English
If it is held that the complex quality (‘‘difference- of-awareness-from-the-object”) is directly perceived in the ob- ject through the senses, then it has to be assumed that the said complex quality existed in the object even before the pro- duction of the awareness, and this would involve the impossible supposition that the complex quality of which the awareness was a constituent was already present even before such an awareness had already come into being. If perception or direct awareness cannot be said to prove the difference between the awareness and its object, there can be no inference which may be supposed to do it. For such an inference has to take form thus—‘‘the object is different from its own awareness, because it is associated with entirely different kinds of qualities or characteristics?.”” But how could it be known that the object has qualities of an entirely different character from its awareness, since a difference between an awareness and its object was contested and could not be proved by perception or any other means? Prakasananda further says that the argument by implication (arthapatti), that awareness involves the acceptance of something different from the awareness of which the awareness is affirmed, because there cannot be any know- ledge without a corresponding object, is invalid. In proving the invalidity of the supposition that knowledge necessarily implies an object, Prakasananda raises the question whether such an impli- cation of an object as conditioning knowledge refers to the pro- duction (utpatt) of knowledge, its persistence (sthitz) oritssecondary cognition. As regards the first alternative Prakasananda says that according to the Vedanta consciousness is ever-existent and is never a product; and, even if it is regarded as a product, the process of cognition can itself be regarded as a sufficient cause for its production. It can by no means be urged that the presence of an external object is in all cases necessary for the production of knowledge; for, though it is arguable that in perception an object is necessary, no one will suggest that an external object is to be considered necessary in the production of inferential knowledge—a fact which shows that the presence of an external object is not indispensable for the production of know- ledge as such. As regards the persistence of knowledge it is said x Siddhanta-muktavali, as printed in the Pandit, 1889, pp. 247-249. * vimato visayah sva-visaya-jnanad bhidyate tad-viruddha-dharmasrayatvat. Ibid. p. 252. x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 19 that awareness has not the object that it knows for its locus or sub- stance (a@sraya), in such a way that the absence of the object, as apart from the awareness, would make it impossible for the awareness to persist ; and, if knowledge is supposed to be persisting in anything, that something would not be a cognized object, but the cognizer itself—as in the Nyaya view, where knowledge is regarded as an attribute of the self and the self is then regarded as the substance or locus (asraya} of knowledge. Since again cognition and its object do not exist in the same space or in the same time (this is proved by the possibility of our knowing a past or a future object), there cannot be any such concomitance between the two that it would be right for any one to infer the external presence of an object because of there being a subjective cognition or awareness. So he argues that there is no proof that cognition and cognized objects are different. In the above account of Prakasananda’s views it is clear that he does not attempt to give any positive proof in support of his thesis that the world-appearance and all objects contained in it have no existence while they are not perceived or that the being of all objects cognized is their percipi. He only tries to show that it cannot be logically established that awareness of blue and blue are two different objects; or, in other words, that it cannot be proved that the cognized object is different from its cognition. It could not legitimately be held that awareness (pratiti) was different from its object (pratyetavya). The whole universe, as we perceive it, is nothing but cognition without there being any object corresponding to it. As dreams are nothing but mere awareness, without there being any real objects behind them which manifest themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects, so also is the world of awaking consciousness!. The world has thus no independent substratum, but is mere cognition or mere aware- ness (vijfiana-matra or bhava-matra). This scheme of Vedanta philosophy is surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu (a.D. 280-360), as taught in his Vimsatika with a short commentary of his own and in his Trimsika with a commentary by Sthiramati?. According to this idealism te pratyetavya-pratityos ca bhedah pramanikah kutah pratiti-matram evaitad bhati visvam caracaram jnana-jneya-prabhedena yatha svapnam pratiyate vijfiana-matram evaitat tatha jagrac caracaram. Siddhanta-muktdvali, p.258. 2 Vijnapti-matrata-siddhi, containing two treatises, Vimsatika and Trimsika, 2-2 20 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. (vijnana-vada) of Vasubandhu all appearances are but transforma- tions of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement, and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects at different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them, or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as a mere creation of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. All that we know as subjective or objective is mere ideation (vijfiapti) and there is no substantive reality, or entity corre- sponding to it; but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual (anabhilapyenatmana) thought, which the saints realize, is also false!. It is possible that the awareness of anything may become the object of a further awareness, and that of another; but in all such cases where the awarenesses are significant (arthavati) there is no entity or reality represented by them; this, however, should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. He says that, taking visual perception as an example, we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes, since wholes would imply parts; they cannot be of the nature of atoms, since such atoms are not separately perceived; they cannot be of the nature of combinations of atoms, since the existence of atoms cannot be proved ?. For, if six atoms combine from six sides, that implies that the atoms have parts; if however six atoms combine with one another at one identical point, that would mean that the combined group would not have a size larger than that of one atom and would therefore be invisible. Again, if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession and sequence would be inexplicable, and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So they have Paris, 1925. Itseems probable that Vasubandhu flourished in a.D, 280-360 rather than in A.D. 420-500 as held by me in the first volume of the present work. See B. Bhattacharya’s foreword to the Tattva-samgraha. * yo balair dharmanam svabhavo grahya-grahakdadih parikalpitah tena kalpiten- atmana tesam natratmyam na tv anabhilapyendtmana yo buddhanam visaya iti. Commentary on Vimsatikd, p. 6. ier * Napi te samhatd visayi-bhavanti, yasmat paramanur ekam dravyam na sidhyati. Ibid. p. 7. ; : x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 21 no real objective existence, though perception leads us to believe that they have. People are dreaming of the world of objects in the sleep of the sub-conscious habit of false imaginative construction (vitatha-vikalpabhydasa-vasana-nidraya), and in their dreams they construct the objective world; it is only when they become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (Jokottara- nirvtkalpa-jnana-labhat prabuddho bhavati) that they find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective material world, and our cognitions are not influenced by external objects; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions and associations? and, since none of us have any real physical bodies, how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of one person can sometimes determine the thought-currents of another. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of the thought-processes, which is called death!. So also the good ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good. In the Trimsika of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthir- amati this idealism is more clearly explained. It is said that both the soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas or. as ex- ternal objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure intelligence (vijfiana-parinama). The transformation (parinadma) of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously with the cessation of the causal moment?.