English
English version: Therefore, it (the quality of being heard) is uncertain. Because sound can be measured like a pot, it is said that sound is impermanent. Because sound can be measured like space, it is said that sound is permanent. Regarding 'non-common', for example, saying that sound is permanent because it is 'audible'. Both the categories of permanent and impermanent are separate from this reason (audibility), because there is nothing else besides permanent and impermanent. Therefore, this is a reason for doubt. What exactly is this 'audibility' like? That which exists in a portion of the similar class (things that are the same as the thesis) and exists universally in the dissimilar class (things that are different from the thesis), for example, saying that sound is not produced by effort and uninterrupted action, therefore it is impermanent. Here, 'not produced by effort and uninterrupted action' is the thesis, with lightning and space etc. as the similar class. This 'impermanence' exists in lightning etc., but does not exist in space etc. 'Not produced by effort and uninterrupted action' is the thesis, with pots etc. as the dissimilar class, and it exists universally in pots etc. This reason (impermanence), because lightning and pots etc. have the same attribute, is also uncertain. Because sound can be impermanent like a pot, it is produced by effort and uninterrupted action; because sound can be impermanent like lightning, it is not produced by effort and uninterrupted action. That which exists in a portion of the dissimilar class and exists universally in the similar class, for example, establishing the thesis that sound is produced by effort and uninterrupted action because it is impermanent. 'Produced by effort and uninterrupted action' is the thesis, with pots etc. as the similar class, and its 'impermanence' exists universally in pots etc. With lightning and space etc. as the dissimilar class, its 'impermanence' exists in a portion of them, such as lightning, but does not exist in space etc. Therefore, as before, this is also uncertain. That which exists in a portion of both the similar and dissimilar classes, for example, saying that sound is permanent because it has no material obstruction. Here, 'permanent' is the thesis, with space (虚空) and atoms (极微) etc. as the similar class, and 'the quality of having no material obstruction' exists in space etc., but does not exist in atoms etc. With pots and pleasure etc. as the dissimilar class, 'the quality of having no material obstruction' exists in pleasure etc., but does not exist in pots etc. Therefore, this reason (the quality of having no material obstruction), because pleasure and space have the same attribute, is also called uncertain. Contradictory determination, for example, establishing the thesis that sound is impermanent because it is 'produced', like a pot. Someone establishes the thesis that sound is permanent because it is 'audible', like the essence of sound. Both of these are reasons for doubt, so both are called uncertain. There are four kinds of contradiction, namely, the contradictory reason of the nature of the dharma (法), the contradictory reason of the difference of the dharma, the contradictory reason of the self-nature of the subject (有法), the contradictory reason of the difference of the subject, etc. Here, the contradictory reason of the self-nature of the dharma, for example, saying that sound is permanent because it is 'produced', or because it is produced by effort and uninterrupted action. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
