English
If it is said that by knowing the fruit arising from the object, why is it not realized that the knowable exists? It is realized. But this example is not appropriate. Because the sprout knowing the seed is not known by the sprout itself alone, but by a consciousness other than the sprout. By inferring the fruit, that is, the sprout, it is realized that this thing has a previously existing cause, that is, the seed. This is because, based on observing the seed and the sprout separately, it is known in this way by the valid cognition that establishes the cause-and-effect relationship. If the valid cognition that establishes the cause-and-effect relationship has not preceded, it cannot be known merely by seeing the sprout. Because in knowing the knowable, there must be a valid cognition of the reason as proof. But in reality, it cannot be established by either self-awareness or other-awareness. Therefore, for the view that acknowledges the existence of things, establishing conventions is difficult, while for the view that acknowledges it as imputed, it is very reasonable. The above is explained. The second part includes: the reasoning of the Vajra Splinters that examines the cause; the Great Dependent Arising that examines the essence; and the existence or non-existence of arising and ceasing that examines the fruit. The first part includes: refuting the view that arises from no cause; refuting the view that arises from another; refuting the view that arises from itself; and summarizing the meaning of the reasoning. The first point is: the Tirthikas and others claim that, like the sharpness of thorns and the bright colors of peacock feathers, etc., they are not made by anyone, but arise from the nature of things themselves. In response to this, first, from the perspective of worldly perception, all fruits can be seen to have their respective causes of arising, but the phenomenon of arising without a cause cannot be seen. Here, the term perception is only an example, and it also includes inference. If it is thought that the various differences in the stems and petals of lotuses, such as size and quantity, are not seen in the cause, and therefore it is unreasonable to think that there are causes for various differences. If the fruit already truly exists in the cause, then how can it become a cause-and-effect relationship? However, the stems of lotuses, etc., do not arise without relying on their own seeds, and it is seen that they arise from seeds, therefore the differences in the fruit are produced by the differences in the cause. Just as there are various kinds of fruits, the differences in the power of the cause can also be established. If asked, who made the various differences in the cause like this? The answer is, no one else made it, just like this.
Chinese
而且，种子没有自己的因是不可能产生的。因此，它来自于先前的因的区分。如果问为什么它有各种各样的能力，而现在的青稞种子或这个因能够产生青稞的幼苗或果实，却不能产生稻子的种子呢？那是因为现在的青稞种子并不是以自主的方式掌握各种各样的能力，而是由于先前因的力量，它被抛向了产生与其同类的自性。这是事物的规律，没有人能够扰乱它。或者，如果问为什么不同的因能够产生不同的果，原因是什么呢？那是因为各自先前因的力量，这样产生是事物的规律。如是说。因此，如果无因，就会陷入常有或常无的过失。但是，事物因为有时在处所和时间上被确定，所以成立为有因。第二，分为：驳斥认为从无常产生，和驳斥认为从常产生。前者已经说完，现在是后者。自在天等说：常有、自生的、全知的自在天，被称为属于神的，清净且值得供养的，常有的，唯一的，具有智慧的变动，是万物的作者，具有这五种功德，先运用智慧，然后创造一切世间。如果说自在天是众生的因，那么，请先说说自在天的体性是什么？如果回答说是地、水、火、风，也就是四大。如果是这样，那也可以。因为从四大产生出所产生的果，所以我方也认为它是因，只是名称上的差别而已，也就是你称它为自在天，而我们称它为四大，只是名称上的差别而已。如果是这样，名称可以随人们的意愿随意安立，因此，用如此大的努力来成立自在天有什么用呢？这种闲暇不应该做。或者，只是名称上的差别，没有什么可争论的。然而，如果你认为自在天具有常有、唯一、值得供养等特点，那么，地等这些是众多且
English
