English
taking all of them, "those" is said, so it should be understood. Or, "whatever" is said to show that at the time they arise referring to (an object), they arise referring to each individual blue color etc. and mind-moments. But the visual-object phenomena being taken as objects are manifold, and similarly the sound-object phenomena etc. are manifold, so "those" is said to show this. That Nibbāna is an object-condition for these six groups: namely, for wholesome kamavacara and rupavacara (states) because it is not included (in them), for wholesome results, and for kamavacara and rupavacara functional (states) — this is said with the intention that Nibbāna is also an object for rupavacara wholesome and functional (states) at the time of recollecting aggregates connected with past existences by means of the knowledge of recollecting past lives. This being the case, Just as it is said: "The immeasurable aggregates are a condition by way of object-condition for the knowledge of recollection of past existences" (Paṭṭhāna 2.12.58), so too should "Nibbāna" be said, but it is not said. For Nibbāna was not dwelt in before, being unconditioned. Nor is there any purpose in knowing Nibbāna by the knowledge of recollection of past existences, when the immeasurable aggregates dwelt in before are known. Just as the knowledge of penetrating others' minds, by revealing the mind itself, is a condition for the sense-sphere knowledge of the mind as object, so too this (knowledge of past lives), by revealing the immeasurable aggregates themselves, is a condition for the sense-sphere knowledge of those as object. And only one who has seen Nibbāna recollects the immeasurable aggregates dwelt in before. Therefore, Nibbāna, just as it is seen, should be understood as the object of those aggregates, but the knowledge of recollection of past existences does not make that object manifest. For it is already manifest to it. Similarly, this should be applied appropriately to the knowledge of future events. Therefore, Nibbāna is not an object for any form-sphere consciousness, and it is appropriate to say "of the four aggregates." The explanation of the Object Condition is concluded. 3. Explanation of the Predominance Condition "Dhuram" means "taking the lead." "Jeṭṭhakam" means "supreme." Here, in "desire predominance for the associated (states) of desire," the word "desire" (chanda) immediately following the first "desire" (chanda), by its connection to it, shows the qualifying nature of "associated" for the conditioning desire. Thus, it should be understood that "for the associated (states) of desire" is said, instead of "desire predominance for the associated (states)." This method applies to the others as well. "By way of respect and esteem" shows the occurrence of wholesome and indeterminate states. What is not obtained should be obtained. What is obtained should not be abandoned. Or, that without which there can be no existence, that should be obtained. The meaning of that is "not to be abandoned." "Uncontemptible" means even what is contemptible, by seeing no fault and by appreciating it, is made uncontemptible. Determined to wrongness, like absorption, of great power. without a dominant condition, they do not arise," thus he says, "absolutely." And those [hindrances] which are hindrances of kamma and defilements, and hindrances to heaven, and hindrances to the path, cannot arise even for the sense-sphere deities who directly perceive heaven. What then to speak of those in the form and formless realms? However, the three kinds of functional-object-dominance, distinguished by sense-sphere and so on, are only an object-dominance condition for unwholesome states accompanied by greed. This is because, for object-having phenomena belonging to other mental continuums, the statement "an internal object-phenomenon is a condition for an external object-phenomenon by way of dominance" is absent. And in "an external object-phenomenon for an external object-phenomenon," since object-dominance is not mentioned, it is understood that there is no dominance condition. Nevertheless, relying on statements like "one delights in external aggregates, treating them as important" (Paṭṭhāna 2.20.31), it should be understood that the functional phenomena of Arahants are spoken of with the intention that they are treated as important and delighted in by ordinary people and so on. It has been considered that the word 'aggregates' (khandha), as in "aggregates that are visible and with impingement" (Paṭṭhāna 2.22.30) and so on, can only refer to matter (rūpa). Or, this is said with reference to delighting in future functional phenomena, at the time of ordinary people and so on. From statements like "one delights in and rejoices in aggregates that are neither result nor result-producing" (Paṭṭhāna 1.3.96), functional phenomena are indeed a dominance condition for greed and wrong views. And these, from statements like "one delights in future aggregates as past objects" (Paṭṭhāna 2.19.23), future phenomena of the three planes are also a dominance condition. However, due to the existence of advertence and functional consciousness, this too should be considered. The explanation of the Dominance Condition is concluded. 