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A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics of the Fourth Century B.C - Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids, 1900 - Complete Book

English

That taste which is derived from the four Great Phe- nomena, is invisible and produces impact, such as the taste of roots, stems, bark, leaves, flowers, fruits, of sour, sweet,^ bitter,^ pungent,^ saline,^ alkaline,^ acrid,^ astring- ent,^ nice and nauseous sapids,^ or whatever other taste there is, derived from the four Great Phenomena, invisible and producing impact — such tastes, invisible and pro- ducing impact, as with the tongue, invisible and reacting, one has tasted, tastes, will, or may taste . . . [630] . . . against which taste, invisible and producing impact, the tongue, invisible and impingeing, has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge . . . [631] ... a taste which, invisible and producing impact, has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge on the tongue, invisible and reacting ... [632] ... in consequence of which taste and depending •on the tongue, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise gustatory contact . . . ^ Buttermilk (takkambilam) is given as a typical sour sapid, ghee from cow's milk (gosappi) as the type of a sweet sapid. But, adds the Cy., sweet added to astringent (kasavam) and kept standing will lose all its sweetness, and so with raw sugar and alkaline substance. Ghee, however, kept standing, while it loses colour and smell, does not lose its taste. It therefore is the absolute sweet (ekanta-madhuram) (Asl. 320). ^ E.g., as nimb-tree fruit {ibid.). ^ E.g., as ginger and pepper {ibid.). * E.g., as sea-salt (ibid.). ^ E.g., as the egg-plant (vatinganakatiram), or as green palm sprouts (cocoanut cabbage) (ibid.). ^ E.g., as the jujube, or the Feronia elejphantum, etc. (ibid.). '' E.g., as the yellow myrobalan (haritakam). I am, as before, indebted to Childers' Dictionary for all this botanical knowledge. ^ Sadu asadu. See § 625, n. 1. 190 . . . and^ . . . born of that gustatory contact, a feeling . . . [or] a perception . . . [or] thinking . . . [or] gustatory cognition, [further] having a taste as its object and depending on the tongue, there has arisen, arises, will, or may arise gustatory contact, . . . and . . . born of that gustatory contact, a feeling . . . [o7'] a perception . . . [or] thinking ... [or] gustatory cognition ; this that is taste, the sphere and constituent element of taste — this is that form which is the sphere of taste.''^ [633] What is that form which is femininity (it thin - driyam) ? That which is of the female, feminine in appearance, feminine in characteristics, in occupation, in deportment, feminine in condition and being — this is that form which constitutes femininity.^ 1 See § 624, n. 2 For the sphere of the tangible, see below, § 648. ^ Literally the in driyam — the faculty, potentiality of the female. Under 'appearance,' which the Cy. (321) rules to be here the import of lingam ( = santhanam, cf. Mil. 133, 134), he indicates the physical proportions in which the woman, generally speaking, differs from the man — smaller hands, feet, and face, upper trunk less broad, lower trunk broader. Characteristics (nimittam) are that by which she is recognisable (sanj ananam), both external bodily marks (no beard, e.g., nor tusks, which would seem to include certain animals) and modes of dressing. Under 'occupation' (kuttam = kiriya) there is an allusion to girls' distinctive amusements— playing with baskets, pestles [and mortars], and dolls (? literally, little daughters, dhitalikaya kllanti), and spinning thread with a mattikavakam, whatever that may be. Under 'deportment,' the 'absence of breadth' (a visa- 191 [634] What is that form which is masculinity (purisin- driyam)? That which is of the male, masculine in appearance, masculine in characteristics, in occupation, in deportment, masculine in condition and being — this is that form which constitutes masculinity.^ dam) in women's walking, standing, sitting, lying, and eating is specified, all these being done more mincingly, less assertively by women. If a man so deport himself, it is said of him, ' He goes like a woman !' The * condition and being ' of the female, constituting her essential nature, are ' born of karma, and take their source at conception.' The other female characteristics are evolved by her ' poten- tiality ' in the course of existence, just as the tree with all its appurtenances is evolved in time from the seed. This ' indriyam ' is discernible, not by the eye, but by the mind (mano. It is an abstract idea). And it is not to the one sex just what the faculties of sight and so forth are to the other. ^ The priority of place given to the female is a form of statement as characteristically Buddhist (not to say Indian) as that of saying ' moon and sun.' Both no doubt have their source very deep in the history, or prehistory, of humanity. The Commentator gives the correlative oppo- sites in describing male characteristics, down to the ' swash-buckling and martial air,' which if a woman affect she is said to ' go like a man.' Boys are said to occupy themselves with their characteristic games of playing at carriages and ploughs, and at making sand-banks round puddles and calling them reservoirs. He then remarks that these sexual distinctions have been evolved during the course of life in primeval ages ; since when, originating by way of conception and, some of them, in the individual life, it happens that they get inter- changed. He then quotes cases of hermaphroditism, said to have occurred in the members of the Order. He is mindful also, as we might expect, to appreciate the sex to which he belongs, and makes a curious applica- tion to it of the doctrine of karma. ' Of the two, the male sex-marks are superior (uttamam), those of the female inferior (hinam). Therefore the former disappear by means of a very bad karma, while the latter are established 192 [635] What is that form which is vitality ( j i v i t i n - driy am) ? The persistence of these corporeal states, their sub- sistence, their going on, their being kept going on, their progress, continuance, preservation, life, life as faculty — this is that form which is vitality.^ [636] What is that form which is bodily intimation (kay a vinnat ti) ? That tension, that intentness, that state of making the body^ tense, in response to a thought, whether good, bad, or indeterminate, on the part of one who advances, or recedes, or fixes the gaze, or glances around, or retracts an arm, or stretches it forth — the intimation, the making known, the state of having made known — th^'s is that form which constitutes bodily intimation.^ by a karma indifferently good. The latter, on the other hand, disappear by means of a karma indifferently bad, while the former are established by means of a very good karma. * Thus, both disappear by badness and are acquired by goodness.' Thus, our Commentator approximates more to Plato's position than to that of the typical religious celibate, find- ing woman not stronger to do evil, but rather the weaker in heaping up either good or evil. ^ ' What there is to say, has been said already in con- nexion with the faculty of vitality as related to incorporeal (formless) states ' (Ask 323. See § 19). '^ Kayo is said to =sariram; possibly to distinguish it from kayo as used for * body- sensibility,' or the tactile sense (Asl. 324), or again from sense-experience generally (p. 43, n. 3). ^ Kayavinfiatti is analyzed in a somewhat rambling style by the Commentator. The gist of his remarks amounts, I gather, to the following : In any communication effected by bodily action — which includes communications from animals to men, and vice versa — that which is made known is one's condition (bhavo) at the time, one's self (sayam), and one's intention (adhippayo); in other words, the Jiow, the ivJio or whatf and the what for. And this is wrought by a bodily suffusion (vipphandanena). He then classifies the kinds of thoughts which tend to 193 [637] What is that form which is intimation by language (vacivinna tti)? That speech, voice, enunciation, utterance, noise, making noises, language as articulate speech, which expresses a thought whether good, bad, or indeterminate — this is called language. And that intimation, that making known, the state of having made known by language — this is that form which constitutes intimation by language.^ [638] What is that form which is the element of space (akasa-dhatu)? That which is space and belongs to space, is sky aijd * produce an intimation,' no others having this tendency.