: all things are newly produced from non-existence, therefore the third aspect (the property) is not established. Then, the seed is the subject, it will not produce fruit, because at the time of the seed as the cause, the fruit does not exist. If that non-existence is not established, then the statement that all fruits are newly produced from non-existence is undermined. If it does not exist at the time of the seed, what is the obstacle to new production? Then, why would it be prevented from a barren woman producing a son? If it is said that a barren woman and the production of a son are contradictory, then it is the same here, the seed does not have a sprout, its production is contradictory. Furthermore, the seed is the subject, from now on a rabbit's horn will also be produced, because at the time of the seed as the cause, both the sprout and the rabbit's horn do not exist, they are the same. If it is said that the pervasion does not exist, because the production of a rabbit's horn from a seed has not been seen, therefore those two are not cause and effect, but the production of a sprout is seen, therefore those two are cause and effect. Then, like above, the good and bad deeds of this life will not become the cause and effect of the next life, and the land and sprout of a dream will also become real cause and effect, because of the reason of not seeing and seeing. Therefore, because the seeing of the fruit is pervaded by the prior cause, the third aspect (absence in dissimilar instances) is established. The fourth reason is that other schools, the eternalists, say that things exist as substances, and from the second instant onwards they do not change, because they are eternal and unique, therefore the last aspect (pervasion) is also not established. Then, that thing is the subject, it will not be able to function, because it is eternal. If that reason is accepted, and it is said what is the obstacle to the eternal also being able to function? Whatever is eternal is pervaded by not being able to function, like a lotus in the sky. Therefore, in terms of meaning
Chinese
是果，而做是次第生起，如时间先后一样。它与常法相悖，因为常法和有作用是相违的。如其他论典中所说：以次第和无次第相违故，常法不能起作用。这样说。与此相反，凡起作用者，皆为无常所遍及，也是在那里面说：诸事物变为他物，智者说为无常。这样也成立了反遍。此外，常法有法，不成实有，以离真实的一和多之故。以这个理由来观察，常实之物，在所知中寻找也找不到，所以最后的同品周遍也成立了。这样四种同品周遍成立后，它就遍及于无生。第三个意义是用理证来确定智慧：所要证成的无生是意义，因为它由四种理证成立，所以是意义成立自性之理。所谓一切生，并非如此理解，而是错觉，如执著蓝色者从蓝色产生一样，有分别的心是从因缘所生。由此遣除无的一边。在已生之时说无生，是因为从各种因缘所生之故，一切法自性空是空性之智慧。第二个意义是：唉玛火，是阿赖耶识如镜之智等等，如上所述。无灭，是说心的显现不灭。它的能立，也是杰塔巴，就是之前的无生能立之理，可以作为无灭的能立，因为是否定之否定即是肯定，而且意义上显现和空性无别。有些人说那样不行，因为要依赖次第，所以三个谛依次在相续中产生。我认为这样说是不合理的，如果那样，所知就会成立为真实存在，因为外道或者声闻缘觉是这样认为的。那些理由是从他们的论典中成立的。他们认为真实存在，如果所知中不成立真实存在，那有什么矛盾呢？这里也一样，次第者必须依次产生三个谛。