Chinese
大正藏第 32 册 No. 1630 因明入正理论 No. 1630 因明入正理论一卷 商羯罗主菩萨造 三藏法师玄奘奉 诏译 能立与能破 及似唯悟他 现量与比量 及似唯自悟 如是总摄诸论要义。此中宗等多言名为能立。由宗因喻多言。开示诸有问者未了义故。此中宗者。谓极成有法极成能别差别为性。随自乐为所成立性。是名为宗。如有成立声是无常。 因有三相。何等为三。谓遍是宗法性。同品定有性。异品遍无性。云何名为同品异品。谓所立法均等义品。说名同品。如立无常瓶等无常。是名同品。异品者。谓于是处无其所立。若有是常见非所作。如虚空等。此中所作性或勤勇无间所发性遍是宗法性。同品定有性。异品遍无性。是无常等因。 喻有二种。一者同法。二者异法。同法者若于是处显因同品决定有性。谓若所作见彼无常。譬如瓶等。异法者若于是处说所立无。因遍非有。谓若是常见。非所作如虚空等。此中常言表非无常。非所作言表无所作。如有非有说名非有。 已说宗等如是多言。开悟他时。说名能立。如说声无常者是立宗言。所作性故者是宗法言。若是所作见彼无常。如瓶等者是随同品言。若是其常见非所 现代汉语译本 大正藏第 32 册 No. 1630 《因明入正理论》 No. 1630 《因明入正理论》一卷 商羯罗主菩萨 造 三藏法师玄奘 奉 诏译 能立与能破，及似唯悟他； 现量与比量，及似唯自悟。 如是总摄诸论要义。此中宗等多言名为能立。由宗、因、喻多言，开示诸有问者未了义故。此中宗者，谓极成有法、极成能别差别为性，随自乐为所成立性，是名为宗。如有成立声是无常。 因有三相。何等为三？谓遍是宗法性、同品定有性、异品遍无性。云何名为同品异品？谓所立法均等义品，说名同品。如立无常，瓶等无常，是名同品。异品者，谓于是处无其所立。若有是常见非所作，如虚空等。此中所作性或勤勇无间所发性遍是宗法性、同品定有性、异品遍无性，是无常等因。 喻有二种。一者同法，二者异法。同法者，若于是处显因同品决定有性，谓若所作见彼无常，譬如瓶等。异法者，若于是处说所立无，因遍非有，谓若是常见，非所作，如虚空等。此中常言表非无常，非所作言表无所作。如有非有，说名非有。 已说宗等如是多言，开悟他时，说名能立。如说‘声无常’者是立宗言，‘所作性故’者是宗法言，‘若是所作见彼无常，如瓶等’者是随同品言，‘若是其常见非所作’
English
English version T32 No. 1630 *Nyāyapraveśa* No. 1630 *Nyāyapraveśa* (Introduction to Logic) in one fascicle Composed by Bodhisattva Śaṅkarasvāmin (商羯罗主) Translated under imperial order by Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang (玄奘) Establishing and refuting, and seeming [reasoning] only enlighten others; Perception and inference, and seeming [knowledge] only enlighten oneself. Thus, [this text] summarizes the essential meanings of various treatises. Here, 'thesis' (宗) and other statements are called 'establishing' (能立). Because the thesis, reason (因), and example (喻) are stated, they reveal the uncomprehended meaning to those who ask. Here, 'thesis' refers to the nature of being established as having a property that is extremely well-known to the possessor of the property and is extremely well-known as distinguishing. It is the nature of being established according to one's own preference. This is called 'thesis.' For example, establishing that sound is impermanent. A reason has three characteristics. What are the three? They are: pervading the property of the thesis, definitely existing in similar instances, and being entirely absent in dissimilar instances. What are called 'similar instances' (同品) and 'dissimilar instances' (异品)? 'Similar instances' are those instances where the property to be established is equally present. For example, establishing impermanence, impermanence is present in things like a pot; this is called a 'similar instance.' 'Dissimilar instances' are those places where the property to be established is absent. If something is permanent and not produced, like space (虚空). Here, being produced (所作性) or being produced immediately by effort (勤勇无间所发性) pervades the property of the thesis, definitely exists in similar instances, and is entirely absent in dissimilar instances; this is the reason for impermanence and so on. There are two types of examples: one is 'similarity example' (同法), and the other is 'dissimilarity example' (异法). A 'similarity example' is where the reason is shown to definitely exist in similar instances. For example, 'Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot.' A 'dissimilarity example' is where it is stated that where the property to be established is absent, the reason is