English
"Even if a stream-enterer drinks unknowingly, liquor does not enter his mouth, because it must be drunk with an unwholesome mind that has reached the course of action." It is not known for what reason that is not good, nor how it is rejected by saying, "It is established by the nature of things." And also that statement in the Dīgha Nikāya commentary: "mixing liquor and milk... etc. ... this is established by the nature of things," that too establishes only an unwholesome mind, even in the case of drinking liquor without intention. For thus, when it is said: "Even in another existence, a noble disciple does not take life even for the sake of life, does not take what is not given... etc. ... does not drink liquor," the objection might arise: "For the first four courses of action, since they are intentional, abstention is easy; but for the last, drinking liquor, since it is unintentional, how can there be abstention?" Considering the possibility of such an objection, and even if it is unintentional due to not knowing the substance, since liquor must be swallowed with an unwholesome mind that has reached the course of action, and such an unwholesome tendency is destroyed in a noble disciple by the path itself, therefore, there is no entry of liquor into his throat. By one who speaks a refutation that implies this meaning, the statement "if he were to mix liquor and milk..." and so forth, was said. Therein, "only milk enters, not liquor," this is intended to show the complete absence of liquor entering the throat in any way, and not to show the ability to separate liquor from milk mixed with liquor. This is the intention here: if indeed anything were to enter milk mixed with liquor, only milk would enter, not liquor. But if milk is not separated from liquor, nothing enters. This is established by nature, the non-entry of water into the mouth is established by nature. Here, by "species" is meant "birth." Therefore, the meaning is that it is established that it does not enter, because the form-phenomena, which are the beaks of cranes, are not a cause for the absorption of milk mixed with water. This too, even if it enters the milk mixed with liquor, it is said to enter another's throat. "It is established by nature" means it is established by the nature of the noble disciple not having defilements that are a cause for drinking liquor, which are formless phenomena. Thus, it should be understood that even in the case of "without consciousness," since liquor must be drunk with unwholesome consciousness, the non-drinking of noble disciples is justified. Or it might be said, even if it is drunk without unwholesome consciousness in the case of "not knowing," it is the nature of the noble ones not to drink liquor, and this is the ultimate justification. That is not so, because it contradicts other statements in the commentaries. The meaning should be taken in such a way that it does not contradict other statements. Moreover, the non-commission of the five paths of action, such as taking life, even in future existences, is the nature and virtue of the noble ones, and that is if they are done with consciousness. If, like drinking liquor, the other four were also not to be done by a noble disciple even unknowingly, then for the noble ones who do not know, bodily and verbal actions such as refraining from killing, refraining from stealing, and refraining from taking what belongs to others would not occur even with wholesome or indeterminate consciousness. But they do occur, as in the case of Elder Cakkhupāla's walking which caused the death of living beings, and Elder Uppalavaṇṇā's being raped, which caused her to attain the path and its fruit. Therefore, it should be understood that it is stated with distinction that liquor does not enter the throat of the noble ones, even in the case of "without consciousness," because it must be drunk with unwholesome consciousness. But are not all paths of action said to be for one who knows the object? No, because wrong view arises precisely from a mistaken grasp. How can a view that grasps the non-omniscient as omniscient, and the impermanent as permanent, etc., know the object? If it did know, it would not be wrong view. And since it is counted among the paths of action, from where comes the rule that the paths of action arise only for one who knows? Now, even if one takes the All-Knowing as All-Knowing, and grasps "this is a being" as its true nature, does perception then know the object? No, because it's the same as grasping the nature of drinking alcohol as "this is not alcohol." And if, by touching the object as "this," without knowing it specifically as "alcohol," one does not know it? Even knowing "this" as a person, without knowing specifically "not all-knowing," perception does not know the object; it's the same. Thus, whether they are Buddhas, or harmful ones like Pūraṇa Kassapa, in generating aversion or attachment, the method is the same. Indeed, all