English
Just as the mental properties do not arise without a state of consciousness, so cannot consciousness arise without its mental properties. Though such be the case, It must not be misunderstood that all the mental properties arise in consciousness at one and the same time. According i 70 to the sense impression or idea only a certain number of mental properties arise according to the class of consciousness. That is the reason why consciousness becomes 89 or 121 classes. The number of mental properties is 52; they are classified as follows : — (i) Common to all classes of consciousness 7 ] ^""*^ (2) Particular mental properties 6 (3) Immoral mental properties 14 samana (4) Common to all classes of moral 27 (5) (6) consciousness Abstinences The Illimitables 19 2 / -^5 sobhana or (7) Reason I beaut ifu 5-^ MENTAL PROPHRilHS COMMON TO ALL CLASSES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Mental properties common to all classes of consciousness are described as lollows ; — I. Contact. Contact phasso O^ascSD) is a state of taking hold of an object, as by touch. It can be compared to the flow of saliva from the mouth of a man who sees another eating some acid fruit, or to the fear that arises in one's consciousness almost amounting to a thrilling sensation, on seeing a man up a high tree in the midst of young branches, or the numbness of the teeth that IS experienced by a person who hears the unpleasant sound occasioned by the sharpening of an instrument on a whetstone on which sand is placed. From these illustrations contact should be understood as to how the object is got hold of, as by touch. When any object such as a visual one comes within the avenue of the six sensory organs such as eye-door and so on, that state, which causes the arising of a state of consciousness, by being present in it at one and the same time and with the other coexistent mental properties, of getting hold of an object as if by touch is called contact. It is likened to the rays of sun falling upon 71 .a wall. Though not associated with the object, it gets hold of the object as if by touch. According to the different names given to different classes of consciousness, contact associated with or coexisting in them bear different names. For instance, contact associated with eye cognition (cakku viiinana ^©SSss^iS, w) is called visual contact (cakku samphassa 0^ x^^). Similarly, auditory contact, olfactory contact, gustatory contact, tactile contact and mind contact in respect of the other organs. Therefore, as it is present in all classes of consciousness it is called sabba citta sadharana aci)-i)S^33 C5)0id-€^). 2. FEELING. Feeling (vedana ®^)^S53) is a state associated with con- sciousness which experiences the taste of an object. What consciousness is capable of doing is to perceive an object or conceive an idea. According to the object being pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent, there arises in consciousness pleasure, pain or indifference. Feeling is that state associated with consciousness which experiences the taste of an object. There- fore feeling is of three kinds v/^ pleasant and unpleasant and indifferent feeling. The other mental properties too to a certain extent have the characteristic feature of experiencing the taste of an object, but not so prominently as feeling (vedana ©i)^553a). The latter has a dominating influence over others in respect of that feature. From the illustration "subhojana rasassadako rajaviya" (Q 5eoi da dc3tt3<^>©taD dic5)8c6.) Both the cook and the king taste the food. The cook only experiences the taste by merely touching the food with the tongue, whereas the king by reason of his dominance will experience the taste during the whole period of his partaking of the food. Therefore feeling (vedana <©t)^bD3) is like a king who experiences the taste of the food. As feeling is also associated with the 89 classes of consciousness, It IS called sabbacitta sadharana (30Q)n) ®:5!3) j5Dji€3w), that is, it is common to all classes of consciousness 3. PERCEPTION. Perception (saiiiia OOC^qCS^j) is that state associated with •consciousness which perceives an object or which notes the 72 73 nature of the object. It is like the carpenter who perceives the place where the timber should be sawn from, having pre- viously made a mark ; or like noting same marks such as the colours white, red, blue or yellow in an object, but not able to give any reasons for the appearance of such colours. It is like a small child who, having seen a bull with two horns for the first time, on inquiring from his mother and coming to know that the animal is called a bull, notes that such an animal with two horns is a bull. But he does not know whether the bull was born of a cow, mare or she-elephant or originated from the earth. Therefore perception is that state associated with consciousness which perceives the object which has been pre- viously seen by noting same marks. When consciousness too is associated with perception, he would know the characteristic features of mind and body, just as he would be knowing that the bull was born ot a cow. When the faculty of reason is added to them, he would know that mind and body have the three salient features ot impermanence, sorrow and soul-lessness which exist in all conditioned things, just like his being able to give more particulars about the origin of the bull, such as the country where it was brought from, breed etc. Consciousness thinks of the object. Perception associated with consciousness perceives or notes the nature of the object such as colour, shape, dimensions etc. If there is no perception in consciousness, it can only think but cannot note the nature ot the object. Consciousness perceives and notes the nature of objects, because for some reason or other the property ot perception is present in consciousness. This property ot perception notes a mark the first time an object is seen, another mark the second time and so on for an indefinite period, the preceding mark being the cause of the succeeding ones. In the five aggregates, the two aggregates of feeling and perception constitute these two mental properties feeling and perception. This perception too as it is associated with all the 89 classes of consciousness is called sabba citta sadharana ;C3&ai §CX55 3a)3d-€^'), that is, it is a property common to all classes of consciousness. 4. VOLITION. Volition ^cetana ®e)t332a) is that state or property asso- ciated with consciousness, which, whilst performing its function by way of willing in respect of the object, causes the other mental properties such as contact and so on which are associated with it, to perform their functions. It is like the teacher, who, whilst studying himself, causes his pupils to study their lessons, or the head carpenter, who, whilst doing his portion of the carpentry, makes his assistants do such work as has been entrusted to them. ]usr as the owner of a paddy field going with a party of work- men to do some work in the field makes a greater effort than the others, in the same manner this volition makes a greater effort m performing its function than the other mental properties which are made to perform their functions each individually. X^olition which is associated with classes of moral and immoral consciousness is called Kamma (SS5^), because it has the capacity to order and accumulate good or bad deeds. This too is called, because it is associated with all classes of consciousness, a property common to all classes (sabba citta sadharana ccfirij SgK55 6Djd^). 5. ONE-POINTEDNESS. One-pointedness (ckaggata OcS)vrct33i) is that property associated with each state of consciousness, which prevents the state of consciousness with its associated other mental properties from spreading on diverse objects and concentrating on each object and pointing to one object at a time. It is like the water, which prevents a quantity of powder, which is capable of spreading by fanning, from spreading and which keeps it *en masse.' Consciousness and the mental properties arise leaning on to- one object only at a time. If this property is not associated with consciousness, then the consciousness and its mental properties would not be able to arise grasping one object at a time. When for some reason or other there is one-pointedness in consciousness, then consciousness and its mental properties arise pointing to and getting hold of one object.