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Atma-karanatva-nirvodhrtvad dtma-para-tantratva ca sakti- matyam api sakti-sabda upacaritah. Akhandananda Muni’s Tattva-dipana, p. 65, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1902. * atah svaprakdase ’pi atmani vicitra-Sakti-bhava-riipavidya-prayuktam dva- vanam durapahnavam. Ramananda Sarasvati’s Vivaranopanydsa, p. 16, Chow- khamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1gor. x1] The World-Appearance II stuff that actually undergoes transformation!. Vacaspati Misra also conceives Brahman, jointly with its avidya, to be the material cause of the world (avidya-sahita-brahmopadanam)*. In his adora- tion hymn at the beginning of his Bhamati he describes Brahman as being in association with its companion, the indefinable avidya, the unchanging cause of the entire objective universe®. Sarva- jiiatma Muni, however, does not wish to give maya the same degree of co-operation in the production of the world-appearance as Brahman, and considers the latter to be the real material cause of the world through the instrumentality of Maya; for Brahman, being absolutely changeless, cannot by itself be considered as cause, so that, when Brahman is spoken of as cause, this can only be ina remote and modified sense (upalaksana), through the instrumen- tality of m@ya*. The author of the Siddhanta-muktavali is referred to by Appaya Diksita as holding that it is the m@ya and maya alone that forms the stuff of the world-appearance; and that Brahman is not in any way the material cause of the universe, but that it is only the basis of the subsistence of maya and is only from that point of view spoken of as being the material cause’. It is clear that the above differences of view regarding the nature of the relation between maya and the self or Brahman in the production of the world-appearance are mere scholastic dis- putes over words or modes of expression, and have but little philosophical significance. As has already been said, these ques- tions do not seem to have arisen in Sankara’s mind. He did not think it worth while to explain anything definitely regarding the nature of avidya and its relation with Brahman, and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe. The world was an illusion, and Brahman was the basis of truth on which these illusions appeared ; for even illusions required something on which they could appear. He never faced squarely the difficulties that are naturally connected with the theory, and was not therefore concerned to explain the definite relation of maya to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe. The natural objection against such views is that the term 1 Siddhanta-lega, p. 12, V.S. Series, 1890. 2 Bhamati on Sankara’s Bhdasva, 1. 1. 2, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, 1904. 2 Anirvacyavidya-dvitaya-sacivasya prabhavato vivarta yasyaite vivad-anila- tejob-avanayah, thid. p. t. 4 Samksepa-sariraka, t. 333, 334, Bhau Sastri’s edition. 5 Siddhanta-lega, p. 13, V.S. Series, 1890. 12 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. avidya (formed by compounding the negative particle a and vidya “knowledge ”’) may mean either absence of knowledge (widya- bhavah) or false knowledge (mithya-jfanam) ; and in neither of these meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or substance-stuff of anything; for a false knowledge cannot be a substance out of which other things are made!. The answer given by Anandabodha Bhattaraka to such an objection is that this avidya is not a psychological ignorance, but a special technical category, which is beginningless and indefinable (anddy-anirvacyavidyasra- yanat). The acceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which one is justified in holding as valid, since it explains the facts. Effects must have some cause behind them, and a mere instru- mental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of the effect; again, effects which are not true cannot have for their material cause (upaddna-karana) that which is true, nor can they have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent. So, since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor be anything which is absolutely non-existent, the hypothesis is naturally forced upon the Vedantists that the material cause of this false world-appearance is an entity which is neither existent nor non-existent?. Anandabodha in his Pramana-mala quotes ap- provingly from the Brahma-tattva-samiksa of Vacaspati to show that avidya is called avidya or nescience because it is a hypothetic category which is neither “is” nor ‘“‘is not,” and is therefore unintelligible; avidyd signifies particularly the unintelligibility of this category?. Anandabodha points out that the acceptance of avidya is merely the logical consequence of indicating some possible cause of the world-appearance—considering the nature of the world-appearance as it is, its cause can only be something which neither is nor is not; but what we understand by such a category, we cannot say; it is plainly unintelligible; the logical requirements of such a category merely indicate that that which is the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be re- garded either as existing or as non-existing; but this does not avidya hi vidyabhavo mithya-jnidnam va na cobhayam kasya cit samavayi- karanam adravyatvat. Anandabodha’s Nydya-makaranda, p. 122, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901. 2 Ibid. pp. 122-124. 3 sad-asad-ubhayanubhayadi-prakaraih anirvacaniyatvam eva hy avidyanam avidyatvam. Brahma-tattva-samiksa as quoted in Pramana-mala, p. 10, Chow- khamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 19c7. x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 13 make this concept either intelligible or consistent!. The concept of avidya is thus plainly unintelligible and inconsistent. Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta. The Vedanta takes a twofold view of things; the first view refers to ultimate reality and the second to appearance. This ultimate reality is pure intelligence, as identical with pure bliss and pure being. This is called ultimately real in the sense that it is regarded as changeless. By pure intelligence the Vedanta does not mean the ordinary cognitional states; for these have a subjective and an objective content which are extraneous to them. This pure in- telligence is pure immediacy, identical with the fact of revelation found in all our conscious states. Our apprehensions of objects are in some sense events involving both a subjective and an ob- jective content; but their special feature in every case is a revelatory inwardness or immediacy which is non-temporal and changeless. The fact that we see, hear, feel, touch, think, remember is equi- valent to saying that there are various kinds of cognizings. But what is the nature of this cognizing? Is it an act or a fact? When I see a blue colour, there is a blue object, there is a peculiar revelation of an appearance as blue and a revelation of the “I” as perceiver. The revelation is such that it is both a revelation of a certain character as blue and of a certain thing called the blue object. When a revelation occurs in perception, it is one and it reveals both the object and its appearance in a certain character as blue. The revelation is not the product of a certain relation which happens to subsist at any time between the character-appearance and the object; for both the character- appearance as blue and the object are given in revelation. The revelation is self-evident and stands unique by itself. Whether I see, or hear, or feel, or change, the fact remains that there is some sort of an awareness which does not change. Awareness is ever present by itself and does not undergo the changes that its contents undergo. I may remember that I had seen a blue object five minutes pre- viously ; but, when I do this, what I perceive is the image of a blue object, with certain temporal and spatial relations, which arises or 1 Vailaksanya-vaco-yuktir hi pratiyogi-niriipanad yauktikatva-prakatana- phala na tv evam-riipatayah samafjasya-sampadandya ity avocama, Pramana- mald, p. 10. 14 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. becomes revealed; but the revelation itself cannot be revealed again. I may be conscious, but I cannot be conscious of con- sciousness. For consciousness as such, though ever present in its immediacy, cannot become an object of any other consciousness. There cannot be any such thing as the awareness of an awareness or the awareness of the awareness of an awareness, though we may multiply such phrases in language at our pleasure. When I re- member that I have been to Trinity College this morning, that only means that I have an image of the way across the commons, through Church Street and Trinity Street; my movements through them are temporally pushed backward, but all this is a revelation as image at the present moment and not a revelation of a past revelation. I cannot say that this present image in any way reveals that particular image as the object of the present revelation. But the former revelation could not be held to be distinct from the present one; for distinction is always based on content and not on revelation. Revelation as such is identical and, since this is so, one revelation cannot be the object of another. It is incorrect to say that ‘‘A is A” means that one A becomes itself over again. It is owing to the limitations of grammatical terminology that identity is thus described. Identity thus understood is different from what we understand by identity as a relation. Identity understood as a relation presupposes some difference or otherness and thus is not self-contained. And it is because it is not self-contained that it can be called a relation.