Moreover, it is impossible for a seed to arise without its own cause. Therefore, it comes from the distinction of previous causes. If asked why it has various abilities, and why the current barley seed or this cause can produce barley sprouts or fruits, but cannot produce rice seeds? It is because the current barley seed does not grasp various abilities in an autonomous manner, but because of the power of the previous cause, it is thrown into the nature of producing its own kind. This is the law of things, and no one can disturb it. Or, if asked why different causes can produce different effects, what is the reason? It is because of the power of each previous cause that such arising is the law of things. So it is said. Therefore, if there is no cause, it will fall into the fault of being either permanent or non-existent. However, things are established as having causes because they are sometimes determined in place and time. Secondly, it is divided into: refuting the view that it arises from impermanence, and refuting the view that it arises from permanence. The former has been said, and now it is the latter. The proponents of Ishvara and others say: The eternal, self-born, omniscient Ishvara, called belonging to the gods, pure and worthy of offering, eternal, unique, possessing the movement of wisdom, is the creator of all things, possessing these five qualities, first using wisdom, and then creating all the worlds. If it is said that Ishvara is the cause of beings, then, please first say what is the nature of Ishvara? If the answer is earth, water, fire, wind, that is, the four great elements. If that is the case, that's fine. Because the effects that arise from the four great elements are produced, we also consider it to be the cause, only a difference in name, that is, you call it Ishvara, and we call it the four great elements, only a difference in name. If that is the case, names can be freely established according to people's wishes, therefore, what is the use of establishing Ishvara with such great effort? This leisure should not be done. Or, there is nothing to argue about just the difference in name. However, if you think that Ishvara has the characteristics of being eternal, unique, worthy of offering, etc., then these such as earth are numerous and
Chinese
无常，心识不动摇，不是供养之神，而是用脚等踩踏的对象，不是恭敬之处，也具有不净，因此，生起者不是自在天，因为自在天被认为是与此相反的性质。如果说自在天是虚空，那也不是，因为没有产生果实的活动。也不是我，因为之前已经遮止了。如果说自在天的自性是不能被现量所思，所以没有那些过失，那么，自在天不是可以思议的，也不是作者，如果它不可思议，那么说它是作者有什么用呢？说必须在思考和了解之后才能说，如果什么都不知道，谁会说它是作者呢？如果不了解因的作者，又怎么会认为这些果是由它产生的呢？必须分别了解所生和能生，并确定为因果之后才能说，否则，石女的儿子等也会成为作者。自在天所产生的果是常我等，还是无常的知识等？如果像第一种情况一样，认为是常我等，那么，果的方面，我和土等的微尘，以及因自在天的自性，不也被认为是常吗？因果二者都是常，那怎么能成为所生能生呢？因为因脱离了产生的行为，果脱离了出生的差别。如果像第二种情况一样，先前的显现的知识等是从所知境青色等对境缘等产生和出现的，并且从无始以来在相续中反复出现的苦乐感受是从先前的业产生的，因此，说说自在天产生了什么果吧，因为它所产生的果是不可能的。如果因自在天本身没有开始，因为实因能力无碍，那么果，即一切果怎么会有开始呢？如果这样，就不能确定这个果只存在于此时，在此之前没有出现过，而必须从无始以来就存在，偶尔指定是不合理的。因此，现在的男人和女
English
impermanent, the mind is unwavering, not a god to be worshipped, but something to be trampled on with feet, etc., not a place of respect, and also possessing impurity, therefore, the arising one is not Īśvara, because Īśvara is considered to have the opposite characteristics. If it is said that Īśvara is space, that is not so, because there is no activity of producing fruit. Nor is it the self, because it has already been refuted. If it is said that the nature of Īśvara cannot be conceived by direct perception, so there are no faults, then Īśvara is not something to be conceived, nor is it a creator, if it is inconceivable, then what is the use of saying that it is a creator? Saying must be said after thinking and knowing, if one does not know what it is like, who would say that it is the creator? If one does not understand the creator of the cause, how can one think that these fruits are produced by it? One must separately understand the produced and the producer, and say it after determining it as cause and effect, otherwise, the son of a barren woman, etc., would also become creators. Is the fruit produced by Īśvara the permanent self, etc., or impermanent knowledge, etc.? If, like the first case, it is thought to be the permanent self, etc., then, in terms of the fruit, is not the self and the atoms of earth, etc., and the nature of the cause Īśvara also considered to be permanent? If both cause and effect are permanent, how can they be the produced and the producer? Because the cause is devoid of the act of producing, and the fruit is devoid of the distinction of being born. If, like