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the mind desiring to drink is present, one engages in the corresponding effort, and when drunk, it enters." These are the four factors. It is not said that there are five, including the factor of knowing it as an intoxicant. If knowing "surā" were an element, it would surely have to be stated, but it is not stated. Just as here, so too in other commentaries on the Suttapiṭaka and so on, the element of knowing is nowhere stated. Therefore, the commentary's phrase: "it is blameworthy in the world because it must be drunk with unwholesome intent," even in the case of no intention, means just this: "it is blameworthy in the world because it must be drunk with unwholesome intent." This is the conclusion to be reached here. Moreover, what is said in the glosses, comparing it in every way to the sameness with life-taking: "Just as when one intends to kill this being, but kills another lying in that very place, it is still life-taking because of the commonality of life; similarly, when one intends to drink this intoxicant, but drinks another intoxicant, it is still unwholesome because of the commonality of intoxicants. But just as when one kills a snake mistaking it for a piece of wood, it is not life-taking; similarly, when one drinks intoxicant mistaking it for coconut water, it is not unwholesome." That is exceedingly inappropriate, because there is no rule of sameness among all precepts and unwholesome actions like life-taking. Life-taking, indeed, is completed even indirectly; not so with taking what is not given. That (taking what is not given) is completed even by command; not so in sexual misconduct and so on. Therefore, to equate completely things that are different even in terms of their constituent elements of action, is indeed inappropriate. If someone says, "Taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and so on, are also completed indirectly, like life-taking," why is that not accepted, since there is no such statement? Here too, since there is no statement "drinking intoxicants is like life-taking," this too should not be accepted. Moreover, a Vinaya expert, rejecting a point established by the commentary's statement, should reject it by showing its contradiction with the suttas or their conformity, etc., not merely by equating it with another precept that is entirely different in terms of its constituent elements of action. Indeed, there is no contradiction with the suttas or other texts in the statement "even for one who drinks intoxicants unknowingly, it is still unwholesome." In the Vinaya Piṭaka, the meaning of this... This is not found in the Suttas and so on, nor in the Sutta Piṭaka and so on. As to what some here say: “Since it is said, ‘Mind is the forerunner of all states’ (Dhp. 1, 2), all unwholesome deeds arise only for one who previously knows the object of transgression.” That reveals their non-comprehension of the Sutta’s intention. For this saying, “Mind is the forerunner of all states,” does not indicate that unwholesome states arise only for one who previously knows the object of transgression. Rather, it indicates that wholesome and unwholesome states, when they arise, arise only by relying on the co-arisen consciousness which is the forerunner in the sense of a cause for arising, and not without consciousness. For here, when it is said, “For one who drinks without knowing it is liquor, it is indeed unwholesome,” the meaning does not arise that unwholesome mental factors like greed and so on arise even without co-arisen consciousness. Thus, there would be no need to bring this Sutta to refute that. There is no contradiction with the Abhidhamma here, because it is stated that wholesome and unwholesome impulsion arises in the five-sense-door process even for one who previously does not know in terms of name, kind, and so on. Moreover, for foolish ordinary people, the impulsions arising at the six doors are mostly unwholesome. Wholesome impulsions, however, arise for them only rarely, due to the power of supporting conditions like good friends. Even for those who are silent, or who are sleeping and dreaming, unwholesome impulsion like restlessness mostly occurs, as there is no impulsion devoid of wholesome or unwholesome states for them. For unwholesome states arise according to conditions, in conformity with the object and in conformity with latent tendencies. What then is bound by previous knowing or not knowing? As for those acts like taking life which are endowed with factors like knowing, and those like drinking liquor and wrong view which are accomplished even without knowing, these have been taught by the Perfectly Enlightened One just as they are, in their true nature. And what contradiction with the Abhidhamma is there in taking them as taught? Thus, since there is no contradiction with the Suttas and so on, and since it is stated in the Commentaries, the meaning here should be understood in the way stated. If Why is