English
Both the subject and the object are grounded in the higher and superior principle, the principle of thought. This grounding implies that this principle of thought and its transformations are responsible for both the subject and the object, as regards material and also as regards form. According to the Sankara Vedanta, however, the stuff of world- objects, mind, the senses and all their activities, functionings and the like are but modifications of maya, which is indescribable (anirvacya) in itself, but which is always related to pure con- sciousness as its underlying principle, and which in its forms as material objects hides from the view and is made self-conscious by the illuminating flash of the underlying principle of pure con- sciousness in its forms as intellectual states or ideas. As already described, the Siinyavadins also admitted the objective existence of all things and appearances; but, as these did not stand the test of criticism, considered them as being essenceless (uzhsvabhava). The only difference that one can make out between this doctrine of essencelessness and the doctrine of indescribableness of the Sankara school is that this “‘indescribable”’ is yet regarded as an indescribable something, as some stuff which undergoes changes and which has transformed itself into all the objects of the world. The idealism of the Sankara Vedanta does not believe in the sahopalam- bha-niyama of the Buddhist idealists, that to exist is to be perceived. The world is there even if it be not perceived by the individual ; it has an objective existence quite independent of my ideas and sensations; but, though independent of my sensations or ideas, it is not independent of consciousness, with which it is associated and on which it is dependent. This consciousness is not ordinary psychological thought, but it is the principle that underlies all conscious thought. This pure thought is independent and self- revealing, because in all conscious thought the consciousness shines by itself; all else is manifested by this consciousness and 3-2 36 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. when considered apart from it, is inconceivable and unmeaning. This independent and uncontradicted self-shiningness constitutes being (abadhita-svayam-prakasataiva asya satta)'. All being is pure consciousness, and all appearance hangs on it as something which is expressed by a reference to it and apart from which it has no conceivable status or meaning. This is so not only epistemologically or logically, but also ontologically. The object- forms of the world are there as transformations of the indescribable stuff of maya, which is not “being,” but dependent on “being”’; but they can only be expressed when they are reflected in mental states and presented as ideas. Analogies of world objects with dream objects or illusions can therefore be taken only as popular examples to make the conception of maya popularly intelligible ; and this gives the Vedantic idealism its unique position. Sankara’s Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of Badarayana and Bhartrprapanfica. Sankara’s defensive arguments consisted in the refutation of the objections that may be made against the Vedantic conception of the world. The first objection anticipated is that from the followers of Samkhya philosophy. Thus it is urged that the effect must be largely of the same nature as the cause. Brahman, which is believed to be intelligent (cetana) and pure (suddha), could not be the cause of a world which is unintelligent (jada and acetana) and impure (asuddha). And it is only because the world is so different in nature from the intelligent spirits that it can be useful to them. Two things which are identical in their nature can hardly be of any use to each other—two lamps cannot be illuminating to each other. So it is only by being different from the intelligent spirits that the world can best serve them and exist for them. Sankara’s answer to this objection is that it is not true that the effect should in every way be similar to the cause—there are instances of inanimate hair and nails growing from living beings, and of living insects growing out of inanimate objects like cow- dung. Nor can it be denied that there is at least some similarity between Brahman and the world in this, ‘that both have being. It cannot be urged that, because Brahman is intelligent, the world also should be intelligent; for there is no reason for such * Vacaspati Misra’s Bhamatt, p. 13, Nirnaya-Sagara edition, 1904. xt] Sankara’s Defence of Vedanta a7 an expectation. The converse of it also has not been found to be true—it has not been found that what is unintelligent has been known to have been derived from a source other than Brahman}. The whole point of this argument seems to lie in the fact that, since the Upanisads assert that Brahman is the cause of the world, the apparent incompatibility of the production of an impure and unintelligent world from the intelligent and pure Brahman has to be explained away; for such ultimate truths can be discovered not by reason, but by the testimony of the Upanisads. Another objec- tion supposed to be raised by Samkhya against Vedanta is that at the time of dissolution (pralaya), when the world of effects will dissolve back into Brahman the cause, the impurities of the worldly state might also make the causal state of Brahmahood impure. Sankara refutes it by pointing out two sets of instances in which the effects do not affect the causal state when they return to it. Of these, one set of instances is to be found in those cases where articles of gold, silver, etc. are melted back into their original material states as unformed gold and silver, and are not seen to affect them with their specific peculiarities as formed articles. The other instance is to be found in the manifestation of magic by a magician. The magical creations of a magician are controlled by him and, when they vanish in this way, they cannot in any way affect the magician himself; for the magical creations have no reality. So also a dreamer is not affected by his dreams when he is awake. So the reality is one which remains altogether un- touched by the changing states. The appearance of this reality as all the changing states is mere false show (maya-matram), like the appearance of a rope as a snake. Again, as a man may in deep sleep pass into a state where there is no trace of his mundane experiences and may yet, when he becomes awake, resume his normal vocation in life, so after the dissolution of the world into its causal state there may again be the same kind of creation as there was before the dissolution. So there can be no objection that the world of impure effects will affect the pure state of Brahman at the time of dissolution or that there could be no creation after dissolution. These arguments of Sankara in answer to a supposed objection 1 kim hi yac caitanyenananvitam tad abrahma-prakrtikam drstam ttt brahma- vadinam praty udahriyeta samastasya vastujatasya brahma-prakrtikatvabhyu- pagamat. Sankara’s Bhdasya, 11. i. 6. 38 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. that the world of effects, impure and unintelligent as it is, could not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman are not only weak but rather uncalled for. If the world of effects is mere maya and magic and has no essence (vastutva), the best course for him was to rush straight to his own view of effects as having no substantiality or essence and not to adopt the parinama view of real transformations of causes into effects to show that the effects could be largely dissimilar from their causes. Had he started with the reply that the effects had no real existence and that they were merely magical creations and a false show, the objection that the impure world could not come out of pure Brahman would have at once fallen to the ground; for such an objection would have validity only with those who believed in the real transformations of effects from causes, and not with a philo- sopher like Sankara, who did not believe in the reality of effects at all. Instead of doing that he proceeded to give examples of the realistic return of golden articles into gold in order to show that the peculiar defects or other characteristics of the effect cannot affect the purity of the cause. Side by side with this he gives another instance, how magical creations may vanish without affecting the nature of the magician. This example, however, does not at all fit in with the context, and it is surprising how Sankara failed to see that, if his examples of realistic transformations were to hold good, his example of the magic and the magician would be quite out of place. If the parinama view of causation is to be adopted, the vivarta view is to be given up. It seems however that Sankara here was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by introducing stealthily an example of the vivarta view of unreality of effects in the commentary on sétras which could only yield a realistic interpretation. The sitras here seem to be so convincingly realistic that the ultimate reply to the suggested incompatibility of the production of effects dissimilar from their causes is found in the fact that the Upanisads hold that this impure and unintelligent world had come out of Brahman; and that, since the Upanisads assert it, no objection can be raised against it on grounds of reason. In the next section the theory of realistic transformation of causes is further supported by the sa#tra which asserts that in spite of the identity of effects with their cause their plurality or diversity may also be explained on the analogy of many papular illustrations.