Back to the library

KMG046 0003.A Commentary on Entering the Bodhisattva's Way of Life Nectar Drops from the Mouth of Jamyang Lama.·A Commentary on Entering the Bodhisattva's Way of Life Nectar Drops from the Mouth of Jamyang Lama..g2.0f

Chinese

所谓的力量、微尘和黑暗这三种属性,如果总是处于完全均等的状态,就被称为转变之因“主物”,如果变得不均等,就说是各种众生的转变由此产生,并且这样认为。然而,主物是唯一的真实存在,却具有三种属性的自性,这并不合理。因为如果存在三种属性,就不是唯一的。因此,那个恒常、唯一、作为原因的自性,或者说主物,是不存在的。同样,这三种属性也是不存在的,因为这三种属性中的每一种都各自具有三种成分,例如微尘的微尘、微尘的黑暗、微尘的力量等等。如果不是这样,就会超出自性或主物的状态。这样,如果作为原因的三种属性不存在,那么由此产生的转变,如声音等,也被认为是存在的,这就会变得非常荒谬或与存在相悖,就像没有泥土的瓶子一样。此外,如果感觉通过量成立为心识的自性,那么没有心识的事物,如衣服等,就不可能存在快乐等。如果说事物,如声音和衣服等,是快乐等的原因的自性,所以没有过失,那么,在究竟意义上,衣服等事物在遮止身体等的时候,不是已经通过分析而被否定了吗?已经否定了。在世俗意义上,这与你自己的承诺相矛盾,因为你认为粗布等的原因也是快乐等,粗布等的结果也是快乐等。因此,产生粗布等的原因也是这个,粗布等产生的结果也是这个,这真是可笑,就像说这个人既是这个人的父亲又是儿子一样。如果存在多种快乐等,那么唯一的自性就会丧失。这也与现量相违背,因为从未见过从快乐等产生粗布等,因为从粗布和月官的念珠等中可以观察到快乐等。因此,粗布等甚至连微尘都无法成立,既然不存在,那么由此产生的快乐等也不可能在其他地方独立存在。有人会说,快乐等不需要依赖粗布等,因为主物的自性是恒常的。

Chinese

如果说是这样,那么快乐等恒常不变地被认知是荒谬的。因为任何可以被认知的快乐等,都不可能脱离其原有的自性。即使如此,也不可能永远认知到恒常的事物,所以这是不合理的。如果说快乐等虽然恒常存在,但有显现和不显现的差别,所以不一定总是被认知,那么,如果快乐等永远不显现,那么谁也不会知道,因此也不可能存在,而且你也不会承认这一点。如果有时快乐等是显现的,那么为什么不总是体验到呢?因为快乐等是可以被认知的,并且遍及认知的对象,而且恒常存在,就像有眼睛的人面前的灯一样。如果说粗大的显现的快乐等变得微细而不显现,以潜能的形态存在,所以无法体验,那么,恒常唯一的快乐等,怎么会同时具有粗大和微细这两种不同的状态呢?或者怎么会既是粗大又是微细呢?如果说舍弃了原有的粗大性质,变成了微细,所以没有过失,那么,变成了微细和粗大状态的快乐等,就成为了无常。如果承认快乐等显现的事物舍弃了之前的状态而变成了其他的状态,那么,为什么不认为同样的二十五种事物也都是无常的呢?因为没有任何事物会永远以一种形态被认知。如果变成了微细和粗大,但没有舍弃快乐的自性,所以没有失去恒常,那么,粗大和快乐是不同的吗?还是一样的?如果是前者,那么粗大消失了,快乐的显现也不会消失,应该总是被体验到。如果认为粗大本身不是快乐之外的其他事物,而是一体的,那么快乐的显现就必然是无常的。第二种观点是,有人会说,快乐变得不显现,但在自性的虚空中以潜能的形态潜伏着,再次显现时,只是先前存在的显现出来而已。如果先前完全不存在的事物不可能产生,因为它不存在。例如,就像泥土里长不出兔角一样。因此,凡是进入显现的途径的事物,都必然以自性的方式存在于自性的虚空中。

