English
However, when it is said, "in the intentional aspect, the mind is unwholesome," for intentional rules, the mind is always unwholesome; for the others, the unwholesomeness is fixed only in the intentional aspect, not in the unintentional aspect. In that case, it should be understood that this meaning is accomplished by implication: it could be wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate, as appropriate. "In the intentional aspect" should be taken as referring to the mind that knows the transgression of the object, not the mind that knows the rule. If it were the latter, all rules would also be subject to blameworthiness in the world. For one who knows, "It is forbidden to do this, it is not proper," even in the case of a rule transgression, a mind of aversion arises due to disrespect. Therefore, Ah, this statement would be meaningless, since all the training rules are worldly faults, and only this much needs to be said. And here, it is not possible to determine that in the non-conscious category like drinking alcohol, the mind is not unwholesome, because the rule that "the mind is unwholesome only in the conscious category" has not been established. However, the rule here is established thus: "in the conscious category, the mind is only unwholesome, not wholesome, etc." And thus, the drinking of those who drink without knowing it is alcohol is with an unwholesome mind, and the anointing of nuns who anoint without knowing it is a fragrant substance or a colored substance is without an unwholesome mind, and the possibility of an offense in both cases is supported. What is stated in the Sāratthadīpanī: "It is understood that the rule 'in the non-conscious category, the mind is unwholesome' does not exist, because of the statement 'in the conscious category, the mind is only unwholesome,' meaning in the non-conscious category due to not knowing the object," is not appropriate. For among the thirteen worldly faults that are non-conscious, only in the non-conscious category of drinking alcohol is there a rule of an unwholesome mind, not for the other twelve, as they can be committed even with a wholesome mind, etc. What is said by someone who does not wish for this rule, which is not even apparent from the words, to present it as another's intention, such as "if in the non-conscious category the mind were also only unwholesome, then the qualification 'in the conscious category' would be meaningless," is itself meaningless, as this rule is not intended by anyone. For no one skilled in grammar desires the rule such that it would be said "the qualification 'in the conscious category' would be meaningless," etc. Rather, one desires it thus: "in the conscious category, the mind is only unwholesome, but in the non-conscious category, the mind is undetermined, it may be only unwholesome, or it may be one of the wholesome, etc." Then the qualification "in the conscious category" would also be meaningful. And the worldly fault nature of the non-conscious training rules is established by the rule of unwholesomeness in their conscious categories. Among them, and in the case of drinking liquor, even in the non-volitional aspect, there is blameworthiness by the world and unwholesome consciousness. But regarding the others, it is only in the volitional aspect. So this view is not contradictory, and there is nothing here that is not well-founded. What is said here, such as, "When one drinks liquor without knowing it... ...because an offense can arise even without unwholesome consciousness... ...the blameworthiness by the world for non-volitional precepts like drinking liquor would not exist," and what is extensively elaborated by citing passages from the Gaṇṭhipadas to prove that point, should not be accepted as essential, because it contradicts the commentaries. Thus, it is said: "Here, non-volitionality should be understood by not knowing the object, and blameworthiness by the world by the necessity of drinking with unwholesome intent." And what is said in this commentary passage, "Blameworthiness by the world is due to the necessity of drinking with unwholesome intent in the volitional aspect," is not good. Because in the Pārājika commentary, it is generally stated for all worldly blameworthy acts that "in the volitional aspect, the mind is unwholesome," and then in the commentary on the precept of drinking liquor, it is specifically stated "by the necessity of drinking with unwholesome intent," thus distinguishing the unwholesome consciousness even in the non-volitional aspect. For it cannot be said that "the meaning stated generally here is again stated in the liquor commentary," because there is no purpose in repeating what has been said, and it would also apply to other non-volitional worldly blameworthy acts. Nor can it be said that "a method stated in one place is also stated for others of the same characteristic," because it should be stated first in the Uyyutta precept for all non-volitional worldly blameworthy acts, or after