English
It has been already pointed out that he himself in his commentary on Gaudapada’s Karika built a powerful argument for the non-existence of all objects of waking experience on the analogy of the non-existence of the objects of dream experience. Santarak- sita (A.D. 705) and Kamalaégila (A.D. 728) in refuting a position similar to that of the view of Sankara—that consciousness is one and unchangeable and that all objects are changing, but that the change of objects does not imply any change of the consciousness itself—argue that, had this been so, then that would imply that all sensibles of different kinds of colours, sounds, etc. were known at one and the same time, since the consciousness that would reveal those objects is constant and unchangeable?. Kamalagila there- fore holds that consciousness is not unchangeable and one, but that there are only the changeable ideas of the sensibles and each idea is different from the other which follows it in time. Sankara’s view that consciousness is only one and that it is only the objects that are many seems to be based on a separation due to an arbitrary abstraction. If the commentary on Gaudapada’s Karika be admitted to be a work of Sankara, then it may be urged that Sankara’s views had undergone a change when he was writing the commentary on the Brahma-sitra; for in the commentary on Gaudapada’s K@rika he seems again and again to emphasize the view that the objects perceived in waking experience are as false and as non-existent as objects of dream experience. His only realism there consisted in the assertion that the world was but the result of a false illusory imposition on the real Brahman, since 1 dvabhyadm ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati ekasmac ca dvayoh; tasmad artha-jfidnayor bhedah. Sankara’s Bhasya, i. ii. 28, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1904. * tad yadi nityaika-jndna-pratibhasatmaka ami gabdadayah syus tada vicitras- tarana-pratibhdsavat sakrd eva pratibhaseran; tat-pratibhasatmakasya jnanasya sarvada vasthitatvat. Kamalagila’s commentary on the Tatitva-samgraha, sl. 331. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, 1926. Neither Santaraksita nor Kamalagila seems to be familiar with Sankara. x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 29 illusions such as mirage, etc. must have some underlying basis upon which they are imposed. But in the commentary on the Brahma-siitra the world of objects and sensibles is seen to have an existence of some sort outside individual thought. Vacaspati in his Bh@mati commentary distinguishes the position of Sankara from that of Buddhist idealism by saying that the Vedanta holds that the ‘‘ blue” is not an idea of the form of blue, but “the blue” is merely the inexplicable and indefinable object?. In discussing the views of Vasubandhu in the Vimsatika and Trimsika it has been pointed out that Vasubandhu did not try to repudiate the objectivity of the objects of awareness, but he re- pudiated the idea that objects of awareness existed outside of thought and produced the different kinds of awareness. His idea seems to have been that the sensibles are made up of thought- stuff and, though they are the psychological objects of awareness, they do not exist outside of thought and determine the different ideas that we have of them. But both the sensibles and their ideas are determined by some inner law of thought, which determines the nature and methods of the whole process of the growth and development of the psychosis, and which determines not only its cognitional character, but also its moral and emotional character. All the arguments of Sankara in which he emphasizes the psychological duality of awareness and its object would have no force against Vasubandhu, as Vasubandhu admits it himself and holds that “‘blue”’ (nila) is different from the idea of blue; the blue is an object (alambana) and the idea of the blue is an awareness. Ac- cording to him thought splits itself into subject and object; the idea therefore expresses itself as a subject-object awareness. The subject and the object are as much products of thought as the idea itself; the fact that he considers the blue to be thought does not mean that he denies the objectivity of the blue or that the only existence of the blue is the blue-idea. The blue is objectively present before the idea of blue as a presentation, just as there is the subject to perceive it, but this objectivity does not imply that the blue is somewhere outside thought in the space outside; for even space-locations are thought-products, and so there is no sense in attributing the sensibles of presentation to the outside world. The sensibles are objects of awareness, but they are not the excitants 1 na hi brahma-vadino niladyakaram vittim abhyupagacchanti, kintu anir- vacaniyam niladiti. Bhamaii, 11. ii. 28. 