所发性故。此因唯于异品中有。是故相违。法差别相违因者。如说眼等必为他用。积聚性故。如卧具等。此因如能成立眼等必为他用。如是亦能成立所立法差别相违积聚他用。诸卧具等为积聚他所受用故。有法自相相违因者。如说有性非实非德非业。有一实故。有德业故。如同异性。此因如能成遮实等。如是亦能成遮有性。俱决定故。有法差别相违因者。如即此因即于前宗有法差别作有缘性。亦能成立与此相违作非有缘性。如遮实等。俱决定故。已说似因。当说似喻。 似同法喻有其五种。一能立法不成。二所立法不成。三俱不成。四无合。五倒合。似异法喻亦有五种。一所立不遣。二能立不遣。三俱不遣。四不离。五倒离。能立法不成者。如说声常。无质碍故。诸无质碍见。彼是常犹如极微。然彼极微所成立法常性是有。能成立法无质碍无。以诸极微质碍性故。所立法不成者。谓说如觉。然一切觉能成立法无质碍有。所成立法常住性无。以一切觉皆无常故。俱不成者。复有二种。有及非有。若言如瓶。有俱不成。若说如空。对无空论。无俱不成。无合者。谓于是处无有配合。但于瓶等。双现能立所立二法。如言于瓶见所作性及无常性。倒合者。谓应说言诸所作者皆是无常。而倒说言诸无常者皆是所作。如是名 现代汉语译本 因为这是所发之性。这个‘因’只在不同的类别中存在。因此，这是相违的。‘法差别相违因’的例子是，比如我们说眼睛等必然是被其他事物所使用的，因为它们是积聚性的，就像卧具等一样。这个‘因’既能成立眼睛等必然是被其他事物所使用，也能成立与所立法不同的相违之处，即积聚性的事物是被其他事物所使用的。因为卧具等是被积聚起来供他人使用的。‘有法自相相违因’的例子是，比如我们说‘有性’不是‘实’（dravya，实体），不是‘德’（guna，性质），也不是‘业’（karma，活动），因为它具有‘一实’的属性，具有‘德’和‘业’的属性，就像‘同异性’一样。这个‘因’既能成立遮止‘实’等，也能成立遮止‘有性’，因为两者都是确定的。‘有法差别相违因’的例子是，比如这个‘因’在之前的宗派中，对于‘有法’的差别，可以作为‘有缘性’，也能成立与此相违的‘非有缘性’，就像遮止‘实’等一样，因为两者都是确定的。以上已经说明了‘似因’，下面将要说明‘似喻’。 ‘似同法喻’有五种：一、能立法不成；二、所立法不成；三、俱不成；四、无合；五、倒合。‘似异法喻’也有五种：一、所立不遣；二、能立不遣；三、俱不遣；四、不离；五、倒离。‘能立法不成’的例子是，比如我们说声音是常住的，因为它没有质碍。那些没有质碍的东西，我们看到它们是常住的，就像极微（paramanu，最小的物质单位）一样。然而，那个极微所成立的法，即常住性是存在的，但是能成立的法，即没有质碍是不存在的，因为所有的极微都具有质碍性。‘所立法不成’的例子是，比如我们说就像感觉（觉，jnana）一样。然而，一切感觉所成立的法，即没有质碍是存在的，但是所成立的法，即常住性是不存在的，因为一切感觉都是无常的。‘俱不成’有两种：有和非有。如果说就像瓶子一样，那么就是‘有俱不成’。如果说就像虚空一样，那么就是针对‘无空论’的‘无俱不成’。‘无合’是指在某个地方没有配合，只是在瓶子等事物上，同时显现了能立和所立两种法。比如我们说在瓶子上看到了所作性和无常性。‘倒合’是指应该说‘凡是所作的都是无常的’，却倒过来说‘凡是无常的都是所作的’，这就是所谓的倒合。
English
English version Because this is the nature of being produced. This 'reason' exists only in different categories. Therefore, it is contradictory. An example of 'contradictory reason due to difference in property' is, for example, we say that eyes, etc., must be used by other things because they are accumulative, like bedding, etc. This 'reason' can both establish that eyes, etc., must be used by other things, and also establish the contradiction different from the property to be established, that is, accumulative things are used by other things. Because bedding, etc., are accumulated for others to use. An example of 'contradictory reason due to the self-nature of the subject' is, for example, we say that 'existence' is not 'substance' (dravya), not 'quality' (guna), and not 'action' (karma), because it has the attribute of 'one substance', and has the attributes of 'quality' and 'action', just like 'sameness and difference'. This 'reason' can both establish the negation of 'substance', etc., and also establish the negation of 'existence', because both are definite. An example of 'contradictory reason due to the difference in the subject' is, for example, this 'reason', in the previous school, for the difference in 'subject', can be taken as 'having a connection', and can also establish the 'not having a connection' that contradicts this, just like negating 'substance', etc., because both are definite. The 'fallacious reason' has been explained above, and the 'fallacious example' will be explained below. There are five types of 'fallacious example of similarity': 1. The probans is unestablished; 2. The probandum is unestablished; 3. Both are unestablished; 4. No concomitance; 5. Inverted concomitance. There are also five