English
When it is said that A is identical with A, it means that on all the various occasions or contents in which A appeared it always signified the same thing, or that it had the same shape or that it was the same first letter of the English alphabet. Identity in this sense is a function of thought not existing by itself, but in relation to a sense of opponency or other- ness. But revelation has no otherness in it; it is absolutely ubi- quitous and homogeneous. But the identity of revelation of which we are speaking does not mean that the revelation signifies the same thing amidst a diversity of contents: it is simply the one essence identical in itself and devoid of any numerical or other kinds of difference. It is absolutely free from “now” and “then,” “here” and “there,” “such” or “not such” and “this” or “‘ that.” Consciousness of the self-shining self taken in this way cannot be regarded as the relation of an appearance to an object, but it is the fact of the revelation or the entity of the self. If we conceive x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 15 of revelation in this way, it is an error to make any distinction in revelation as the revelation of the past or the revelation of the present moment. For moments are revealed as objects are re- vealed ; they do not constitute revelation or form any part of it. This. revelation is identical with the self-shining self to which everything else has to be related in order to be known. ““Is cognizing an act or a fact?” Before this can be answered the point to be made clear is what is meant by cognizing. If we ignore the aspect of revelation and speak of mental states which can be looked at from the point of view of temporal or qualitative change of character, we must speak of them as acts or events. If we look at any mental state as possessing certain characters and relations to its objects, we have to speak of these aspects. But, if we look at cognizing from the point of view of its ultimate truth and reality as revelation, we cannot call it either an act or a fact; for, as revelation, it is unique and unchangeable in itself. All relations and characters are revealed in it, it is self-evident and is at once in and beyond them all. Whether we dream or wake, whether we experience an, illusion or a truth, revelation is always there. When we look at our mentai states, we find that they are always changing, but this is so only with reference to the contents. Apart from this there is a continuity in our conscious life. By this continuity the Vedanta apprehends not any sort of coherence in our ideas, but the fact of the permanence of revelation. It may be asked what remains of revelation, if the mental states are taken away. This question is not admissible; for the mental states do not form part of revelation; they are rendered conscious by coming into relation with revelation. This category is the ultimate reality. It is not self or subject in the sense in which self or ego is ordinarily understood. For what is ordinarily understood as the ego or the “I” is as much a content of the perception of the moment as any other objective content. It is not impossible that any particular objective content may be revealed at any time without the corresponding “‘I perceive” being explicitly revealed at the same time. The notion of ego or ‘“‘I”’ does not refer to an everlasting abiding independent self or person; for this notion is as changing as any other objective content. The “I” has no definite real content as referring to an existing entity, but is only a particular mode of mind which is often associated, as a relatively abiding content, with other changing contents of the 16 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. mind. As such, it is as changeable as is any other object. “‘I know this” only means that there is a revelation which at one sweep reveals both the ‘‘this” and the “I.” So far as the revelation appears as revealing the “‘this” and the ‘‘I,” it is manifested in a subjective mental state having a particular conscious centre different from other similar centres. But, since revelation cannot in reality be individuated, all that we may say about “I” or ‘‘mine,” ‘‘thou”’ or ‘‘ thine,” falls outside it. They are all contents, having some indefinite existence of their own and revealed by this principle of revelation under certain conditions. This principle of revelation thus has a reality in quite a different sense from that which is used to designate the existence of any other object. All other objects are dependent upon this principle of revelation for their manifestation, and their nature or essence, out of connection with it, cannot be defined or described. They are not self-evident, but are only expressed by coming into some sort of relation with this principle. We have already seen that this principle cannot be either subjective or objective. For all considera- tions of subject or object fall outside it and do not in any way qualify it, but are only revealed by it. There are thus two principles, the principle of revelation and all that which is re- vealed by it. The principle of revelation is one; for there is nothing else like it; it alone is real in the highest and truest sense. It is absolute in the sense that there is no growth, decay, evolution or change in it, and it is perfectly complete in itself. It is infinite in the sense that no finitude can form part of it, though through it all finitude is being constantly revealed. It is all-pervading in the sense that no spatial or temporal limits can be said to affect it in any way, though all these are being constantly revealed by it. It is neither in my head nor in my body nor in the space before me; but yet there is nowhere that it is not. It has sometimes been designated as the“‘ Self” or atman, but only in the sense of denoting its nature as the supreme essence and transcendent reality of all— the Brahman. Apart from this principle of revelation, all else is constituted of a substanceless indefinable stuff called maya. In some schools of Sankara Vedanta it is said that all is pure and simple illusion, that things exist only when they are perceived and dissolve into nothingness as soon as we cease to perceive them; this school has been designated the Drstt-srstt school, a doctrine which has been x1] _ Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 17 briefly explained in the tenth chapter of the present work!. One of the most important texts of this school is the Siddhanta-muktavali by Prakasananda?. Prakasananda seems to have taken his inspiration from the Yoga-vasistha, and he denied the existence of things when they are not perceived (ajfata-sattvanabhyupagama). He tried to show that there were no grounds for holding that external objects existed even when they were not perceived or that external objects had a reality independent of their perceptions. Examining the capacity of perception as a proof to establish this difference be- tween perception and its object, he argued that, since the difference between the awareness and its object was a quality of the awareness, the awareness itself was not competent to grasp this quality in the object, as it was one of the constituents of the complex quality involving a difference of the awareness and its object; to assert the contrary would be a fallacy of self-dependence (@tmasrayatva). If the apprehended difference is a complex, such as “ difference- between-awareness-and-its-object,” and if this complex is a quality which is apprehended as existing in the object, it has to be assumed that, in order that the nature of awareness may be realized, vindi- cated or established, it must depend upon itself involved as a con- stituent in the complex “‘difference-between-awareness-and-its- object”’ directly and immediately—which comes to the same thing as saying that awareness becomes aware of itself by being aware of itself; this is impossible and is called the logical fallacy of self- 1 A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1. pp. 477-478, by S. N. Dasgupta, published by the Cambridge University Press, 1922. 2 Prakasananda refers to the arguments of Prakasatman’s (A.D. 1200) Pafica- padika-vivaranaand Sarvajfiatma Muni’s (A.D. 900) Samksepa-sartraka and refers approvingly to Suregvara, the author of the Naiskarmya-siddhi. Appaya Diksita (A.D. 1620) refers to Prakasanandain his Siddhanta-lesa (pp.13,72). Nana Diksita, a follower of the school of Prakasananda and author of the Siddhanta-dipikd, in a commentary on the Siddhanta-muktavalt, gives a list of Vedanta teachers. In this list he mentions the names of Prakasanubhavananda, Nrsimha and Raghavendra Yati. Venis thinks (see The Pandit, 1890, pp. 487-490) that Prakasanubhava is the same as Prakasatman and Nrsimha the same as Nrsimhasrama Muni, who is said to have converted Appaya Diksita to Sankara Vedanta, and thinks that Prakasananda lived in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, being wedged in between Nrsimha and Appaya. Though it would be difficult to settle his time so precisely and definitely, yet it would not be wrong to suppose that he lived some time towards the latter half of the sixteenth century. Prakasananda’s doctrine of Drsti-srsti is apparently unknown to the earlier Vedantic works and even the Veddanta-paribhdsd, a work of the early sixteenth century, does not. seem to be aware of him, and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can be traced only to Appaya, who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Prakasananda may thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century. DII 2 18 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. dependence?.