unwholesome actions are preceded by perversion. Moreover, it is the nature of alcohol, when being drunk, to inevitably produce unwholesome states, just as when it has been drunk. For a person who has drunk alcohol with the perception of milk, a continuous stream of unwholesome states like lust and hatred towards mother, sister, etc., arises by the very nature of the substance. Similarly, at the moment of drinking, intense lust arises. Therefore, when Sāgata Thera drank unknowingly, he lost his five supernormal powers and jhānas. And afterwards, a continuous stream of unwholesome states, such as disrespect towards the Buddha and others, persisted until the alcohol wore off. Therefore, the Blessed One, by showing the arising of his disrespectful unwholesome states, revealed the fault of alcohol and laid down the training rule. Indeed, without the arising of the five hindrances, there is no loss of jhāna. Therefore, this meaning, that alcohol, whether being drunk or drunk, produces unwholesome states by its own nature, even for one who does not know, is established by the case of Sāgata Thera's loss of jhāna, and also by the converse, that alcohol does not enter the Ariyas due to their lack of defilements. This conclusion should be reached. Indeed, such an understanding is in accordance with the Vibhajjavāda doctrine. However, the understanding that "only for one who drinks knowingly is it unwholesome" is the view of other sects, such as the Abhayagiri school. But this, written by commentators and gloss-makers, who, not knowing it to be "another's doctrine," have assimilated it with their own views, has entered even the Vibhajjavāda circle and corrupts the Sāsana to this day. It is said that even in the past In this very Tamil country, a certain heterodox one, a thera named Nāgasena, the story of Kuṇḍalakesī, for showing the method of crushing other doctrines, causing it to be made in the form of a Tamil poem, instructed the poet making the poem with much inverted meaning such as: "This unwholesome aspect of drinking liquor, even knowing it and drinking it, and other infinite knowables, due to differences in place, time, etc., omniscience cannot know by way of specific characteristics alone, because knowledge is limited, and there would be a loss of the infinitude of the knowable. But it can be known by way of general characteristics such as impermanence, etc." and, "In ultimate realities, just as there are distinctions like name-and-form, so too, conventional designations like 'person' are also distinct types of objects." And in that composition, by means of specious reasons, having deluded the mind, he caused it to be composed. And relying on that poem, this heterodox opinion, here, mixed with the Vibhajjavādin view, persisted for a long time. But that, later, by the great thera Acariya Buddhappiya, having cut off the net of views, external and internal, and having established the pure teaching here, though it was purified, in the Vinaya commentary Sāratthadīpanī (Sārattha. Ṭī. Pārājikakaṇḍa 2.42), relying on the statement that supports "the mind is unwholesome only in the case of drinking liquor with full awareness," by some with perverted minds, it again raised its head. And that, having been investigated by the great theras, having made a censurable statement, having crushed it, and having separated the monks who held to that view, by means of the Dhamma, the Vinaya, and the Teacher's Dispensation, it was long ago suppressed. Therefore, here, we thus extensively reject this, "lest this view corrupt other Vibhajjavādins." Therefore, the reasons stated and unstated here, having carefully considered, so that there is no contradiction with the scriptures, the meaning should be taken accordingly. "The rest" means that for which there is no rule that the mind is unwholesome only in the case of knowing the object with full awareness, that is "all." "They obstruct" means by taking a part of "there is no fault for a female animal" and so on, regarding non-offenses. preventing. Closing the door, that is, closing the door which is the reason for the taking of the meaning "and that, by a human woman" (Pārā. 41) and so on. Cutting off the current, that is, cutting off the uninterrupted current of transgression by means of the doors of taking both meanings. Making it firmer, that is, by the aforementioned reasons, making firm the offense already established by the first enactment, meaning, not giving an opportunity for non-offense. And since this arises by making it lax even in a worldly offense in the absence of transgression, and in an unmentionable transgression due to its not being an object, therefore, showing such an arising and the cause of arising, it is said, "except for overestimation," and so on. "Except for overestimation" states the reason for this subsequent enactment as "absence of transgression." "Except for a dream" states the reason as "being unmentionable." Therein, "absence of transgression"