English
English version: ‘Similar in Example and Dharma’. In ‘Similar but Different Dharma’, what is established without being rejected: For example, if someone says that all ‘impermanent’ things have ‘obstruction’ (physical hindrance or limitation), like ‘atoms’ (the smallest units of matter). Because the ‘permanence’ (eternal and unchanging nature) of the dharma established by ‘atoms’ is not rejected, since they consider ‘atoms’ to be ‘permanent’, the dharma that can be established is ‘without obstruction’. What is not rejected in what can be established is like talking about ‘karma’. Only the point to be established is rejected, not what can establish it. They say that all ‘karmas’ are without ‘obstruction’. Regarding cases where neither is rejected, in response to those arguments, like talking about ‘space’. Because they do not reject the ‘permanence’ and ‘non-obstruction’ of ‘space’, since they say that ‘space’ is ‘permanent’ and without ‘obstruction’. Not separate, like talking about a ‘jar’, considering it to have ‘impermanence’ and ‘obstruction’. Inverted separation, like saying: all things with ‘obstruction’ are ‘impermanent’. Such statements like ‘pseudo-thesis’, ‘pseudo-reason’, and ‘pseudo-example’ are not truly valid arguments. Furthermore, for self-enlightenment, it should be known that there are only two valid means of cognition (pramana): ‘Perception’ (Pratyaksha) and ‘Inference’ (Anumana). Here, ‘Perception’ refers to non-conceptual cognition. If one possesses correct wisdom, and regarding objects like form, is free from all conceptualizations such as names and categories, appearing directly and clearly, it is therefore called ‘Perception’. ‘Inference’ refers to observing the meaning of things through various characteristics (signs, marks). There are three types of characteristics, as mentioned earlier. Through these characteristics as the cause (hetu), correct wisdom arises regarding the object to be inferred, thus understanding that there is fire or impermanence, etc. This is called ‘Inference’. In these two means of cognition, wisdom itself is the result (phala), because it can prove the truth of things. Just as it has a function and manifests, it is therefore also called a ‘means of cognition’. Conceptual wisdom, which produces different cognitions about the meaning of things, is called ‘Fallacious Perception’ (Pseudo-Perception). For example, the wisdom that arises through distinguishing between jars, clothes, etc. Because their cognition of things does not take the true nature of things themselves as the object, it is called ‘Fallacious Perception’. If various wisdoms of ‘fallacious meaning’ (pseudo-meaning) arise, preceded by the wisdom of ‘fallacious reason’ (pseudo-reason), it is called ‘Fallacious Inference’ (Pseudo-Inference). There are many types of ‘fallacious reasons’, as mentioned earlier. Using these ‘fallacious reasons’ as the cause, various wisdoms arise regarding ‘fallacious objects of inference’ (pseudo-object of inference), but they cannot be correctly understood, and this is called ‘Fallacious Inference’. Furthermore, if one can correctly reveal the faults of a valid argument, it is called ‘Refutation’ (Nigrahasthana). That is, revealing the ‘deficient property’ (nyuna), ‘thesis fallacy’ (paksa-bhasa), ‘unestablished property’ (asiddha), ‘uncertain reason’ (anaikantika), ‘contradictory reason’ (viruddha), and ‘example fallacy’ (drstanta-bhasa) of the initial argument. Revealing these faults can inspire and enlighten the questioner, and therefore it is called ‘Refutation’. If the faults are not revealed truthfully, -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 能立过言名似能破。谓于圆满能立显示缺减性言。于无过宗有过宗言。于成就因不成因言。于决定因不定因言。于不相违因相违因言。于无过喻有过喻言。如是言说名似能破。以不能显他宗过失。彼无过故。且止斯事。 已宣少句义 为始立方隅 其间理非理 妙辩于余处 因明入正理论一卷 ◎因明入正理论后序 因明入正理论者盖乃抗辩标宗摧邪显正之闷阈也因谈照实。明彰显理入言趣本。正以离邪。论之者。较言旨归。审明要会也。昔应符道树兹义备焉。登庸鹿林斯风扇矣。六师稽颡而卷舌。十仙请命以知归。非天灵曜寝光邪津鼓浪。同恶孔炽。寔繁有徒。所以世亲弘盛烈于前。陈那纂遗芳于后。扬真殄谬夷难解纷。至矣。神功备详余论。粤有天主菩萨亚圣挺生。博综研详。聿修前绪。撰略精秘。逗适时机。启以八门通其二益。芟夷五分取定三支。其义简而彰。其文约而显。西方时彦钻仰弥深。自非履此通规。未足预其高论。大唐皇帝乘时启圣。阐金镜而运金轮。纳录嗣明。振玉鼓而调玉烛。洞敷玄化。载缉彝章。爇慧炬而鉴昏城。舣智舟而济苦海。我三藏法师玄奘。神悟爽𢪛峻节冠群。行四勤如不及。瞻三宗而好问。汉地先达各擅专门。寓目必察其微。纳心并殚其妙。嗟乎圣迹 绵远。像教陵夷。未尝不临讹文以喟然。抚疑义而太息。望葱山而高视。期鹫峰而远游。既而冒险乘危。询师访道。行达北印度迦湿弥罗国。属大论师僧伽耶舍。稽疑八藏考决五乘。论师以大义磐根嘉其素蓄。唯因明妙术诲其未喻。梵音觏止冰释于怀。后于中印度摩竭陀国。遇尸罗跋陀罗菩萨。更广其例。触类而长。优而柔之。于是遍谒遗灵备讯余烈。虽遇鍱腹纵辩无前。风偃邪徒抑兼兹论。旋弘周化景福会昌。粤以贞观二十一年秋八月六日。于弘福寺。承诏译讫。弘福寺沙门明浚笔受证文。弘福寺沙门玄谟证梵语。大总持寺沙门玄应正字。大总持寺沙门道洪。实际寺沙门明琰。罗汉寺沙门慧贵。宝昌寺沙门法祥。弘福寺沙门文备。廓州法讲寺沙门道深。蒲州栖岩寺沙门神泰。详证大义。银青光禄大夫行左庶子高阳县开国男臣许敬宗奉诏监译。三藏法师以虚已应物辟此幽关。义海淼其无源。词峰峻而难仰。异方秀杰同禀亲承笔记玄章并行于世。余以不敏妄忝吹嘘。受旨证文偶兹嘉会。敢录时事贻诸后毗。胜范鸿因无泯来际。