English
If one thinks that truth will become one, then establishing the two truths is merely a gateway for leading those to be tamed onto the path. Ultimately, the two truths are not definitively separate; rather, they are the inconceivable dharma-dhatu, merely suchness, the ultimate reality. As it is said in the sutra: 'Unborn is the one truth, some say there are four truths, abiding in the heart of enlightenment, even one truth is not seen, how much less seeing four truths?' Just like that. Although ultimately there is no establishment of two truths, they exist in name, because the way of appearing and the way of existing are definite. As said before: 'In the past, this was considered the two truths.' It is also like that. Again, someone says: 'Even so, among the two truths that are established, the conventional object, without a self-character, the conventional is something that must be established by others, that is, by the minds of others. If it becomes so by being established by that, then how can sentient beings ever transcend suffering, since they will not transcend? Because as long as the limit of sentient beings is not exhausted, the mind will not be exhausted, and as long as the mind is not exhausted, the conventional established by the mind will not be exhausted, therefore, this nirvana where all the proliferation of grasping and being grasped ceases will never exist.' If that is the case, then this conventional appearance that never changes, like hair-nets and dreams, etc., is an appearance due to the power of the proliferation of the individual discriminating minds of other sentient beings. This is not the conventional truth that appears to the face of the one who has passed into nirvana. Therefore, it is not the case that one cannot transcend suffering because of the existence of the dualistic appearance of others. Nor is it the case that because one person's grasping and being grasped dissolve into the dharma-dhatu, everyone's grasping and being grasped will disappear. Even in sleep, there are no self-characterized objects such as wild animals and rivers that are not established by the power of discrimination, but when the sleeper awakens, the appearances of sleep of each individual disappear. Even if others have the appearance of sleep, it does not harm the one who is awake. As it says in the *Entering the Middle Way*: 'Here, as in the waking state, as long as one is not awake, these three exist for him. When one has become awake, all three do not exist, just like that, awakening from the sleep of delusion is the same.' Just like that. Therefore, even after liberating from the subtle habitual imprints of the dualistic appearance of grasping and being grasped, and after becoming enlightened in the dharma-dhatu of nirvana, if it is still certain that there are conventional proliferations such as birth, etc., then for oneself
Chinese
即使世俗或戏论存在，如果不是那样，那么所有的世俗戏论都不存在，那就是涅槃。如经中所说：“知之薪柴皆已焚，焚烧寂灭诸佛法身，彼时无生亦无灭，心灭彼身乃证得。”正如所说，生等戏论之网全部寂灭，如薪尽火灭一般，心识之流完全止息，在法界空明双运不可言说的状态中，如水入水一般，成为自生智慧，远离一切边，虽然遍观所知，但戏论的自性唯有寂灭。此时，心和心所的戏论完全止息，因此究竟的智慧得以显现，并且由于获得了自生智慧，所以应当理解为心灭。如果认为凡夫俗子的分别念所熏染的戏论之心没有止息，或者认为止息之后没有智慧，如同灯灭一般，那就是对佛的极大诽谤，为了避免这种情况，应当对甚深之义生起定解。第二，如果像你一样，认为所知和能知没有自性，那么进行分别也不合理，是这样吗？虽然能知的主体和所要考察的客体这两个都不成立自性，但是这两个互相依赖和观待而安立，因此，就像世间没有考察就令人愉悦的名声的言语一样，依靠它来表达所有的分别，这是非常合理的。第三，为了了知分别和戏论的一切法皆非真实，当一切境都以自性不成立时，如果以分别的智慧或分别来考察，由于分别不能以自己作为自己的境来考察，那么，那时第一个分别也需要第二个分别来考察等等，因此你的分别将变成没有尽头，是这样吗？在考察所考察的一切法皆为无实之后，确定不住于生和不生等任何一边时，那时对于分别
English
Even if conventionality or elaboration exists, if it is not like that, then all conventional elaborations do not exist, which is Nirvana. As it says in the scripture: "The firewood of knowable things is completely burned, and the peace from burning is the Dharmakaya of all Buddhas. At that time, there is no birth and no cessation. The cessation of mind is what the body manifestly realizes." As it is said, the net of elaborations such as birth is completely pacified, like a fire with exhausted fuel. The flow of consciousness completely ceases, and in the inexpressible state of the Dharmadhatu, the union of appearance and emptiness, it becomes like water poured into water. The self-arisen wisdom is free from all extremes, and although it sees all knowable things, the nature of elaboration is only pacification. In this case, the elaboration of mind and mental factors completely ceases, so ultimate wisdom is manifested, and because self-arisen wisdom is attained, it should be understood that the mind ceases. If one thinks that the mind of elaboration, which is influenced by the conceptual thoughts of ordinary beings, has not ceased, or that after cessation there is no wisdom, like a lamp extinguished, then that is a great slander against the Buddha. To avoid this, one should generate definite understanding of the profound meaning. Second, if, like you, one