entirely absent. For example, 'Whatever is permanent is not produced, like space.' Here, 'permanent' indicates 'not impermanent,' and 'not produced' indicates 'without production.' If there is non-existence, it is called 'non-existence.' Having explained the thesis and other such statements, when enlightening others, it is called 'establishing.' For example, saying 'sound is impermanent' is a statement of the thesis; 'because it is produced' is a statement of the property of the thesis; 'whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot' is a statement following similar instances; 'whatever is permanent is not produced.' --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
作。如虚空者是远离言。唯此三分说名能立。 虽乐成立由与现量等相违故。名似立宗。谓现量相违。比量相违。自教相违。世间相违。自语相违。能别不极成。所别不极成。俱不极成。相符极成。此中现量相违者。如说声非所闻。比量相违者。如说瓶等是常。自教相违者。如胜论师立声为常。世间相违者。如说怀兔非月有故。又如说言人顶骨净。众生分故。犹如螺贝。自语相违者。如言我母是其石女。能别不极成者。如佛弟子对数论师立声灭坏。所别不极成者。如数论师对佛弟子说我是思。俱不极成者。如胜论师对佛弟子立我以为和合因缘。相符极成者。如说声是所闻。如是多言。是遣诸法自相门故。不容成故。立无果故。名似立宗过已说似宗。当说似因。不成不定及与相违。是名似因。 不成有四。一两俱不成。二随一不成。三犹豫不成。四所依不成。如成立声为无常等若言是眼所见性故。两俱不成。所作性故对声显论。随一不成。于雾等性起疑惑时。为成大种和合火有而有所说。犹豫不成。虚空实有。德所依故。对无空论所依不成。 不定有六。一共。二不共。三同品一分转异品遍转。四异品一分转同品遍转。五俱品一分转。六相违决定。此中共者。如言声常所量性故。常无常品皆共此因。 现代汉语译本：就像虚空一样，是远离言语的。只有这三个部分可以被称为能立（sādhanā，论证）。 虽然乐于成立，但由于与现量（pratyakṣa，直接感知）等相违背，所以被称为似立宗（siddhānta，错误的论证）。例如，与现量相违背，如说声音不是所闻。与比量（anumāna，推论）相违背，如说瓶子等是常。与自教相违背，如胜论师（Vaiśeṣika，印度哲学流派）立声音为常。与世间相违背，如说怀有兔子的不是月亮。又如说人的头顶骨是清净的，因为是众生的一部分，就像螺贝一样。与自语相违背，如说‘我的母亲是石女’。能别不极成，如佛弟子对数论师（Sāṃkhya，印度哲学流派）立声音灭坏。所别不极成，如数论师对佛弟子说‘我是思’。俱不极成，如胜论师对佛弟子立‘我’以为和合因缘。相符极成，如说声音是所闻。像这样多说，是为了遣除诸法自相的缘故，不容许成立的缘故，立了也没有结果的缘故，被称为似立宗的过失。已经说了似宗，接下来应当说似因（hetu，错误的理由）。不成（asiddha，未确立），不定（anaikāntika，不确定）以及相违（viruddha，矛盾），这些被称为似因。 不成有四种：一、两俱不成，二、随一不成，三、犹豫不成，四、所依不成。例如，成立声音为无常等，如果说‘因为是眼睛所见之性’，这就是两俱不成。因为是所作性，对声显论（Śabdavāda，关于声音的论述）来说，这就是随一不成。在对雾等性质产生疑惑时，为了成立大种（mahābhūta，基本元素）和合而有火，而有所说，这就是犹豫不成。虚空是真实存在的，因为是德（guṇa，性质）所依，对无空论来说，这就是所依不成。 不定有六种：一、共（sādhāraṇa，共通），二、不共（asādhāraṇa，不共通），三、同品（sapakṣa，相似例子）一分转异品（vipakṣa，相异例子）遍转，四、异品一分转同品遍转，五、俱品一分转，六、相违决定（viruddhāvyabhicārin，矛盾的确定）。这里所说的共，例如说‘声音是常，因为是所量性’，常和无常的品类都共同具有这个因。
English
English version: Like the void, it is remote from words. Only these three parts are called sādhanā (establishment). Although delighting in establishing, because it contradicts direct perception (pratyakṣa) and so on, it is called a fallacious thesis (siddhānta). For example, contradicting direct perception, such as saying that sound is not heard. Contradicting inference (anumāna), such as saying that pots and so on are permanent. Contradicting one's own doctrine, such as the Vaiśeṣika (Indian philosophical school) asserting that sound is permanent. Contradicting the world, such as saying that the moon does not have a rabbit. Also, such as saying that the human skull is pure because it is a part of a living being, like a conch shell. Contradicting one's own words, such as saying 'My mother is a barren woman.' The qualifier is not established for both, such as a Buddhist disciple asserting to a Sāṃkhya (Indian philosophical school) that sound is destructible. The qualified is not established for both, such as a Sāṃkhya saying to a Buddhist disciple 'I am thought.' Neither is established for both, such as a Vaiśeṣika asserting to a Buddhist disciple that 'I' is the cause of combination. The