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the non-jhāna factors, equanimity and one-pointedness of mind, are excluded. to be understood. If so, when it is established by "seven jhāna factors," why is it said, "excluding the two feelings of pleasure and pain"? To show that the two, pleasure and pain, among the five divisions of feeling, are absolutely not jhāna factors, as they are specified in the place of jhāna factors. Or, even if there is the designation of jhāna factors, to show that the two divisions of feeling are absolutely not conditions for jhāna. However, for equanimity, concentration, and one-pointedness, even if there is no being a condition for jhāna, there is no absence of being a condition for jhāna. Thus, they are included in "all seven jhāna factors." Here, the word "all" is to include all divisions of wholesome, etc., but not to include all occurrences of consciousness, so it should be understood. "From whatever source" means "rightly or wrongly." These two, jhāna and path conditions, are not found in rootless consciousnesses. This is said to show that they are not absent in root-accompanied consciousnesses, not that they are absent in rootless consciousnesses. If the meaning is taken this way, it would only be understood that the attainment of something by someone is not prevented in rootless consciousnesses, not that it is made to show the non-absence of the jhāna condition even in rootless consciousnesses accompanied by initial application. However, if this statement means the non-attainment in rootless consciousnesses, then the non-attainment of the jhāna condition in rootless consciousnesses accompanied by initial application would follow. Therefore, it should be understood that the non-attainment of jhāna in the Dhamma-saṅgaṇī in the chapters on the emptiness of inclusion of the mind-element, etc., refers to that non-attainment, and this non-attainment of the jhāna condition is said to be in rootless consciousnesses. Just as the strong activity of contemplating, which involves drawing together and unifying initial application, etc., in root-accompanied states, is not so in rootless consciousnesses. However, in this treatise, even if there is some slight contemplation, even if it is weak, it is helpful. Therefore, the jhāna condition is mentioned even in rootless consciousnesses accompanied by initial application. Therefore, those They recite thus: "These two jhāna-path conditions are not found respectively in the two five-fold sense-consciousness rootless thoughts." Their reading is more beautiful. This is the explanation of the meaning of this treatise, not of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. By being conjoined in equal ways, as if reaching a state of oneness, is helpfulness, the conjoined condition. Even though they are conjoined, by being disjoined, by reaching a state of diversity, is helpfulness, the disjoined condition. Indeed, there is no disjoined conditionality for those disjoined ones, like material forms, etc., which are not conjoined in terms of basis-conascence or post-nascence, but are helpful in terms of object, etc. But for material forms, even though they are inseparable from other material forms, there is no disjunction itself, so there is no disjoined conditionality for them. For it is said: "Conjoined with four, disjoined with four" (Dhātu. 3). "By the characteristic of being present" means by the nature of being present. Therefore, it refutes the existence characterized by being produced and perceivable, as stated in phrases like: "I have done evil kamma" (Pārā. 38), and "There is a certain person who practices for his own benefit" (Pu. Pa. Mātikā 4.24). Even though there is generation, the primary support is helpfulness by way of existence, thus it says "by way of support." And this support should be understood as the common helpfulness by way of existence for basis, object, conascence, etc. There is no co-existence for many contact-impressions, etc., occurring in an object by way of touching, etc. When one aggregate of contact-impressions exists, a second does not; but when it does not exist, it does. Therefore, helpfulness by way of non-existence is non-existence conditionality. Even though there is the non-existence of previous thoughts, they are not helpful by way of non-existence. But immediately, by their non-existence, they are helpful as if giving an opportunity for occurrence to those that do not obtain an opportunity for occurrence by their own existence, thus it says "helpfulness by giving an opportunity for occurrence." And here, helpfulness merely by non-existence, giving opportunity, is non-existence conditionality. By the non-departure of its own nature, non-occurrence... For those that have ceased, by the disappearance of their nature, there is helpfulness as a vanished condition, and non-existence as immediate emptiness of cessation, vanishment as attainment of cessation. This is their distinction. Similarly, by existence, helpfulness through its own nature is the existence