thinks that knowable things and the knower have no self-nature, then it would be unreasonable to discriminate, wouldn't it? Although the subject of cognition and the object to be examined do not establish self-nature, these two are mutually dependent and relative, and are merely established as such. Therefore, just as in the world, all discriminations are expressed based on the mere pleasant reputation of something unexamined, it is very reasonable. Third, in order to realize that all phenomena of discrimination and elaboration are untrue, when all objects are not established by their own nature, if one examines with the wisdom of discrimination or discrimination itself, since discrimination cannot examine itself as its own object, then at that time, the first discrimination would also need to be examined by a second discrimination, and so on. Therefore, your discrimination would become endless, wouldn't it? After examining all phenomena to be examined as unreal, and determining not to abide in any extreme such as birth and non-birth, then at that time, for discrimination
Chinese
不是以“这是它”的方式执著的所依或对境存在。如果任何时候，所指向的对境没有所依，因为那个缘故，有境的分别念就不会产生，因为一切戏论寂灭的缘故。分别念也如水中的波浪一般，在法性的状态中，被称为自性的寂灭。第三，以理证断除增益，分为驳斥说有者的论证，和赞同说空者的论证两种。第一种是：在任何说有者的宗派中，认为境和识这二者是真实的，那是极其难以成立的，因为没有论证的量。如果识成立为量，境就成立为存在，因为这个识量见到它存在。那么，请问识真实存在有什么理由或所依呢？对此，识自己不能真实成立，如果由其他的识来成立，就会变成无穷，所以没有其他的论证。或者，由所知，也就是由所知或所量，这个真实的显现来执持，识就成立了吗？那么，请问所知存在有什么所依呢？它的所依是识。如果说境和识二者互相依靠，一个依靠另一个而成立，那么，那样的存在不是以自己的体性成立，而是依靠互相观待而存在，就像长短一样。因此，在成立任何一个时，另一个不能作为例子，因为它没有成立。因此，究竟上二者都不存在。例如，如果没有儿子，那他就不能成为父亲，因为没有安立者。同样，如果没有父亲存在，儿子又从何而来呢？因为没有原因，二者都不合理。就像没有安立者儿子，在那之前就没有父亲一样，在这里，境和识二者中，任何一个被作为要成立的，它之前没有成立，就像儿子一样，在那之前，它的论证者，另一个就像父亲一样，是不可能存在的，最终二者都不存在。还有，他们这样认为：我们不说这个是互相依靠而成立的。例如，幼芽从种子中生长，而种子存在，是由幼芽的生长来证实的，就像所知
English
The support or object grasped as "this is it" does not exist. If at any time the object pointed to has no support, then the discriminating awareness with an object will not arise, because all elaboration is pacified. That discriminating awareness, like a wave in water, is said to be naturally extinguished in the state of Dharma-nature. Third, cutting off superimpositions with reasoning, divided into refuting the arguments of those who assert existence, and praising the arguments of those who assert emptiness. The first is: In any school of those who assert existence, it is extremely difficult to establish that these two, object and consciousness, are true, because there is no valid means of proof. If consciousness is established as valid, then the object is established as existent, because this valid consciousness sees it as existent. Then, what reason or basis is there for consciousness to truly exist? To this, consciousness itself cannot be truly established, and if it is established by another consciousness, it will become infinite, so there is no other proof. Or, is consciousness established by the knowable, that is, by the knowable or measurable, this true manifestation? Then, what basis is there for the knowable to exist? Its basis is consciousness. If you say that the object and consciousness rely on each other, one being established by the other, then such existence is not established by its own nature, but exists by relying on mutual dependence, like long and short. Therefore, when establishing either one, the other cannot be used as an example, because it is not established. Therefore, ultimately neither exists. For example, if there is no son, then he cannot become a father, because there is no establisher. Similarly, if there is no father, where does the son come from? Because there is no cause, neither is reasonable. Just as there is no father before there is a son to establish him, so here, whichever of the object and consciousness is taken as what is to be established, it is not established beforehand, like a son, and before that, its proof, the other, like a father, cannot exist, and ultimately neither exists. Furthermore, they think like this: We do not say that this is established by mutual dependence. For example, a sprout grows from a seed, and the existence of the seed is confirmed by the growth of the sprout, just like the knowable
Chinese
如果说，通过了知从境产生的果，为什么不能了知所知存在呢？这是可以了知的。但这个例子并不恰当。因为苗芽了知种子，并非仅仅是苗芽自身了知，而是通过苗芽之外的意识，对果，也就是苗芽进行推断，从而了知此物具有先前存在的因，也就是种子。这是因为在分别观察种子和苗芽的基础上，通过确立因果关系的量来如此了知的。如果事先没有确立因果关系的量，仅仅是看到苗芽是无法了知的。因为在了知所知时，必须要有作为理由的能立的证知。但实际上，无论通过自证还是他证都无法成立。因此，对于承认事物存在的观点来说，安立名言是困难的，而对于承认是假立的观点来说，则是非常合理的。以上阐述完毕。第二部分包括：以因进行观察的金刚屑的理证；以自性进行观察的伟大缘起；以果进行观察的有无生灭。其中第一部分包括：驳斥认为从无因中产生；驳斥认为从他产生；驳斥认为从自产生；总结理证的意义。第一点是：外道等声称，就像荆棘的尖锐和孔雀羽毛的绚丽色彩等，都是未经任何人制造，而是事物自性产生的。对此，首先从世俗现量来看，所有的果都可见到各自产生的因，而无因而生的现象是不可能见到的。这里所说的现量仅仅是举例说明，也包括比量。如果认为莲花的茎和花瓣的大小多少等各种各样的差异，在因上没有见到，因此认为存在各种差异的因是不合理的。如果在因上果已经真实存在，那还怎么能成为因果关系呢？然而，莲花的茎等不依赖于自身的种子就不会产生，并且可见到是从种子中产生的，因此果的差异是由因的差异所产生的。就像果有各种各样一样，因的势力的差异也是可以成立的。如果问，如此这般的因的各种差异是谁制造的呢？回答是，没有任何其他的人制造，就像这样