English

If it is said that it is so, then it is absurd to perceive happiness, etc., as being constant and unchanging. Because any happiness, etc., that can be perceived cannot possibly deviate from its original nature. Even so, it is not possible to always perceive something that is constant, so this is unreasonable. If it is said that although happiness, etc., always exists, there is a difference between being manifest and unmanifest, so it is not necessarily always perceived, then if happiness, etc., is never manifest, then no one will know it, so it cannot exist, and you would not admit this either. If happiness, etc., is sometimes manifest, then why is it not always experienced? Because happiness, etc., is perceptible, pervades the object of perception, and is constant, like a lamp in front of a sighted person. If it is said that the gross, manifest happiness, etc., becomes subtle and unmanifest, existing in the form of potential, so it cannot be experienced, then how can the constant, single happiness, etc., have both the contradictory states of being gross and subtle? Or how can it be both? If it is said that there is no fault because it abandons its original gross nature and becomes subtle, then the happiness, etc., that has become subtle and gross is established as being impermanent. If it is admitted that the manifest happiness, etc., abandons its previous state and becomes something else, then why not consider all twenty-five entities to be impermanent as well? Because it is impossible for anything to always be perceived in only one way. If it becomes subtle and gross, but does not abandon the nature of happiness, so it does not lose its constancy, then are grossness and happiness different? Or are they the same? If the former, then even if grossness ceases, the manifestation of happiness will not cease, and it should always be experienced. If it is thought that grossness itself is not something other than happiness, but is one with it, then the manifestation of happiness is necessarily established as being impermanent. The second view is that some say that happiness becomes unmanifest, but lies dormant in the realm of the self as a potential, and when it manifests again, it is merely the manifestation of what was previously there. If something that was previously completely non-existent cannot arise, because it does not exist. For example, like a rabbit's horn from clay. Therefore, whatever enters the path of manifestation necessarily exists in the realm of the self by its very nature.

Chinese

如果认为果在因位时存在,那么所有果在因位时都存在,为什么总是不能被见到呢?对此可以提问。对此,如果说只是心识在对境上先前不明显,后来才明显,就像暗室里的瓶子因灯光而显现一样,那么,你的根本理证就崩溃了。因为显现不是因位时就有的,而是新产生的,即使你不愿意或者不承认,但事实上就是如此。如果显现因位时就存在,那么显现与不显现的差别也无法成立,因为一开始就应该显现。因此,你自己的承诺自相矛盾。而且,这还与理证相违背。如果果真实在因上存在,那么你吃食物时就变成吃不净之物了。另外,你用购买上好布料的钱去购买棉花种子,然后从种子中提取棉花,再织成布料穿上,这样你的宗义就成立了。对此,有人说:实际上,果在因上存在,但世间人因愚痴的昏暗遮蔽了眼睛,所以看不见。如果说,数论派的导师们所确立的,关于果存在于因上的真理的知识,世间人也同样拥有,那么,既然因缘具足,为什么不能看见呢?应该能看见才对。按照你的说法,普遍来说,证悟真理的智慧作为果,应该存在于一切众生心中。如果承认果在因上真实存在的数论派的观点,那么他们也应该吃食物而不吃不净之物,想要衣服就去买布,而不会去追求棉花种子,难道你没看到吗?无论在何时何地,你所建立的关于真理的观点,都没有看到有人像你那样享用,这是一种损害。有人说:世间人的见解不是量,所以不能构成损害。那么,世间人所见的果的自性显现也就不真实,而是虚假的了。如果那是虚假的,那么“这个因有这个果,所以后来才显现”,这句话就变得毫无意义了。他们说:如果衡量者是虚假的,那么所衡量的事物就不能成立。那么,中观派的你,衡量者的智慧也不是胜义谛上的量,那么,由此所衡量的成立的宗义也是虚假的。

