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of this treatise should be stated. For when Paṭṭhāna is known concisely in this way, the detailed explanation becomes easy to understand. And there, the meaning of the name should be stated first. Saying, "There, of those... [etc.]... the meaning of the name should first be understood thus," showing the meaning of the common name Paṭṭhāna first, he begins with "In what sense is it Paṭṭhāna?" Indeed, the syllable "Pa" indicates a prefix. It, like in "among the distinguished phenomena, that which is supreme is attained," and so on, indicates various kinds of meaning. Is it not that "distinguished by kinds" means "pavibhatta" (distinguished)? Does the prefix "pa" indicate only "kind," not "various kinds"? No, because those kinds are of various sorts. Indeed, the word "nānā" (various) is used to show the variety that arises from the meaning. There, because even one phenomenon has many conditions like root causes, etc., and because each condition has many phenomena, of various kinds... The conditionality should be known. By this, that it is divided by way of root-condition and so on, it shows the reason for obtaining the name Paṭṭhāna, which is a superior division from the division into wholesome and so on, as stated in the Dhamma-saṅgaha and so on. Goṭṭha means a cattle-pen. Paṭṭhita-gāvo means a gone-away ox. In the place from which it came, it refers to the Mahāsīhanāda Sutta. The remainder of the phrase is "because of its continuous going." Or else, that by which one goes is a going, meaning that each Paṭṭhāna is a place of going, because of the going of the omniscience knowledge, which proceeds unhindered. There, to show that it is a place of going for one who has going, superior to those who have going, it is said "of the omniscience knowledge." Showing that it is a place of hindered going for the Dhamma-saṅgaṇī and so on, like the falling place of a very swift man, and that this is a place of unhindered going, like a great road, it shows that being a place of going with superiority is the reason for obtaining the name Paṭṭhāna. Of the Triads means of the phenomena stated by way of triads. Samantā means that they are twenty-four, having gone in all ways, such as by way of direct order and so on. In this sense, "twenty-four Samanta-Paṭṭhānas" should be understood as having the word Samanta placed after, where it should have been "Samanta-twenty-four-Paṭṭhānas." Or else, by "Samantā, six by six," it shows the sixfold nature of the triads and so on from all sections, such as the direct order. Therefore, the word Samanta is an adjective for the sixfold Paṭṭhānas of the triads and so on, not for the twenty-four. Thus, by making them "Paṭṭhānas from all sides, those are twenty-four," it is said "twenty-four Samanta-Paṭṭhānas." Or else, Paṭṭhānas that proceed from all sides, by ways such as the direct order of phenomena, the triads, the dependent origination sections, the direct order of conditions, and the root-causes, are Samanta-Paṭṭhānas, meaning they proceed by complete methods. And those are twenty-four. Therefore, it is said, "by way of the combination of these twenty-four Samanta-Paṭṭhānas, which are called minor Paṭṭhānas." "Root and that is a condition" by this statement lest it be taken as a cause that is also a condition of the nature of a dominant condition, etc., he refutes this by saying: "being a root, it is a condition." Since the same fault arises from this, he says again: "it is said to be a condition by way of being a root." Thereby, here, by the word 'root' (hetu), the grasping of a phenomenon (dhamma) is not done, but rather, a specific power of a phenomenon is grasped, he shows. For, intending the co-referentiality of that and the word 'condition' (paccaya), it is said: "it is a root and it is a condition," and "being a root, it is a condition." And having done thus, later in the Pāḷi, "roots, associated with roots...etc.... by way of root condition" and so on, the helpfulness of that phenomenon by that and that way of helpfulness, such as being a root, is stated. In the commentary, however, "whatever phenomenon, not abandoning whatever phenomenon, stands or arises, that is its condition," and "the phenomenon that is helpful in the sense of a root is a root condition," and so on, by a designation predominantly of phenomena, it should be seen that there is no such thing as a power of a phenomenon distinct from phenomena, and thus the manifestation of the power of phenomena is done by phenomena themselves. Here too, "it is a root and it is a condition," shows the power of a phenomenon by phenomena themselves. For, the designation "root condition" and so on, is not predominantly of phenomena, like the designation of wholesome, etc., but rather, it is predominantly of the helpfulness of phenomena. "It goes" (eti) - the meaning of this is "it occurs," and that is a common term for arising and standing. Therefore, he says: "stands