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A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics of the Fourth Century B.C - Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids, 1900 - Complete Book

English

Living beings are then classified in an order of increasing fineness in the food they live on, beginning with crocodiles, who, they say, swallow pebbles, continuing with peacocks, hyenas, and elephants, later with other birds, then with borderers, town-dwellers, kings, and ending with the Yama and Paranimmitavasavatti gods, who enjoy food of supreme delicacy. ^ * Just as derived form is derived in such and such a way and in no other, so, to say it is not derived, is equi- valent to saying it is not derivable.' Asl. 333. Possibly the form of negative here employed (no up a da) is a technical mark of the relatively unethical nature of this aspect of r up am. An up a da, on the other hand, is used with a philosophical import. Cf. D. i. 17 with M. i. 148 — anupada vimutto and anupada parinib- banattham. See also below, §§ 1210 and 1213. ^ In keeping with the general psychological standpoint of the present work, the things which are not derived jrom (have no foothold or support in) other things are considered 198 soft ; the smooth and the rough ; pleasant (easeful) con- tact, painful contact ; the heavy and the light^ — such a tangible, invisible and producing impact,^ as, with the under the aspect of sense-percepts. They are tangibles or intangibles. Element (dhatu) is now substituted for the collective term used above, namely, great phenomena or beings (mahabhutani, § 584 et seq. Both terms occur together in A. i. 222. The latter term may be used to denote great or wondrous derivatives of the four elements, great either physically or ethically, as when (Vin. ii. 240) the ocean and its ' great creatures ' serve to illustrate the Dhamma and those wondrous phenomena, the human beings who by way of it are seeking or have attained Nir- vana. Dhatu, on the other hand, as the Cy. with un- flagging ' mindfulness ' once more points out, indicates absence of substratum or soul. Asl. 332. On the essential characters of the four elements, see below, §§ 962-965, also the following note. ^ The first two and last of these four pairs are so many aspects or modes of the earth-element (Asl. 332), and are paraphrased respectively as rigid and non-rigid, polished and jagged (saw-like), weighty and non- weighty. These correspond almost exactly to our modern view of the modes of resistance, ^.6^, of active touch, or of skin-sensibility with a co-efficient of muscular sense. The Buddhist view lacks, as all but recent psychology has lacked, insight into the presence of the muscular factor ; on the other hand, it is logically more symmetrical in giving * lightness ' where Dr. Bain, e.g., gives 'pressure' — another positive. Pleasant contact is defined as a tangible which is desired on account of pleasant feeling; the opposite, in the case of painful contact. Each of the three elements furnishes instances of either : In connexion with solidity there is the pleasant contact felt when a soft-palmed attendant is doing massage to one's feet, and the opposite when his hands are hard. Erom ' caloric,' or the flame-element, we may get the pleasure of a warming-pan in winter, or the reverse, if it is applied in summer. From the aerial element, we may get the pleasure of fanning in summer, or the discomfort of it in winter. Asl. 332, 333. ' The Cy. here discusses a point of attention in sense- perception which is interesting as adumbrating modern 199 body-sensibility, invisible and reacting, one has touched, touches, will, or may touch . . . [649] . . . against which tangible, invisible, and pro- ducing impact, the body- sensibility, invisible and reacting, has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge . . . [650] . . . such a tangible, invisible and producing impact, as has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge against the body-sensibility, invisible and reacting . . . European theories respecting consciousness and subcon- sciousness (Asl. 333). In a concrete object of sense, the three modes of the tangible, i.e,, the three elements (solid, hot, airy), may all of them be present. Now do they all come * at one stroke ' into the field of consciousness (apatham)? They do. Thus come, do they impinge on the body- sense ? They do. When it has thus made them a (mental) object, does cognition of body arise at one blow? It does not. Why? Thus: Mental objects are made either by deliberate sensing or by intrusion. (The latter term — ussado — is more literally extrusion, or prominence, but either word shows that involuntary, as contrasted with voluntary attention is meant.) Now when one is de- liberately testing the hardness or softness of a ball of boiled rice by pressure, heat and vapour are present, but it is the solid to which one gives attention. If hot water be tested by the hand, though there is solid and vaporous (matter), it is heat that occupies the attention. If one lets the breeze blow on the body at the window in hot weather, solid and heat are present, but it is the aerial element that is attended to. Or take involuntary impressions : If you stumble, or knock your head against, a tree, or bite on a pebble, heat and wind are present, but the intrusive object is solid matter. So analogously for walking on something hot, or being deafened by a hurricane. The three elements are not apprehended as such at the same instant. And with regard to the extended surface of the body-sentience, cognition of body arises only in that spot where the sentient surface is impinged upon, e.g., when a shoulder- wound is bathed (? dressed ; cf. Vin. ii. 115 and Transl.) with a quill, the kaya-pasado of the shoulder is impinged upon, or intensified, and there cognition arises. And where the pasado is most powerfully impressed, there cognition arises first. 200 [651] ... in consequence of which tangible and depend- ing on the body-sensibility, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise bodily contact . . . and . . . born of that bodily contact, a feeling ... [or] a perception . . . [or] thinking . . . [or] cognition of body . . . [further,] having a tangible as its object and depending on the body (-sensibility), there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise bodily contact . . . and . . . born of that bodily contact, a feeling . . . [or] a perception ... [or] thinking . . . [or] cognition of body ; this that is the tangible, the sphere and element of the tangible— this is that form which is the sphere of the tangible.^ [652] What is that form which is the fluid (aqueous) element (apodhatu)? That which is fluid and belongs to fluid, that which is ^ Buddhaghosa goes on, with reference to the senses generally, to give a psychological account of the passing from one group of sensations or ' object of thought ' to another in terms not far removed from what would now be used to describe the ' movement of attention ' (Asl. 334). We pass from one object to another (a) from deliberate inclination, or (h) from a sensation of preponderating im- pressiveness (ajjhasayato va visayadhimattato va). E.g., (a) from saluting a shrine, a believer forms the in- tention of entering to do homage to a statue and contem- plate the carvings and paintings, (b) While contemplating some vast tope, a man is struck by the sound of music, and is then affected by flowers and incense brought near. 201 viscid^ and belongs to viscous, the cohesiveness of form^ — this is that form which is the fluid element. [All] this is that form which is not derived. [653] What is that form^ which is the issue of grasping (upadinnam) ?* ^ Literally, oil (sneho). Cf. the description with that of akasadhatu, § 638. ^ This is the aspect of the moist or liquid element in an object compact of several elements. The one essential 'mark' of apo-dhatu is paggharanam, flowing. See § 963. But ' cohesiveness of form means the cohering condition of some concrete in which there is superfluity of solid' (Asl. 335). For it is' by the cohesive force of the fluid element that lumps of iron or what not are made rigid. Similarly in the case of stones, mountains, palms, tusks, horns, etc. Hence Buddhaghosa passes on to discuss the mutually related spheres of the elements and their apparent approxi- mations to each other, as in viscous things, e.g., or con- gealed liquid, or boiling water. Corrupt MSS., however, render parts of the disquisition hard to follow. His con- clusion is that whereas the elements may vary in their condition as phenomena, their essential mark never alters, however latent it may be.