4. Explanation of the Contiguity Condition. 4. Just as the non-existence and disappearance conditions are spoken of in the specific sense of giving space, the contiguity and immediate contiguity conditions are not so. But these are spoken of in the specific sense of causes for the fixed order of consciousness. Therefore, showing that specific sense of causes for the fixed order of consciousness, by way of elements, with "eye-consciousness element" and so on... He does not specify based on wholesome, etc. There, if it were said: “The mind-cognition element to the mind-cognition element,” the distinction of cause and effect would not be understood. Therefore, it would be necessary to say: “The former former to the latter latter.” And if that were the case, the showing of the distinction of consciousness by the distinction of element, which he began to do, would be interrupted. “The mind-cognition element to the mind-door element” this too cannot be said due to the absence of a rule. And “the mind-door element to the eye-cognition element” likewise cannot be said. For there is no rule that the mind-door element is an immediate condition only to the eye-cognition element. Therefore, starting with the evident five cognition elements, he shows the method by example as far as there is a rule for the distinction of elements. Then, to show everything without remainder, he says: “The former former wholesome,” etc. “Of similar wholesome ones” means of wholesome ones similar in feeling or in roots, or of suitable wholesome ones. By this, the conditionality of those different in plane is also stated. By the inclusion of bhavaṅga, cuti (death-consciousness) in wholesome and unwholesome root-series is also to be understood as included, and in the indeterminate root-series, tadārammaṇa (registering consciousness) as well. “Of the sense-sphere functional advertence” means “of the advertence of the sense-sphere functional consciousness.” It should be understood that by the inclusion of advertence, he specifies the sense-sphere functional consciousness. Sense-sphere resultant consciousness is an immediate condition to the group of sense-sphere functional consciousnesses, and being so, it is only to advertence— this is the intention here. It should be understood that by the inclusion of advertence here, voṭṭhabba (determining consciousness) is also included. The explanation of the immediate condition specification is finished. 6. Explanation of the Co-nascence Condition Specification 6. “Aññamaññassa (of one another)” is the ancient reading for “one to another.” But in the Pāḷi text, in “aññamaññaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayo (one another is a condition by co-nascence condition),” the meaning of this “aññamaññaṃ” which is stated, should be explained, not the meaning of “aññamaññassa” which is not stated. Nor is the meaning of another word stated when the meaning of a word with the same meaning is stated. Therefore, they read: “Aññamaññaṃ means añño aññassa (one to another).” “Okkantī (descent)” means the five-fold is called rebirth-linking, not other kinds of rebirth-linking. With this intention, it says: “at the moment of rebirth-linking in the five-constituent existence.” The statement “material phenomena to immaterial phenomena” is said to prevent the idea that the conditionality of material phenomena is negated at that moment, even though it was previously stated “mind-and-matter at the moment of descent.” “At some time” means “at some particular time.” Thus, it prevents the previously unnegated co-nascent conditionality of some material phenomena, which are the basis, at some rebirth-linking time, for other material phenomena and for the basis at a later time, for immaterial phenomena. And so, the case ending is inverted, to say “at some time” or “at some particular time.” For “some” is a singular accusative, an equivalent for the plural nominative in connection with “material phenomena,” and in connection with “time” it is understood as a singular locative. And by the former statement, “one constituent and the basis for three constituents,” etc., when it is appropriate to say “a condition for mind” for the basis together with mind, this shows that it is so said for the basis alone. Even though it is obtained that “three are not by way of mutual conditionality,” it should be understood that this is said because the conditionality of mutual co-nascence is not included in the statement in some places. In the case of kamma-originated matter, which is a part of matter originating from four causes, the genitive case should be understood as indicating a part of the whole, or as specification. The explanation of the Co-nascent Condition is finished.