congruent is established for both, such as saying that sound is heard. Speaking in this way is for the sake of eliminating the self-characteristics of all dharmas, because it is not permissible to establish, and because establishing it is fruitless, it is called the fault of a fallacious thesis. Having spoken of fallacious theses, we should now speak of fallacious reasons (hetu). Unestablished (asiddha), uncertain (anaikāntika), and contradictory (viruddha) are called fallacious reasons. There are four types of unestablished reasons: 1. Unestablished for both, 2. Unestablished for either one, 3. Uncertain due to doubt, 4. The substratum is unestablished. For example, in establishing that sound is impermanent, if one says 'Because it is the nature of being seen by the eye,' this is unestablished for both. Because it is the nature of being produced, for the Śabdavāda (doctrine of sound), this is unestablished for either one. When doubt arises about the nature of mist and so on, in order to establish that fire exists due to the combination of the great elements (mahābhūta), if something is said, this is uncertain due to doubt. Space is truly existent, because it is the substratum of qualities (guṇa), for the doctrine of non-space, this is the substratum being unestablished. There are six types of uncertain reasons: 1. Common (sādhāraṇa), 2. Uncommon (asādhāraṇa), 3. Present in a part of the similar instances (sapakṣa) and pervasive in the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa), 4. Present in a part of the dissimilar instances and pervasive in the similar instances, 5. Present in a part of both instances, 6. Contradictory determination (viruddhāvyabhicārin). Here, the common is, for example, saying 'Sound is permanent because it is measurable,' both permanent and impermanent categories share this reason. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese
是故不定。为如瓶等所量性故声是无常。为如空等所量性故声是其常。言不共者。如说声常。所闻性故。常无常品皆离此因。常无常外余非有故。是犹豫因。此所闻性其犹何等。同品一分转异品遍转者。如说声非勤勇无间所发无常性故。此中非勤勇无间所发宗。以电空等为其同品。此无常性于电等有。于空等无。非勤勇无间所发宗。以瓶等为异品。于彼遍有。此因以电瓶等为同法故。亦是不定。为如瓶等无常性故。彼是勤勇无间所发。为如电等无常性故。彼非勤勇无间所发。异品一分转同品遍转者。如立宗言声是勤勇无间所发。无常性故。勤勇无间所发宗。以瓶等为同品。其无常性于此遍有。以电空等为异品。于彼一分电等是有。空等是无。是故如前亦为不定。俱品一分转者。如说声常。无质碍故。此中常宗。以虚空极微等为同品。无质碍性于虚空等有。于极微等无。以瓶乐等为异品。于乐等有。于瓶等无。是故此因以乐以空为同法故。亦名不定。相违决定者。如立宗言声是无常。所作性故。譬如瓶等。有立声常。所闻性故。譬如声性。此二皆是犹豫因。故俱名不定。 相违有四。谓法自性相违因。法差别相违因。有法自相相违因。有法差别相违因等。此中。法自相相违因者。如说声常。所作性故。或勤勇无间 现代汉语译本：因此，这（所闻性）是不确定的。因为声音可以像瓶子一样被衡量，所以说声音是无常的。因为声音可以像虚空一样被衡量，所以说声音是常。说到‘不共’，例如说声音是常，因为它是‘所闻性’。常和无常的范畴都脱离了这个原因（所闻性），因为除了常和无常之外没有其他可能。所以这是一个犹豫因。这个‘所闻性’到底像什么呢？ 同品（与宗相同的事物）一部分有，异品（与宗不同的事物）普遍有，例如说声音不是由努力和不间断的行为产生的，所以是无常的。这里，‘非勤勇无间所发’作为宗，以闪电和虚空等作为同品。这个‘无常性’在闪电等事物上有，在虚空等事物上没有。‘非勤勇无间所发’作为宗，以瓶子等作为异品，在瓶子等事物上普遍存在。这个原因（无常性）因为闪电和瓶子等具有相同的属性，所以也是不确定的。因为声音可以像瓶子一样是无常的，所以它是努力和不间断的行为产生的；因为声音可以像闪电一样是无常的，所以它不是努力和不间断的行为产生的。 异品一部分有，同品普遍有，例如立宗说声音是由努力和不间断的行为产生的，因为它是无常的。‘勤勇无间所发’作为宗，以瓶子等作为同品，其‘无常性’在瓶子等事物上普遍存在。以闪电和虚空等作为异品，其‘无常性’在闪电等事物上存在，在虚空等事物上不存在。因此，像前面一样，这也是不确定的。 同品和异品一部分有，例如说声音是常，因为它没有物质阻碍。这里，‘常’作为宗，以虚空和极微等作为同品，‘无质碍性’在虚空等事物上有，在极微等事物上没有。以瓶子和快乐等作为异品，‘无质碍性’在快乐等事物上有，在瓶子等事物上没有。因此，这个原因（无质碍性）因为快乐和虚空具有相同的属性，所以也称为不确定。 相违决定，例如立宗说声音是无常的，因为它是‘所作性’，就像瓶子一样。有人立宗说声音是常的，因为它是‘所闻性’，就像声音的本质一样。这两种都是犹豫因，所以都称为不确定。 相违有四种，即法自性相违因、法差别相违因、有法自相相违因、有法差别相违因等。这里，法自相相违因，例如说声音是常，因为它是‘所作性’，或者是由努力和不间断的行为产生的。