or arises." For, some conditions are only for standing, like the post-natal condition; some are only for arising, like the immediately preceding conditions, etc.; some are for both, like the root conditions, etc. And "characterized by helpfulness" should be seen as showing the helpfulness of the power of a phenomenon by a phenomenon. "It rests upon, it is established in" - that is the root (hetu). Since verbal roots have many meanings, the word 'hi' should be seen as having the meaning of 'foundation' (mūla), like the word 'mūla'. Or, by this, as by a root that, being the cause of action, carries sap upwards, a plant goes to its fruit, proceeds, attains growth and development - that is a root (hetu). Revata Thera speaks to the teachers. "Monks, for one who attends properly, unarisen wholesome states arise, and arisen wholesome states grow." By such (words), the wholesome nature's dependence on proper attention is established. Thus it is said: "The wholesome nature is dependent on proper attention." By this very (reasoning), it is shown that unwholesome and indeterminate natures, unlike the wholesome nature, are not dependent on a cause. What some might think: "Just as the unwholesome nature of a rootless cause is inherent, so too the wholesome nature etc. of rooted causes is inherent, and for other co-arisen (states), it is dependent on a cause." To answer this, he begins with "If indeed..." Non-greed might be wholesome or indeterminate. If non-greed is inherently wholesome, then being wholesome, it would not be indeterminate. But if it is indeterminate, then being of that nature, it would not be wholesome, just as the nature of non-greed is not the absence of hatred. But since it is both ways, therefore, just as you seek the wholesome nature etc. dependent on a cause in co-arisen states like contact, which are both ways, and not inherently, so too in the roots, wholesomeness etc. should be sought as dependent on something else, not inherently. What was said: "The wholesome nature etc. is inherent in co-arisen roots," that is not appropriate. But that (nature), when sought, is dependent on proper attention etc. Thus, just as in the roots, so too in co-arisen states, the wholesome nature etc. is dependent on proper attention etc., not dependent on a cause – this is the meaning that is established. In "even having taken as object," the word 'pi' shows this meaning: having stood in any one of the mere sense-objects etc., it is said that "whatever phenomenon one takes as object" (implies) the condition of being an object for all sense-objects... etc.... and mind-objects. Therefore no phenomenon is not (an object). "What indeed is not accomplished by one who has zeal?" etc. When consciousness arises, having obtained the support of previous volitional formations, zeal etc. become the leading factors, the chief factors, accomplishing the co-arisen states themselves... They do not arise without existing; and the associated phenomena act under their sway, in a lower or higher state, by following them. Thus, they are adhipati conditions. Even a revered object, for those inclined, leaning, and tending towards it, for contemplation, enjoyment, path, and fruit, becomes a condition, as if making them act under its own sway. Therefore, this helpfulness, by acting as a master over what is dependent on oneself, should be seen as the adhipati condition. Here, in "the rule of mind-consciousness element, etc., of mind," by the word "etc.," is meant 'determining immediately after investigating,' and 'rebirth immediately after death.' This shows that the rule of immediate arising of whatever mind arises immediately after whatever mind, is accomplished only by means of the preceding mind, distinguished by its respective co-operative conditions. Here, in "being prevented by the power of development," it is like how, when a tree is given a poison, even though it is capable of flowering, it does not flower; but when the poison is removed, it flowers with that same capability. Similarly here, being prevented by the power of development, there is no arising even for that which is capable of arising; and when that prevention is gone, there is arising with that same capability—this is the meaning. Here, a distinction should be understood merely from the expression, not from the meaning. The meaning is that the distinction is merely from the literal sense, not from the expressible meaning, like the terms 'accumulation,' 'continuity,' 'designation,' and 'expression.' Therefore, to show the specific literal meaning, he said "How?" and so on. Therein, the ability to produce immediately, due to the absence of an interval between the cessation and arising of the preceding and succeeding (phenomena), is the anantara condition. And the ability to produce in a truly immediate manner, as if bringing about a unity in itself, due to the absence of form like material phenomena, and the absence of co-existence of condition and conditioned,