stating it in the liquor precept, it should be extended to the other non-volitional worldly blameworthy acts. Moreover, when stating the same meaning, it should be stated in the same order as before, "by the necessity of drinking with unwholesome intent in the volitional aspect," because repetition serves to remove doubt and so on. And in the context of precepts, what needs to be specified is specified; otherwise, offenses and non-offenses... because it is difficult to understand the distinction of self and others. Thus, in the Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga Commentary, it is stated, “They are unintentional because they can be committed even without intention; but when there is intention, they are worldly faults and unwholesome intentions because they must be committed with unwholesome intention.” Here, the worldly fault and unwholesome intention of the Giraggasamajja and others are specifically stated only for the intentional side, not so for drinking intoxicants. For that, regarding both sides, it is generally stated, “because it must be drunk with unwholesome intention,” not specifically, “on the intentional side.” Therefore, to show that this drinking of intoxicants is a worldly fault and unwholesome intention on both the intentional and unintentional sides, it is well established that it is stated separately, “its worldly fault is because it must be drunk with unwholesome intention.” By this, what is stated in the Sāratthadīpanī, “its worldly fault is because it must be drunk with unwholesome intention on the intentional side,” is understood to be a presentation of this very meaning. Indeed, with this very meaning, unwholesome intention is stated for other unintentional worldly faults, not three intentions. Therefore, what is stated in the Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga Commentary, “Giraggasamajja, the Citta-āgāra training rule, Saṅghāṇi, female adornment, perfume and color, scented powder, and the pressing and kneading by bhikkhunīs and others— these ten training rules are unintentional and unwholesome intentions. The meaning here is: they are unintentional because they can be committed even without intention; but when there is intention, they are worldly faults and unwholesome intentions because they must be committed with unwholesome intention,” that too is refuted, as the opposite meaning is proven by the method stated above. Therefore, it should be understood that this statement is made to show this distinction: that even on the unintentional side of drinking intoxicants, the intention is unwholesome. And the meaning here is: “in the case of not knowing the object,” and here the particle “ca” indicates a special meaning, being synonymous with “apica” (and also). Therefore, what is said about other unintentional worldly faults, that they are unintentional because they can be committed even without intention, ...are not, but when there is mind, because it is committed only with unwholesome intention, they are worldly faults and unwholesome mental states. Thus, the characteristic of being a worldly fault and an unwholesome mental state is stated. That does not apply to the precept of drinking intoxicants here. It is said that there is a special point here. If asked, "What is it?" It should be understood that the "mindless" aspect is due to not knowing the object, and being committed even without a mind that knows the object. There is no special point about the "mindless" aspect here. However, even in the "mindless" aspect, which is called not knowing the object, because the intoxicant must be consumed with an unwholesome mind, the worldly fault and unwholesome mental state should be understood in both the "with mind" and "mindless" aspects of this precept. This is the special point here. For here, by not specifying "when there is mind," but stating generally "only with unwholesome intention," it should be understood that both aspects establish the worldly fault and unwholesome mental state. Therefore, in the commentary on the minor precepts, in the Paramatthajotikā (Khuddakaṭṭhakathā, description of the last five precepts), it is said that "the ground for heedlessness, which is intoxicants, has two origins: from the body and from the body and mind." Here, "intoxicants" refers to the absence of a knowing mind, and even the mere body, devoid of the mind factor, is said to be one origin. And even at that moment of single origin, the volition with which one drinks is entirely unwholesome. Therefore, in that same commentary, it is said: "The first five here, being entirely originated from unwholesome mental states, are abstentions from natural faults like taking life, the rest are from designated faults." Thus, for all five, the unwholesome mental state, the worldly fault, and the natural fault are generally stated. And among the factors, the factor of knowing is not mentioned. Indeed, it is said: "For the ground of heedlessness, which is intoxicants, one of the intoxicants is intoxicating,