it said in the commentary: "A novice, knowing, drinking, incurs a breach of precept, not unknowingly"? This is no fault, for the breach of precept depends on the Buddha's command, like the breach of precept for those who follow the suspended. For their breach of precept does not occur merely by the arising of unwholesome kamma, it is prescribed only after the Sangha's dependent admonition. So here too, it is prescribed for drinking knowingly, not for drinking unknowingly. Indeed, the domain of the training rule is one, the domain of unwholesome kamma is another. Therefore, for novices, when one of the first five training rules is broken, all training rules are broken. But for unwholesome kamma, what is broken, is broken by that one alone, not by others. Therefore, even if a novice drinking unknowingly has no breach of precept, it should be understood as unwholesome kamma that has reached the path of action. But the statement made by some in the Sāratthadīpanī: "For a novice, drinking liquor unknowingly, there is no pārājika, but there is unwholesome kamma," which is rejected as "that is merely their opinion," and the reason given there is: "For a bhikkhu, even unknowingly, drinking intoxicants from the seed onwards, incurs a pācittiya. Only this much is said in the commentary: 'A novice, knowing, drinking, incurs a breach of precept, not unknowingly.' It is not said, 'but there is unwholesome kamma'," that reason is no reason. For in the commentary, in the place where the breach of precept for novices is discussed — that it is only for drinking knowingly, not unknowingly — the non-mention of "but there is unwholesome kamma" is not a reason for the absence of unwholesome kamma in the case of unknowingly drinking. Because there is no occasion for it there, and it is stated in the proper place: "It is to be drunk only with unwholesome kamma, it is blameworthy by the world." Nor did those teachers, who said "but there is unwholesome kamma," speak taking only this passage from the Khandhaka commentary, which explains the breach of precept for novices, such that it could be said, "only this much is said in the commentary." Rather, they took many passages from the commentary on liquor drinking and from the Suttapiṭaka commentaries... Such a statement, taking the traditional teaching of the Mahāvihāra residents, they said. This is the view of those of different doctrines, like the Abhayagiri residents, that only for one who drinks knowing it, is it unwholesome. Therefore, what was said by some: "For a novice who drinks liquor without knowing it is liquor, there is no pārājika, but it is unwholesome," that should be taken as well-said. And what, in the Sāratthadīpanī (Sārattha. ṭī. Pārājikakaṇḍa 2.42), the statement made by some, "Even for a stream-enterer who drinks unknowingly, liquor does not enter the mouth, because it must be drunk with an unwholesome mind that reaches the path of action," having rejected it as "not good," and having said, "Indeed, this too, like the virtue of the Bodhisatta's mother when the Bodhisatta is in her womb, should be understood as established by the nature of things for noble disciples," to support this very establishment by the nature of things, "Indeed, in future existences too, a noble disciple does not kill a living being even for the sake of life, nor does he drink liquor. If they mix liquor and milk and put it into his mouth, only milk enters, not liquor. Like what? Just as for cranes, when milk is mixed with water, only milk enters, not water. If that is established by nature, this too should be understood as established by nature" – this commentary statement was presented, but that too is not proper. For just as in "like the virtue of the Bodhisatta's mother, it is established by the nature of things for noble disciples," the nature of the Bodhisatta's mother is simply the non-arising of unwholesome deeds due to the power of the Bodhisatta's and her own perfections. Similarly, for noble disciples in future existences, the nature of things is simply the non-arising of unwholesome deeds that cause specific breaches of precepts, due to the power of the path that completely abandons the ten paths of action (such as taking life) and other unwholesome deeds that lead to lower realms. For here, "nature of things" is not causelessness, like the nature of things for naturalists. Or, in this sense of "nature of things," the presence or absence of an effect due to the presence or absence of a cause is the nature of things, not the absence of cause and condition. Existence, and thus here too, the absence of courses of action like taking life, due to the complete absence of the defilement that is their cause; and the presence of the remaining unwholesome things, due to the presence of their cause, this is the nature of things, not causelessness. Therefore, by the very absence of craving, the cause of woe, the noble ones do not swallow liquor, even unknowingly. This has been well said by some: