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Thus, though the waves are identical with the sea, yet they have xt] Sankara’s Defence of Vedanta 39 an existence in their plurality and diversity as well. Here also Sankara has to follow the implication of the sara in his interpre- tation. He, however, in concluding his commentary on this siitra, says that the world is not a result of any real transformation of Brahman as effect; Brahman alone exists, but yet, when Brahman is under the pitas phenomena of a world-creation, there is room for apparent diversity and plurality. It may be pointed out, however, that such a supplementary explanation is wholly incom- patible with the general meaning of the rule, which is decidedly in favour of a realistic transformation. It is unfortunate that here also Sankara does not give any reason for his supplementary remark, which is not in keeping with the general spirit of the siitra and the interpretation which he himself gave of it. In the next section the siitras seem plainly to assert the identity of cause and effect, “because of the possibility of the effect, because the cause exists, because the effect exists in the cause and is due to an elaboration of the cause and also for other reasons and the testimony of the Upanisads.” Such a meaning is quite in keeping with the general meaning of the previoussections. Sankara, however, interprets the sétra as meaning that it is Brahman, the cause, which alone is true. There cannot therefore be any real transformation of causes into effects. The omniscience of Brahman and His being the creator of the world have thus only a limited validity; for they depend upon the relative reality of the world. From the absolute point of view therefore there is no [svara who is the omniscient creator of the world?. Sankara supports this generally on the ground of the testimony of some Upanisad texts (e.g. mrttiketyeva satyam, etc.). He however introduces an argument in support of the sat-karya-vada theory, or the theory that the effect is already existent in the cause. This theory is indeed common both to the parinama view of real transformation and the vivarta view, in two different ways. It is curious however that he should support the sat-karya-vada theory on parinama lines, as against the genera- tive view of a-sat-karya-vada of the Nyaya, but not on vivarta lines, where effects are treated as non-existent and false. Thus he 1 kuta-stha-brahmatma-vadinah ekatvaikantyat isitrisitavyabhavah isvara- kavana-pratijfa-virodha iti cet; na; avidyatmaka- nama-ritpa-bya-vydkaranapek- saivat sarvajnatvasya. Sankara’ s Bhasya on Brahma-siitra, 1.1. 14. na tattvikam aisvaryyam sarvajhatvam ca brahmanah kintv avidyopadhikam iti tadadsrayam pratijna-siitram, tattvdsrayam tu tad ananyatva-sitram. Bhamati on the above Bhasya. 40 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. says that the fact that curd is produced from milk and not from mud shows that there is some such intimate relation of curd with milk which it has not with anything else. This intimate relation con- sists in the special power or capacity (Sakti) in the cause (e.g. the milk), which can produce the special effect (e.g. the curd). This power is the very essence of the cause, and the very essence of this power is the effect itself. If a power determines the nature of the effect, it must be already existent in the cause as the essence of the effect. Arguing against the Nyaya view that the cause is different from the effect, though they are mutually connected in an insepar- able relation of inherence (samavaya), he says that, if such a samavaya is deemed necessary to connect the cause with the effect, then this also may require a further something to connect the samavaya with the cause or the effect and that another and that another ad infinitum. If it is urged that samavaya, being a rela- tion, does not require any further relation to connect it with anything else, it may well be asked in reply how ‘‘conjunction” (samyoga), which is also regarded as a relation, should require the relation of inherence (samavaya) to connect it with the objects which are in conjunction (samyogin). The conception of samavaya connecting substances with their qualities is unnecessary ; for the latter always appear identified with the former (tadatmya-pratitz). If the effect, say a whole, is supposed to be existing in the cause, the parts, it must exist in them all taken together or in each of the separate parts. If the whole exist only in the totality of the parts, then, since all the parts cannot be assembled together, the whole as such would be in- visible. If the whole exist in the parts in parts, then one has to conceive other parts of the whole different from its constituent parts; and, if the same questions be again repeated, these parts should have other parts and these others; and thus there would be a vicious infinite. If the whole exists wholly in each of the parts at the same time, then there would be many wholes. If it exists successively in each of the parts, then the whole would at one time be existent only in one part, and so at that time the functions of the whole would be absent in the other parts. If it is said that, just as a class-concept (e.g. cow) exists wholly in each of the individuals and yet is not many, so a whole may also be wholly existent in each of the parts, it may well be replied that the experience of wholes is not like the experience of class-concepts. The class-concept of cow is realized in each and every cow; but x1] Sankara’s Defence of Vedanta 4l a whole is not realized in each and every part. Again, if the effect is non-existent before its production, then, production being an action, such an action would have nothing as its agent, which is impossible—for, since the effect is non-existent before its pro- duction, it could not be the agent of its production; and, since being non-existent, it cannot be the agent of its production, such a production would be either itself non-existent or would be without any agent. If, however, production is not defined as an action, but as a relationing of an effect with its cause (svakarana-satta-samavaya), then also it may be objected that a relation is only possible when there are two terms which are related, and, since the effect is as yet non-existent, it cannot be related to its cause. But, if the effect is already existent, what then is the necessity of the causal operation (karaka-vyapara)? The answer to such a question is to be found in the view that the effect is but an elabora- tion of the cause into its effect. Just as a man may sit with his limbs collected together or stretched out and yet would be considered the same man, so an effect also is to be regarded as an expansion of the cause and as such identical with it. The effect is thus only a transformed state of the cause; and hence the causal operation is necessary for bringing about this transformation; but in spite of such a transformation the effect is not already existing in the cause as its potency or power. There are seven other smaller sections. in the first of these the objection that, if the world is a direct product of the intelligent Brahman, there is no reason why such an intelligent being should create a world which is full of misery and is a prison-house to himself, is easily answered by pointing out that the transcendent creator is far above the mundane spirits that suffer misery in the prison-house of the world. Here also Sankara adds as a supple- mentary note the remark that, since there is no real creation and the whole world is but a magical appearance, no such objection that the creator should not have created an undesirable world for its own suffering is valid. But the sitras gave him no occasion for such a remark; so that indeed, as was the case with the previous sections, here also his maya theory is not in keeping even with his general interpretation of the sitras, and his remarks have to be appended as a note which hangs loosely and which does not appear to have any relevancy to the general meaning and purport of the siitras. 42 The Sankara School of Vedanta [cH. In the next section an objection is raised that Brahman cannot without the help of any other accessory agents create the world; the reply to such an objection is found in the fact that Brahman has all powers in Himself and can as such create the world out of Himself without the help of anything else. In the next section an objection is raised that, if the world is a transformation of Brahman, then, since Brahman is partless, the transformation must apply to the whole of Brahman; for a partial transformation is possible only when the substance which is under- going the transformation has parts. A reply to such an objection is to be found in the analogy of the human self, which is in itself formless and, though transforming itself into various kinds of dream experiences, yet remains unchanged and unaffected as a whole by such transformations. Moreover, such objections may be levelled against the objectors themselves; for Samkhya also admits the transformation of the formless prakrtt. In another section it is urged that, since Brahman is complete in Himself, there is no reason why He should create this great world, when He has nothing to gain by it. The reply is based on the analogy of play, where one has nothing to gain and yet one is pleased to indulge in it. So Brahman also creates the world by His lila or play. Sankara, however, never forgets to sing his old song of the maya theory, however irrelevant it may be, with regard to the purpose of the sitras, which he himself could not avoid following.