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The expression or intimation itself, it says, does not spring directly from thought, but it is said nevertheless to have its source in thought because those phenomena (of gesture and speech) on which the intima- 206 Bodily and vocal intimation, or whatever other form exists that is born of thought, caused by thought, has its source in thought, whether it be in the sphere of visible forms, sounds, odours, tastes or tangibles, in the spatial, or the fluid element, in the lightness, plasticity, wieldiness, integration or subsistence of form, or in bodily nutriment — this is that form which is sprung from thought. [668] What is that form which is not sprung from thought ? The sphere of the five senses, femininity, masculinity and vitality, the decay and the impermanence of form, or whatever other form exists that is not born of thought, not caused by thought, does not have its source in thought, whether it be in the sphere of visible forms, sounds, odours, tastes, or tangibles, in the spatial or fluid element, in the lightness, plasticity, wieldiness, integration or subsistence of form, or in bodily nutriment — this is that form which is not sprung from thought. [669] What is that form which comes into being together with thought (citta-saha-bhu)? [670] What is that form which does not come into being; together with thought ? Answers as in the preceding pair of relatives. [671] What is that form which is consecutive to thought (citf anuparivatti)? [672] What is that form which is not consecutive to thought ? Answers as in the preceding pair of relatives. tion depends are immediately prompted by thought, just as we say that old age and death ' are ' impermanence (in virtue of their forming part of the content of that idea). While there is thought, there is also expression of thought. But the concomitance stated in § 669 is not to be under- stood like that arising between thought and feeling and other mental processes. He is probably referring to the mental complex indicated above in § 1 and the like. 207 [673] What is that form which belongs to the self (a j j h a 1 1 i k a m) ?^ The spheres of the five senses — this is that form which belongs to the self. [674] What is that form which is external (to the self — b a h i r a m) ? The sphere of the five kinds of sense-objects . . .^ and bodily nutriment — this is that form which is external (to the self). [675] Which is that form which is gross (o 1 a r i k a m) ? The spheres of the five senses and of the five kinds of sense-objects — this is that form which is gross. [676] Which is that form which is subtle (suk- humam) ? ^ See below, §§ 1044, 1045. It will already have been noted (p. 59, n. J.), that ajjhattam, ajjhattikam does not run on all fours with our modern psychological term ' subjective,' or that which belongs to the conscious experi- ence of the individual. It connotes anything belonging to an individual organism, physical or mental. Hence, too, the word ' self ' must here be understood in no narrow metaphysical, or even psychological sense, but as equiva- lent to the concrete person or attabhavo (see above^ p. 175, n. 1). It is used in the sense of all but the last of the four constituents into which Professor W. James- divides the Self, viz., the material Self (body, clothes, family, home, property : the Buddhist would only admit the first item, I fancy), the social Self (recognition from others), and the spiritual Self (psychic faculties or dis- positions). ('Principles of Psychology,' 1892, i. 292-296.) Only the fourth constituent, the ' pure Ego,' was rejected by Buddhism, as it was, twenty-two centuries later, by Hume. O/., however, the apparently more ' subjective ' use in §§ 161 and 1207. I have felt equal reluctance to foist the (relatively) modern counterpart 'objective' on to bahiram or bahid- dha(see § 1045). ^ Bead in full, this should coincide with the latter part of § 596, beginning at * the spheres of visible form.' 208 Femininity . . . and bodily nutriment — this is that form 'which is subtle.^ [677] What is that form which is remote (dure)? Femininity . . . and bodily nutriment — this is that form which is remote. [678] What is that form which is near (s a n t i k e) ? The spheres of the five senses and of the five kinds of sense-objects — this is that form which is near.^ ^ The Cy., paraphrasing olarikam by thulam, ex- plains that this has reference to the material embodiment of sense-objects and to the fact of sensuous impact, suk- humam connoting the contrary. Under the latter class we have, according to my assumption (p. 203, n. 3), the indriyas of sex and vitality, intimation, space, the modes of form and the nutritive principle in food. The force of this effort at dichotomy is, to the modern Western mind, curious and not obvious. It is suggestive of tradition earlier than the date of the compiling of the Abhidhamma, as arly as the earlier Upanishads — of a time when there was no definite antithesis between material and immaterial, extended and unextended. We have seen that the senses, though 'invisible,' were conceived as species of 'form' — nay, that the later Cy. preserved the tradition of their shape and size. And I incline to think that just as, in the older Upanishads, soul was a shadowy, impalpable, but ' physi- cal double of the physical body,' and just as ' when an early Greek philosopher speaks of to 6v, he does not mean Being, but Body' (Burnet, 'Early Greek Philosophy,' 27), so the items in the list divided out in these two answers are all physical ' forms,' whether patent, impressive, and pervading, or latent, fine and mysterious. ^ Dure, the Cy. explains, refers to that which on account of its being difficult to apprehend or discriminate cannot be discerned by way of the sensuous impact, whether it be literally far or near at hand. Conversely, s an tike refers to things which are patent to sense, even though they may be distant. The content of each division agrees with that of the preceding division, and we see that, whereas the field of sense-perception is pronounced to be a relatively patent, as well as gross concern, the essence of sex, vitality, etc., 209 [Basis (vatthu).p [679] What is that form which is the basis of visual con- tact (cakkhusamphassassa vatthu)? The sphere of vision — this is that form which is the basis of visual contact. [680] What is that form which is not the basis of visual contact ? The sphere of hearing . . .^ and bodily nutriment — this is that form which is not, etc. down to the nutritive principle in food, is found to be as obscure, latent or relatively inaccessible, as it was subtle or minute. Asl. 337. ^ From § 653 to § 961 the Commentator lapses into silence, dismissing the reader with the remark that in the exposition on * spheres,' etc. (§§ 695-741), the method of treatment is more detailed than it was above, and, further, that the category of triplets (§ 742 et seq.) is easy to understand. To enable the reader to gather with more ease the drift of this part of the catechizing, I have in- serted a few headings to indicate whenever there is a change in the aspect under which 'form' is considered. Thus we have form considered under the aspect of the basis (vatthu) in the subjective procedure of coming-to- know, of the object so apprehended, and so forth. In all the answers, where lacunae occur, except where otherwise specified, the formula appears to be the answer of § 596, with one or more terms omitted, and with the occasional insertion of 'the sphere of the tangible,' ac- cording to the sense required by each specific process of dichotomy. 2 By referring to the standard answer, § 596, it will be seen that the negatives in the present answer include * visible forms,' or the objects of the sense of vision. Now, vatthu means seat, embodiment, or what we might call physical basis. However, then, the process of sense-stimu- lation was ultimately conceived, the effective result was held to take place in the sense-organ (and heart). The sense-object was defined as the arammanam of the con- tact. See § 687. 14 210 [681] What is that form which is the basis of the feeUng . . . the perception . . . the thinking . . . the visual cognition which is born of visual contact ? The sphere of vision — this is that form which is the basis of the . . . visual cognition^ which is born of visual con- tact. [682] What is that form which is not the basis of the . . .