English
The fundamental categories which make the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental relations, are evolved in the first stage of transformations; and these x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 25 abide through the other two stages of transformations and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness of blue is only a modification of the “awareness,” but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the subject or the knower (grahaka-graha) anda relation with the object which is known (grahya-graha). Blue as an object is essential for making an awareness of blue possible; for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought, and it does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply onto- logical objectivity. It is argued that, if the agency of objective entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge could be admitted to be produced without the operation of the objective entities; but, since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be conceded to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge. Sankara, in attempting to refute the Buddhist idealism in his commentary on the Brahma-sitra, 11. ii. 28, seems to refer to a school of idealism which is the same as that described by Santaraksita in his Tattva-samgraha (commented upon by Kama- lasila), but largely different from that described in Vasubandhu’s Trimsika. The positive arguments against the impossibility of an external world constituted by partless atoms are the same*. But 1 Vacaspati, however, in his Bhamati commentary, I. ii. 28, introduces some new points. He says that spatial extension, as perceived in visual perception, cannot be due to the perception of partless atoms. Nor can it be said that the colour particles produced in uninterrupted succession generate the notion of spatial extension, though there is no spatial extension in the individual atom; for it is not possible that the groups of colour particles are not interrupted by taste, smell and the tactual particles. So it has to be admitted that the colour particles are at some distance from one another and are interrupted by other particles, and that the continuous appearance of colour in spatial distribution is a false appearance, like the appearance of continuous trees from a distance con- stituting a forest (gandha-rasa-sparsa-paramanv-antarita hi te riipa-paramanavo na nirantarah; tasmad arat santaresu urksesu eka-ghana-pratyayavad esa sthiila- pratyayah paramanusu santaresu bhranta eva). 26 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. it is further argued on behalf of the Buddhist idealists that the awareness of a pillar, the awareness of a wall or of a jug or of a piece of cloth, implies that these individual awarenesses are mutually different in nature among themselves; and that consequently the apparent differences among objects are but differences among the ideas; and that therefore the objects are of the same nature as the particular ideas by which we are supposed to know them; and, if that be so, the hypothesis of an external world of objects becomes unnecessary. Moreover the fact that both the idea of the object and the object are taken at one and the same moment proves that both the object and the idea are identical, just as the illusory second moon perceived simultaneously with the moon is identical with itt. When one of them is not perceived the other also is not perceived. If they were by nature separate and different, there would be no reason why there should be such a uniform and invariable relation between them. The reason for the diversity of our ideas is to be sought not in the diversity of external objects which are ordinarily supposed to produce them, but in the be- ginningless diversity of the instinctive sub-conscious roots (vdsana) which produce all our ideas in the waking state, just as they produce dreams during sleep; as dreams are admitted by all to be produced without any external objects, so are all ideas produced without any external real objects; for as ideas the dream ideas are just the same as the waking ideas. But in both cases there are the in- stinctive sub-conscious roots (vasana@), without which no ideas, whether in the dream state or in the waking state, can be produced; so these, being invariably present in all cases of production of ideas, are the cause of all ideas?. 1 This simile is adduced by Vacaspati probably from a quotation from Dinnaga—sahopalambha-niyamad abhedo nila-tad-dhiyoh bhedas ca bhranti- vynanaiy drsyetendav ivaddvaye. Since both the blue and the idea of the blue are taken at the same moment, they are one and the same; for any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical. As one moon appears as two in an illusory manner, so the dif- ference between the idea and the object is also perceived only illusorily. This argument of sahopalambha-niyama is absent in Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika and Trimsika. * Vacaspati summarizes in this connection the inference of the Sautrantikas for the existence of an external world of objects as the causes of the corre- sponding ideas. The argument of the Sautrantikas runs thus: When, the old causes remaining the same, there is a new effect, that new effect must be due to a new cause. Now, though it should be admitted that in the passing series of inner consciousness each particular moment generates the succeeding one, and that this power of productivity is called vdsand (tat-pravurtti-vijfiana-janana-sak- x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 27 Sankara in refuting the above position says that such a view is untenable because it contradicts our experience, which always distinguishes the subject and the object from the awareness. We are directly aware of our sense-contact with external objects which we perceive, and the object of awareness and the awareness are not one and the same. Our awareness itself shows that it is different from its object. The awareness of a pillar is not the same as a pillar, but a pillar is only an object of the awareness of a pillar. Even in denying external objects, the Buddhist idealists have to say that what is knowable only within appears as if it was existing outside. Sankara argues thus: if externality is absolutely non-existent, how can any sense-cognition appear as external? Visnumitra cannot appear as the son of a barren woman. Again, the fact that an idea has the same form as its object does not imply that there are no objects; on the other hand, if there were no objects, how could any idea have the same form as its corresponding object? Again, the maxim that any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical is false; for, if the object and its awareness are comprehended at the same moment, the very fact that one is taken along with the other shows that they cannot be identical. Moreover, we find that in all our awarenesses of blue or yellow, a jug or a wall, it is the qualifying or predicative factors of objects of knowledge that differ; awareness as such remains just the same. The objects of knowledge are like so many ex- traneous qualities attributed to knowledge, just as whiteness or blackness may be attributed to a cow; so whether one perceives blue or red or yellow, that signifies that the difference of perception involves a difference in objects and not in the awareness itself. So the awareness, being one, is naturally different from the objects, which are many; and, since the objects are many, tir vasanda), and that its tendency to effectuate itself is called its power of fruition (paripaka), even then it would be difficult to understand how each particular moment should have a power altogether different from other moments; for, since there is nothing else to change the character of the moments, each moment is just as much a moment as any other. So it has to be admitted that there are other things which make one moment different in its power of effectuation from any other; and these are the external objects. 1 Sankara says yad antar-jreya-riipam tad bahirvad avabhasate. 'This seems to be a quotation from Dinnaga. Dinnaga’s verse, as quoted by Kamalasila in his commentary on the Tattva-samgraha, verses 2082-2084, runs as follows: yad antar-jneya-riipam tu bahirvad avabhasate ; so ’rtho vijhana-riipatuat tat-pratyayatayapi ca. This shows that Sankara had Dinnaga in his mind when he attempted to refute the Buddhist idealists. 28 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. they are different from the one, the awareness. The awareness is one and it is different from the objects, which are many’. Moreover, the argument that the appearance of world objects may be ex- plained on the analogy of dreams is also invalid; for there is a great difference between our knowledge of dreams and of worldly objects—dreams are contradicted by the waking experience, but the waking experiences are never found contradicted. It is curious to note here the contradictions in Sankara’s own statements.