English

If it is asserted that the effect exists at the time of the cause, then why is it that all effects, if they exist at the time of the cause, are never perceived? This can be questioned. To this, if it is said that it is merely that the mind, with respect to the object, was previously unclear and later becomes clear, just as a vase in a dark room becomes clear by the light of a lamp, then your fundamental reasoning collapses. For the clarity is not present at the time of the cause but is newly produced, and even if you do not wish or acknowledge it, that is indeed how it is in reality. If clarity exists at the time of the cause, then the distinction between clarity and non-clarity cannot be established, as it should be clear from the beginning. Therefore, your own assertion is self-contradictory. Moreover, it contradicts reason. If the effect truly exists in the cause, then when you eat food, you would be eating impure things. Furthermore, you should buy cotton seeds with the money you would use to buy fine cloths, then extract cotton from them and weave it into clothes to wear, and thus your doctrine would be established. To this, someone says: In reality, the effect exists in the cause, but worldly people do not see it because their eyes are obscured by the dimness of ignorance. If the knowledge of the truth that the effect exists in the cause, as established by the teachers of the Samkhya school, is also present in worldly people, then why is it not seen when the causes are complete? It should be seen. According to you, universally, the wisdom that realizes the truth as the effect must be present in all sentient beings. If one acknowledges the Samkhya system, which asserts that the effect truly exists in the cause, then they should also eat food and not eat impure things, and if they want clothes, they should buy cloth and not seek cotton seeds. Have you not seen this? In no place or time has anyone been seen enjoying things in the way you have established the truth, and this is a harm. Someone says: The perception of worldly people is not a valid cognition, so it does not constitute a harm. Then, the clear manifestation of the nature of the effect seen by worldly people is also not true but false. If that is false, then the statement "This cause has this effect, and therefore it will later become clear" becomes meaningless. They say: If the measurer is false, then the measured cannot be established. Then, you, Madhyamika, the knowledge of the measurer is also not established as valid in the ultimate sense, so the established tenets measured by it are also false.

Chinese

难道不会改变吗?如果这样,那么虚假的辨析量,衡量并断定“其自性为空性或胜义为空性”,并以此理由修习空性也不合理,是吗?在此,我们并非以量成立的空性作为目标,而执着于一个实有的宗派。因为,如果不触及或不依赖于瓶等可观察之物,那么瓶无等事物的无实有就永远无法独立存在。因此,瓶无和瓶子的空性等名相或世俗的空性,也是遮止或排除其他事物的方面。因此,任何自性虚假的事物,其无实有也必然是虚假的。那么,修习万法皆空有什么用呢?因为实有和无实有两者都是虚假的,两者都不真实。暂时地,仅仅是为了对治从无始以来串习的实执而束缚于有,而串习事物无自性。实有和无实有两者都是虚假的。因此,就像梦中梦见生子后死亡而痛苦,认为孩子不存在的分别念,是认为孩子存在的分别念的障碍,而那也是虚假的。因此,就像两木相磨而生的火焚烧两木一样,以智慧之火分析万法皆无实有,焚烧殆尽安立为实有和无实有的所有目标,从而安住于息灭一切戏论的智慧时,就是远离一切宗派的大中观。如是说:中观论典中说:执著于“有”即是常,视“无”即是断,因此智者不应安住于有和无。第四,总结意义:因为这个理由,如此辨析,没有任何事物是无因而有的,也不会从常因中产生。外在的一切法,如种子生芽等,依赖于各自的因缘而产生。内在的生处是

English

Wouldn't it change? If so, then that false discriminating measure, measuring and determining "its own nature is emptiness or ultimate emptiness," and meditating on emptiness for that reason would also be unreasonable, wouldn't it? Here, we do not take emptiness established by valid cognition as our target, and adhere to a truly established tenet. Because, if one does not touch or rely on objects to be examined, such as a pot, then the non-existence of that object, such as the non-existence of a pot, can never exist independently. Therefore, the emptiness of the non-existence of a pot and the emptiness of a pot, such as the nominal or conventional emptiness, is also a part of negating or excluding other objects. Therefore, whatever object is false by its own nature, its non-existence is also clearly considered to be necessarily false. So, what is the use of meditating that all things are non-existent? Because both existence and non-existence are equally false, and neither is true. For the time being, it is merely to counteract the clinging to reality that has been habitual since beginningless time and binds us to existence, and to become accustomed to the non-self-existence of things. Both existence and non-existence are false. Therefore, just as in a dream, one dreams of having a child who dies and suffers, the thought that the child does not exist is an obstacle to the thought that the child exists, and that is also false. Therefore, just as the fire produced by rubbing two sticks together burns both sticks, the fire of wisdom that analyzes all things as non-existent burns completely the dense forest of all the targets established as existence and non-existence. When one abides in the wisdom that pacifies all elaborations, it is the Great Middle Way that is free from all tenets. As it is said: In the Treatise on the Middle Way, it is said: To cling to "exists" is to grasp permanence, to view "does not exist" is to see annihilation. Therefore, the wise should not abide in existence and non-existence. Fourth, summarizing the meaning: Because of this reason, thus analyzing, no object exists without a cause, nor does it arise from a permanent cause. All external phenomena, such as a sprout from a seed, arise depending on their respective causes and conditions. The internal sources of birth are