30 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. of the corresponding awareness. It does not seem that Sankara says anything to refute such a view. Sankara’s position in the commentary on Gaudapada’s Karika@ seems to have been the same sort of view as that of Dinnaga, which he takes so much pains to refute in the Brahma-sitra-bhasya, and as such it was opposed to the view of Nagarjuna that there must be some essence or reality on which the illusory impositions are made. But in the Brahma- siitra-bhasya he maintains the view that the objective world, as it appears to our consciousness, is present before it objectively and independently—only its ultimate nature is inexplicable. The difference of the objects from the awareness and their inde- pendent existence and activity have been accepted by most of the later Vedanta teachers of the Sankara school; and it is well known that in sense-perception the need of the mind-contact with the object of perception through the specific sense is considered indispensable?. Prakagatman (A.D. 1200) in his Pafica-padika-vivarana raises this point and says that the great difference between the Mahayanists and the Vedantins consists in the fact that the former hold that the objects (visaya) have neither any separate existence nor any independent purpose or action to fulfil as distinguished from the momentary ideas, while the latter hold that, though the objects are in essence identical with the one pure consciousness, yet they can fulfil independent purposes or functions and have separate, abiding and uncontradicted existences?. Both Padmapada and Prakasatman argue that, since the awareness remains the same while there is a constant variation of its objects, and therefore that which remains constant (amuvrtta) and that which changes (vydavrtta) cannot be considered identical, the object cannot be regarded as being only a modification of the idea*. It is suggested that the Buddhist idealist urges that, if the object (e.g. blue) is different from the awareness, it cannot be revealed in it, and, if the blue can be revealed in the awareness, at that moment all the other things of the world might as well be revealed; for there is no such 1 See Vedanta-paribhasd, ch. 1, Srivenkategvar Press, Bombay, IQIl. ® tattva-darsinas tu advitiyat samvedanat abhede ’pi visayasya bhedenapi artha- kriyd-sdmarthya-sattvam sthayitvam cabadhitam astiti vadanti. Pafica-padika-vi- varana, p. 73. In addition to this work Prakasatman also wrote two inde- pendent commentaries on Brahma-sitra called Sdriraka-mimamsa-nyaya-sam- graha and Laukika-nydya-muktavali. ° anuurttasya vyauritan na bhedo ’nuvrttatvad Gkasa-ghatadivat. Pafica- padika-vivarana, p. 73. x1] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 31 specific relation with the blue that the blue alone should appear in consciousness at that moment. If it is urged that the blue produces the awareness of the blue, then what would be the function of the visual organ? It is better, therefore, the Buddhist suggests, to admit a natural and unique relation of identity of the idea and the object. The Vedantist objects to this and says that such a supposition cannot be true, since we perceive that the subject, object and the idea are not one and the same. To such an objection the Buddhist is supposed to reply that these three do not form a complex unity, but arise at three successive moments of time, and then by virtue of their potency or root-impression a complex of the three appears; and this complex should not therefore be inter- preted as being due to a relationing of three distinct entities?. Thus the fact that “‘I perceive blue” is not to be interpreted as a conscious relationing of “I,” “the blue” and the awareness, but as an ideation arising at one particular point of time, involving all the three constituents in it. Such a supposition is necessary, be- cause all appearances are momentary, and because the relationing of the three as three independent entities would necessarily be impossible without the lapse of some time for their operation of relationing. The theory of momentariness naturally leads us to the above supposition, that what appears as relationing is nothing but one momentary flash, which has the above three as its constituent elements; so the Buddhist is supposed to admit that, psychologic- 1 tasmat svabhavikasadharanabhedasambandhdd eva vijnane nilam avabhasate. Panca-padikd-vivarana, p. 74: Arguing from a similar point of view, Santaraksita and Kamalagila urge that, if the object was not identical with the awareness, there must be some im- mutable law why they should appear simultaneously. This law according to the Buddhists could only be either of identity (ta@datmya) or of causality as invariability of production (tad-utpatti). The first alternative is what the Buddhists here are contending for as against the Vedantists.