condition. By the non-disappearance of its nature, helpfulness through non-attainment of cessation is the non-vanished condition. Thus, the distinction in conditionality should be understood even in the distinction of phenomena. Indeed, having fully understood all the distinct powers of phenomena as they truly are, the Tathāgata declared the twenty-four distinct conditions. Therefore, with faith in the Blessed One, one should generate knowledge born of hearing, "These phenomena have such distinctions," and then apply oneself to their realization through knowledge born of thinking and meditation. Since there is no non-inclusion of even one of the four aggregates, there is no partiality of name-phenomena for the immediate and so on. Having said "or name-phenomena," it is not merely the four aggregates that are names, which partake in the nature of condition and conditioned. Rather, showing that Nibbāna is also a name, he said, "due to Nibbāna's non-inclusion," and so on. In "the pre-nascent condition is a part of matter," the word "part" excludes what is other than matter-matter. However, matter-matter, even if future in the wholesome triad, is indeed mentioned elsewhere as a pre-nascent condition. For it is said: "The invisible and unresisting phenomenon is a condition for the invisible and unresisting phenomenon by way of the pre-nascent condition – object pre-nascent, base pre-nascent. The object pre-nascent base, the female faculty, the male faculty, the water element, edible food, as impermanent... and so on... displeasure arises." (Paṭṭhāna 2.22.39) The explanation of the enumeration of conditions is finished. Exposition of Conditions 1. Explanation of the Exposition of the Root Condition 1. That which is designated as the root condition, should be understood thus: By this, the conditionality of the phenomenon called root, for the conditioned phenomena called root-associated, root-originated, and root-arisen matter, by way of the root condition, is designated as the root condition. And that conditioning phenomenon, which is described as a root, is a condition for the conditioned phenomena described. is, that is designated as the root condition, it should be understood, he shows. In both ways, that the helpfulness by way of being a root is designated as the root condition, is shown. This is the method in the remaining conditions as well. Helpfulness, however, is the very nature of phenomena, it is not other than phenomena. Thus, the Blessed One, showing that particular phenomenon as helpful in that particular way, shows that particular helpfulness. In "Roots are a condition for their associated phenomena," the first word "root" is a designation of the condition specified in the nominative case. By that, it shows that the helpfulness by way of being a root is the root condition. The second is a qualifier of the conditioned phenomena. By that, it shows that it is not a condition for just any associated phenomena by way of being a root condition, but only for those associated with a root. But since the word "associated" is relative, even if the second word "root" were absent, since no other object of expectation is specified, would not the meaning be understood that it is a condition for its own associated phenomena by way of the root condition? This is not absolute. For when the word "root," specified in the nominative case, is understood as being active only in "is a condition by way of the root condition," then it is not a qualifier of the associated phenomena. Thus, any associated phenomena, without distinction, might be taken. Therefore, referring to the case where the word "associated" is active only in itself, and without a qualifier from the word "root," the taking of just any associated phenomena occurs, he said, "Otherwise...pe... the meaning would be." But just as when it is said, "Immaterial foods for associated phenomena" (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.15) and "Immaterial faculties for associated phenomena" (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.16), even without the second mention of food or the second mention of faculty, only those associated with food or faculty are taken, could it not be so here too? No, because there is no non-associated with food or faculty. Since there is nothing to be excluded there, even without the second mention of food or faculty, only those associated with them are taken, so it was not done. But here, there is something to be excluded, so the second mention of root must be stated. Even so, roots Regarding "of those conjoined with roots" here, because the specification "that root itself is the conjoined root for those conjoined with roots" is not made, does it follow that any root whatsoever is a condition by way of root-condition for any root-conjoined phenomenon whatsoever? It does not follow, because the root itself, specifically indicated, is again stated as a conjoined specification. And for this very purpose, even though being conjoined with a root is established without a second word "root",