types of 'fallacious example of dissimilarity': 1. The probandum is not excluded; 2. The probans is not excluded; 3. Both are not excluded; 4. No exclusion; 5. Inverted exclusion. An example of 'the probans is unestablished' is, for example, we say that sound is permanent because it has no obstruction. Those things that have no obstruction, we see that they are permanent, like atoms (paramanu). However, the property established by that atom, that is, permanence, exists, but the probans, that is, having no obstruction, does not exist, because all atoms have obstruction. An example of 'the probandum is unestablished' is, for example, we say like sensation (jnana). However, the probans established by all sensations, that is, having no obstruction, exists, but the probandum, that is, permanence, does not exist, because all sensations are impermanent. There are two types of 'both are unestablished': existence and non-existence. If we say like a pot, then it is 'existence both are unestablished'. If we say like space, then it is 'non-existence both are unestablished' in response to the 'theory of no space'. 'No concomitance' refers to a place where there is no coordination, only the probans and the probandum both appear simultaneously in things like pots. For example, we say that we see the property of being produced and the property of being impermanent in a pot. 'Inverted concomitance' refers to saying 'whatever is produced is impermanent' should be said, but instead it is said 'whatever is impermanent is produced', this is what is called inverted concomitance. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 似同法喻品。
Chinese
似异法中。所立不遣者。且如有言诸无常者见彼质碍。譬如极微。由于极微所成立法常性不遣。彼立极微是常性故。能成立法无质碍无。能立不遣者。谓说如业。但遣所立。不遣能立。彼说诸业无质碍故。俱不遣者。对彼有论。说如虚空。由彼虚空不遣常性无质碍性。以说虚空是常性故。无质碍故。不离者。谓说如瓶见无常性。有质碍性。倒离者。谓如说言诸质碍者皆是无常。如是等似宗因喻言。非正能立。 复次为自开悟。当知唯有现比二量。此中。现量谓无分别。若有正智于色等义离名种等所有分别。现现别转。故名现量。言比量者。谓藉众相而观于义。相有三种。如前已说。由彼为因。于所比义有正智生。了知有火或无常等。是名比量。于二量中即智名果。是证相故。如有作用而显现故。亦名为量。 有分别智。于义异转。名似现量。谓诸有智了瓶衣等分别而生。由彼于义不以自相为境界故。名似现量。若似因智为先所起诸似义智。名似比量。似因多种。如先已说。用彼为因。于似所比诸有智生。不能正解名似比量。 复次若正显示能立过失。说名能破。谓初能立缺减过性。立宗过性。不成立性。不定因性。相违因性及喻过性。显示此言开晓问者。故名能破。若不实显 现代汉语译本： ‘似同法喻品’。 在‘似异法’中，对于所建立的论点不予否定的情况：例如，如果有人说一切‘无常’的事物都具有‘质碍’（可以理解为物理阻碍或局限性），就像‘极微’（物质的最小单位）。由于‘极微’所成立的法的‘常性’（永恒不变的性质）不被否定，因为他们认为‘极微’是‘常性’的，所以能够成立的法是‘无质碍’的。对于能够成立的论点不予否定的情况，比如谈论‘业’（karma）。只是否定所要建立的论点，而不否定能够成立论点。他们说诸‘业’没有‘质碍’的缘故。对于两者都不否定的情况，针对那些论点，比如谈论‘虚空’。由于他们不否定‘虚空’的‘常性’和‘无质碍性’，因为他们说‘虚空’是‘常性’的，并且没有‘质碍’。不相离的情况，比如谈论‘瓶子’，认为它具有‘无常性’和‘有质碍性’。倒离的情况，比如这样说：凡是有‘质碍’的事物都是‘无常’的。像这些‘似宗’、‘似因’、‘似喻’的言论，都不是真正的能成立的论证。 其次，为了自我开悟，应当知道只有‘现量’（perception）和‘比量’（inference）这两种量（pramana，认识的工具）。这里，‘现量’指的是没有分别的认知。如果具有正确的智慧，对于色等事物，远离名称、种类等所有的分别，直接而清晰地显现，因此称为‘现量’。所谓‘比量’，指的是通过各种相（特征、标志）来观察事物的意义。相有三种，如前所述。通过这些相作为原因（因），对于所要比较的事物产生正确的智慧，从而了解有火或者无常等等，这称为‘比量’。在这两种量中，智慧本身就是结果（果），因为它能够证明事物的真相。就像具有作用而显现一样，因此也称为‘量’。 有分别的智慧，对于事物的意义产生不同的认知，这称为‘似现量’（fallacious perception）。比如，那些通过分别瓶子、衣服等而产生的智慧。由于它们对于事物的认知不是以事物自身的真实相状为境界，因此称为‘似现量’。如果以‘似因’（fallacious reason）的智慧为先导而产生的各种‘似义’（fallacious meaning）的智慧，就称为‘似比量’（fallacious inference）。‘似因’有很多种，如前所述。用这些‘似因’作为原因，对于‘似所比’（fallacious object of inference）的事物产生各种智慧，但不能正确理解，这称为‘似比量’。 其次，如果能够正确地揭示能成立的论证的过失，就称为‘能破’（refutation）。也就是揭示最初的能立论证的‘缺减过性’（deficient property）、‘立宗过性’（thesis fallacy）、‘不成立性’（unestablished property）、‘不定因性’（uncertain reason）、‘相违因性’（contradictory reason）以及‘喻过性’（example fallacy）。揭示这些过失能够启发和开导提问者，因此称为‘能破’。如果不真实地揭示过失，