the second case, the prior appearance of knowledge, etc., arises and occurs from the object of knowledge, such as the object of blue, etc., and the feelings of pleasure and pain that repeatedly occur in the continuum from beginningless time are produced from prior karma, therefore, tell me what fruit Īśvara produces, because the fruit it produces is impossible. If the cause Īśvara itself has no beginning, because the substantial cause has unobstructed power, then how can the fruit, that is, all fruits, have a beginning? If this is the case, it cannot be determined that this fruit exists only at this time and has not appeared before this, but must exist from beginningless time, and occasionally specifying is unreasonable. Therefore, the present men and wome
Chinese
这些无始之物也因此变成了先前不存在而现在存在了。如果认为自在天神有次第地创造了这些器情世界，所以有些果产生，有些果不产生，这样就没有过失。那么，为什么自在天神所产生的果，不是在任何时候都产生呢？既然一切果的因仅仅是自在天神。如果自在天神不依赖于任何其他的条件，那么产生一切果的因在任何时候都是具足的，为什么果不产生呢？应该产生啊。如果说依赖于其他的俱生缘，那么俱生缘又怎么可能在任何时候都不具足呢？既然没有不是自在天神所造的事物，那么自在天神产生果，又依赖于什么其他的因呢？这不合理。如果一定要依赖于其他的条件，那么因缘聚合本身就成了因，而不是自在天神。因为因缘聚合时，果没有不产生的道理。没有因缘时，自在天神也没有产生的能力。另外，即使允许自在天神依赖于因缘聚合，但如果因为聚合的力量，而使他不得不做出让其他众生痛苦等自己不愿做的事情，那就变成了受其他支配。如果他能随心所欲地产生果，那也是依赖于欲望，成了被欲望的铁钩所控制的受支配者。另外，即使承认他是器情世界的创造者，但又怎么会是你所期望的自在天神呢？因为凡是具有产生果的能力，就必然是无常的。常法只能是无所作为的。数论派等外道认为，极微，也就是常住的微尘，是世界的因。这在前面“尘亦有方分”中已经破斥过了，所以这里不需要再讲了。第三，我。关于破斥有生，分为破斥神我和破斥我生两种。第一种是破斥神我。数论派认为，神我是常、一、实、不可见（非肉眼所见）、一切的作者，具有这五种性质，是众生的因，并且认为一切所知事物都必定是二十五谛。它的体性也是
English
These non-existent things would also consequently exist from a previous non-existence. If it is thought that the Lord sequentially created these containers and contents, so there are times when some fruits are produced and some are not, then there is no fault. Then, why are all the fruits that have become the Lord's fruits not produced at all times? Since the cause of all fruits is only the Lord. If that Lord does not depend on any other conditions, then the cause of producing all fruits is complete at all times, why are the fruits not produced? They should be produced. If it is said that it depends on separate simultaneous conditions, then how is it possible that simultaneous conditions are not complete at all times? Since there is no other thing that is not made by that Lord, then what other cause does that Lord depend on to produce fruits? That is not reasonable. If it is necessary to depend on other conditions, then the collection of causes and conditions itself becomes the cause, not the Lord. Because when causes and conditions are gathered, there is no way that the fruit will not be produced. Without those causes and conditions, the Lord also has no power to produce. Furthermore, even if we allow that the Lord depends on the collection of causes and conditions, if he is forced by the power of the collection to do things that he does not want to do, such as causing suffering to others, then he will become subject to others. If he produces fruits as he wishes, then he is dependent on desire and becomes a dependent controlled by the iron hook of desire. Furthermore, even if we admit that he is the creator of the containers and contents, how can he be the Lord you desire? Because whatever has the ability to produce fruits is necessarily impermanent. Permanence is only devoid of function. Those non-Buddhists debaters and others who say that atoms, that is, permanent subtle particles, are the cause of the world, have already been refuted by the previous statement that "atoms also have directional divisions," so there is no need to discuss it here. Third, the self. Regarding the refutation of origination, there are two parts: the refutation of the chief and the actual refutation of the self's origination. The first is: The Samkhya school asserts that the chief is permanent, singular, material, invisible (not seen by the eye of flesh), the agent of all, possessing these five qualities, is the cause of beings, and that all knowable things are definitely determined to be twenty-five principles. Its essence is also